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Abstract 
A shortcoming is identified with respect to the ability of exemplar-based 
connectionist models of category learning to offer accounts of learning about stimuli 
with variable dimensionality. Models which may simulate these tasks, such as the 
configural-cue network (Gluck & Bower, 1988b), appear to be unable to accurately 
simulate certain data well simulated by exemplar-based models such as ALCOVE 
(Kruschke, 1992). 
A task in which the advantage of ALCOVE is exemplified is the prediction of 
human learning rates on the six category structures tested by Shepard, Hovland, and 
Jenkins (1961). The ability of ALCOVE to simulate the observed order of difficulty 
depends on its incorporation of selective attention processes (Nosofsky, Gluck, 
Palmeri, McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994). This thesis focuses on developing configural- 
cue network models which incorporate these processes. 
Informed by an information-theoretic approach to modelling the 
implementation of selective attention using a configural-cue representation, five 
connectionist models are developed. Each is capable of predicting the order of 
difficulty reported by Shepard et al. (1961). Two models employ a modular structure, 
but analysis suggests that these may lack much of the functionality of the basic 
configural-cue network. The remaining three incorporate dimensional attention 
schemes. These models appear to offer superior generalisability in relation to the 
simulation of learning about variable dimensionality stimuli. 
This generalisability is examined by applying a variant of one of these 
dimensional attention models, to data collected by Kruschke (1996a) on the inverse 
base-rate effect and base-rate neglect. The model provides a qualitative fit to this data. 
The success of these configural-cue models on these two tasks, only 
successfully modelled previously using two distinct types of representation, indicates 
that the approach has some potential for further applications. Differences between the 
models applied, however, indicates that more sophisticated conceptions of the attention 
process may be required to allow further generalisability. 
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1.1 Prolegomenon 
The experimental investigation of category learning may be regarded as a 
continuation of research begun in the early history of psychology into ‘associative 
learning’. The methods employed in the type of category learning experiments discussed in 
this thesis generally extend from the basic instrumental learning paradigm. 
In instrumental learning experiments an animal (e.g. a dog) only gets reinforced 
(e.g. given food) if they produce the ‘correct’ behaviour (e.g. press lever) in the presence 
(or following presentation) of a particular stimulus (e.g. a bell ring). The dog may only get 
food ifthey press the lever and the bell has just rung. The expected pattern is that the 
appropriate stimulus (bell), becomes a discriminative stimulus, in that it gains control over 
the response (press lever). The animal may be said to have learned that if it hears the bell 
and presses the lever it will get food. It is discriminative in that if another stimulus is 
presented during the experiment (e.g. a flashing light) and is only followed by 
reinforcement if a different response is produced, (e.g. barking), then the light’s presence 
enables discrimination between types of event which reward barking, and types of event 
which reward pressing the lever. 
These two types are, broadly speaking, categories. Adding other stimuli to the 
training, with reinforcement given if and only if the ‘correct’ response (from barking or 
lever pressing) is produced, will increase the membership of these categories. While this 
may make them look more like ‘proper’ categories and less like stimulus-response chains, 
the distinction, at this point, is arbitrary. The category is defined as consisting of those 
stimuli associated with a particular rewarded response. It could also be described as the set 
of stimulus-response pathways which end at the response (e.g. barking), and begin at the 
stimuli positively associated with rewarded occurrences of the response. 
To learn about learning, the basic paradigm may be extended in a variety of ways. 
One might, for example, alter aspects of the task to see if variations in the task produce 
reliable variations in the learning rate. This may be in terms of the rates at which errors are 
made given each variant of the task. This measure addresses the idea of task difficulty. The 
difference in difficulty between one task and another is a function of the differences 
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between the tasks and the nature of the system learning the task. A theory about the 
difference between the difficulty of two tasks is a theory about what is relevant to the 
cognitive system upon which task learning or performance depends. 
Other experiments attempt to probe the nature of the knowledge which supports 
performance on a task. These experiments might involve the use of concurrent learning 
tasks. Here, following training on one task, the participants may be expected to learn a 
different task to gauge what effect existing knowledge has on performance of a new task. 
Alternatively, insights into the way in which the knowledge required for task competence 
is stored or represented may be gained by presenting experimental participants with new 
stimuli, in order to examine how they deploy or generalise existing knowledge to the new 
stimuli. 
~ 
The categorisation experiments, which are the principal focus of this thesis, do not 
generally involve any specific methods of reinforcement. Feedback is usually in the form 
of some representation of the experimenter-defined correct response, for example, the 
category label. The basic models of associative learning developed to describe animal 
learning data, however, appear to have a high level of applicability to descriptions of 
human category learning. Consequently, similar models of learning are used in animal 
learning research and the study of human category learning. The connectionist approach to 
simulating category learning is the clearest example of this associationist heritage. 
Connectionist models of category learning generally incorporate multiple theories 
about the communication processes and slmctures that might underlie learning and 
performance in categorisation tasks. These theories are implemented in terms of 1) rules 
that describe the way in which the network‘s connections alter, 2) models describing what 
it is about stimuli which get represented in the learning process, and 3) methods of 
determining the network‘s output. 
These various theories are usually ‘combined’ to allow a model to simulate data 
from a particular experiment. Having been so developed, the model may be applied to 
related tasks, in order to evaluate the ability of the model to generalise its particular mode 
of description across tasks. 
Attempts to generalise connectionist models to other tasks may inform 
developments of the model, or the theoretical assumptions or components underlying the 
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model. Obviously, the ability of a model, developed to account for one set of data, to 
simulate another set depends, to a great extent, on the similarity of the two tasks. The 
characteristics of connectionist models, like those of other kinds of model, depend largely 
on the experiments they are designed to represent. 
One possible advantage of connectionist models over other modelling approaches 
is that, in some cases, the multiple theories they incorporate may be changed independently 
of one another. Problems with simulating data from a new experiment, for example, may 
be rectified by altering the way in which the stimuli involved in the experiment are 
represented by the model. The learning rule used may be the same in the two models. 
This allows a certain amount of parsimony when it comes to model design and 
alteration, in that the functional components of the model may be systematically tested and 
evaluated in relation to one another. It can, however, lead to a high level of complexity in 
interpreting exactly which parts of the model are essential to its ability to simulate data. 
The components of these models are highly interactive in nature. The more components 
one introduces to a model, the less straightfonvard it is to identify what exactly it is about 
the model that is responsible for its successes and failures. 
Alterations made to allow a model to simulate data from another experiment, 
however, should not necessarily prevent it from being able to simulate the data for which it 
was originally developed. If they do, the modifications should be accompanied by some 
theory as to why different models are required to simulate performance on the different 
tasks. Modifications to models should increase their generalisability, or should involve 
some principled account as to why the two experiments cannot be explained in terms of the 
same model. A failure to offer this generalisability, or a principled account as to why such 
a general model may be impossible, identifies a worthwhile challenge for research. 
An example of the kind of challenge described above provides the main direction 
for the research described in this thesis. Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins’ (1961) 
investigation of category learning rates has turned out to be a particularly diagnostic test 
for models of category learning. It has also resulted in a situation in which the only models 
which are currently capable of simulating their findings are apparently incapable of being 
able to simulate fairly basic data from other categorisation and associative learning tasks. 
No psychological theory has been proposed as to why this is the case. 
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Shepard et al.’s (1961) study (partially replicated by Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, 
McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994) involved examining the rates at which particular 
experimenter defined category structures were learned by human participants. The 
structures used the same stimuli; eight objects which could be differentiated from one 
another on the basis of variation in three dimensions. Each structure had two categories, 
containing four of the objects each. The tasks differed from one another in terms of the 
way in which the objects were divided into two groups. 
The category structures used in the experiments will be described in detail in 
chapter 2. Shepard et al. (1961) however, noted systematic differences between the rates at 
which each type of structure was learnt. The order of difficulty for the structures could not 
be accounted for, at the time, by any model of associative learning, incorporating any 
model of stimulus representation. These authors proposed that it might be accounted for by 
a particular model of stimulus representation, now known as the exemplar model. This 
model, however, would require some secondary learning process, which they referred to as 
‘abstraction’ or ‘selective attention’. 
They suggested such a process may allow the learning process to take advantage of 
the fact that some of the tasks had irrelevant dimensions. Task difficulty could be 
described as being inversely proportional to the number of dimensions which were 
irrelevant to perfect performance. Task difficulty described only in terms of associative 
relationships obtaining between stimulus representations and the category labels would not 
be sufficient. 
A formal model of the way in which selective attention might allow an exemplar 
based model of category learning to account for Shepard et al.’s data was presented in 
1984, in the form of the generalized (sic.) context model (or GCM) (Nosofsky, 1984, 
1986). In 1992, a connectionist implementation of the GCM was developed capable of 
representing selective attention as dependent on a secondary learning process (Kruschke, 
1992). This model provided quantitative fits to learning data produced in Nosofsky et al’s 
(1994) replication of Shepard et al’s (1961) experiment which were superior to those 
produced by other models of category learning. 
Despite the success of the exemplar approach on this particular task, the model of 
stimulus representation it employs is difficult to generalise to other tasks. One major 
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weakness is that it is unable to offer any principled, plausible account for experimental 
data relating to learning about stimuli that have different numbers of dimensions or 
components. This prevents it from being able to represent some of the most basic of 
associative learning phenomena. 
This thesis, therefore, attempts to develop connectionist models under the 
constraint that they not only be capable of simulating Shepard et al.’s (1961) data, but that 
they are also able to simulate learning about stimuli with different numbers of dimensions 
or components. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of Shepard et al’s (1961) category 
learning tasks and describes their findings as well as those of Nosofsky et al‘s (1994). The 
diaposticity of the data, with respect to attempts to produce models capable of accounting 
for them, is discussed and reasons for why some models ‘fail’ are described. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the ways in which major components of 
connectionist models of category learning have been developed. The first section describes 
the development and properties of basic learning and choice rules commonly used in these 
models. Their origins in associative learning theory and the early ‘stochastic’ models of 
learning is discussed. The shortcomings of these approaches, in terms of their lack of any 
specific representations of stimuli, are described. 
The second section of chapter 3 provides an overview of various models of 
stimulus representation. The importance of generalisation in any model of learning is 
identified and the way in which this is effected by different models is discussed. The 
configural-cue form of representation is identified as emerging from basic associative 
learning theory as a means of accounting for basic learning phenomena. The origins of the 
exemplar approach in models used to account for psychophysical data is examined, and the 
differences between the assumptions required for its use in category learning and 
psychophysics is explored. The shortcomings of both the basic configural-cue model and 
the basic exemplar approach are described in relation to Shepard et al.’s (1961) findings 
and other observations. 
The third section describes various approaches to the implementation of selective 
attention in connectionist models. Experimental findings suggesting that such a process 
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may be required are described. The implementation of selective attention in the exemplar 
network is described in detail with particular reference to the way in which it facilitates 
successful modelling of Shepard et al.’s findings. Attempts to implement selective 
attention processes using other forms of representation are described. Modular approaches, 
which involve structural organisation of stimulus representations into ‘spatial’ groups, are 
examined in relation to the data they can simulate, and the data they cannot. 
A more recent class of model based on the idea of ‘rapid attention shifts’ 
(Kruschke, 1996a) is also discussed. Its applicability to the simulation of data concerning 
base-rate effects is described in detail as these experiments involve stimuli with different 
numbers of components. Significantly, these are experiments that the exemplar approach 
cannot simulate. 
Chapter 4 deploys an information theoretic analysis of the Shepard et al. (1 961) 
category structures. This approach is used to describe the relationships that obtain between 
a configural-cue model of representation and the category structures. The approach is used 
to develop three augmented configural-cue models. Each provides a way of describing 
learning in terms of the average rate of increase to the transmission rate of a proposed 
channel between spatially organised modules and a decision process. Two of the models 
use ‘modular’ weights to implement some form of selective attention, while a third uses a 
‘dimensional’ model of the process. 
The third model also employs a ‘sequential sampling’ process to represent the rate 
at which the various stimulus representations become active during a learning trial in terms 
of the operation of a Markov process. Selective attention, in this case, operates on 
dimensional sampling probabilities. All three of the models are capable of qualitatively 
simulating the order of task difficulty observed by Shepard et al. and Nosofsky et al. 
(1994). 
In chapter 5 the simple modular models developed in chapter 4 are used to inform 
the design of two connectionist models. These models are also successll in offering a 
qualitative fit to the learning data of Nosofsky et al. (1994). The models appear to have 
numerous shortcomings with respect to their generalisation beyond the task modelled and 
these are described in detail. 
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Chapter 6 focuses on connectionist implementations of the simple dimensional 
attention model proposed in chapter 4. The sequential sampling model offers two distinct 
methods of implementing the dimensional attention process. One of these is based on 
modifymg the sampling probabilities of the dimensions based on a back-propagation of 
error scheme. The second method involves altering weights between dimensions to control 
the sampling probabilities in terms of learnt relationships between the relative relevance of 
dimensions. Models making use of each method are described and tested. A third model 
extends the approach used in the second method to implement a rapid attention shift 
version of the process. All three models produce a qualitative fit to the Nosofsky et al. 
(1994) data. The shortcomings of the models are discussed in detail. These models, 
however, appear to offer superior potential for generalisation to other tasks than the models 
presented in chapter 5. 
Chapter 7 applies a variant of the rapid attention shift model developed in chapter 6 
to the modelling of two experiments investigating base rate effects. The model is capable 
of providing qualitative fits to the experimental data produced by Kruschke (1996a, 
experiments 1 and 3) showing base-rate neglect and the inverse base-rate effect. 
Significantly, exemplar models capable of simulating the difficulty of the Shepard et al. 
(1961) tasks cannot simulate these effects. 
Chapter 8 discusses the extent to which the goals of the thesis, outlined in the first 
section of this chapter, are achieved by the research carried out. The further applicability of 
the models developed and tested in chapters 6 and 7 is also briefly discussed. While these 
models appear to offer ways of addressing the difficulties described in the previous 
section, the research indicates that the apparent flexibility of selective attention is not 
adequately captured. It is speculated that models using a single form of representation may 
be made to emulate the performance of other models, using different representations, by 
the operation of an appropriately specified selective attention process. Further research is 
clearly required into the flexibility with which stimulus information is used by learners to 
inform the development of more generalisable models of category learning. 
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Studv on Catepory Learning Rates. 
2.1 Category structure complexity and subjective difficulty 
The 1961 Psychological Monologue, Learning and Memorization of Classifications 
(Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961), was an account of an exploration of the effect of the 
logical structure of a classification task on the rate at which it could be learnt. The 
investigation was quite broad in scope attempting to address numerous issues including 
transfer of training; mode of stimulus presentation; differences between classification and 
identification; and rule formation. 
Experiment 1, for example, looked at differences in learning rates for each of six 
experimenter defined task types (labelled I, 11,111, IV, V, and VI). It also examined transfer 
of learning between successive repetitions of the same task type using different 
configurations of input, differences in learning rates between classification tasks and 
identification tasks, and the ‘efficiency’ of the rules developed by participants to carry out 
the classification tasks. The second and third experiments continued along these lines but 
explored different representations of the objects to be classified, memorisation of 
classification structures, and the efficiency of rules developed when presented with the 
entire structure at once with category labels attached. 
The estimate regarding the relative difficulty of the six structures depends on the 
model one adopts regarding classification learning. Shepard et al. (1961) used two models 
to predict an order of difficulty. One of these was based on complexity of the rule required 
to determine membership without error. The other was based on a multivariate signal 
processing (McGill, 1954) analysis ofthe tasks. This analysis was interpreted according to 
an assumption that the more dimensions one had to pay attention to, before a reduction of 
the uncertainty regarding the category label to zero was possible, the more difficult the task 
would be (Shepard et al., 1961, appendix). These models will be discussed in more detail 
below and in later chapters but they suggested an ordering of I, 11, (111, IV, V), VI. 
The results obtained, despite certain limitations, were highly influential in that they 
seemed to indicate a relationship between Shepard et al.’s measures of the complexity of 
the task and the difficulty of that task. Models of learning that prevailed in the field, at the 
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time, were based on stimulus generalisation and cue conditioning. These models either 
were incapable, in principle, of carrying out some of the tasks or, because they were not 
‘responsive’ to the kind of complexity information, which seemed to predict difficulty, 
could not accurately simulate the observed difficulty. 
This may be regarded as the basic finding and will be discussed in more detail 
below. The link between the measure of complexity and the difficulty of the task is 
represented throughout the results of the various experiments. The observation of the effect 
was repeated in a partial replication of the research, reported by Nosofsky et al. (1994). 
The limitations of the original research principally involved the low number of 
participants (six in the first experiment, 20 in the second and third) which effectively 
renders the force of the results a product of their consistency across the various 
experiments. The results of individual experiments and what they say about things like 
transfer, different representations of the task structures, and rule formulation are, 
consequently, somewhat less significant. 
Nosofsky et al. (1994) were motivated to overcome the limitations of the Shepard 
et al. procedures, with respect to the basic effect, in order to obtain data rich enough to 
enable quantitative evaluations of more recent models of category learning. Their results 
extended the Shepard et al. (1961) findings by collecting trial-by-trial data enabling 
average learning curves to be developed and the ease of learning for individual patterns to 
be identified. 
2.2 Experimental structure for Nosofsky et aL (1994) 
The experiment requires participants to learn the category assignments of eight, 
three-dimensional stimuli according to one of the six category types. Learning was trial 
and error for a fixed number of blocks or until criterion (whichever occurred first), with the 
participants being shown each object in random order, making their guess as to category 
label and then being given feedback in the form of the actual label. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the six basic category structures. The objects differed from 
one another in terms of independent variation in three dimensions. Each dimension 
consisted of a pair of substitutive features or attributes which, for illustrative purposes, are 
given as big-small, black-white, and triangle-square. The actual stimuli used by Shepard et 
al. (1961) consisted of images containing, at each of three positions, one of two 
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‘thematically related’ pictures (ibid. p.6). Each position represented a dimension such that 
one position might always contain a picture of a nut or a bolt, and another might contain a 
picture of a trumpet or a violin. Nosofsky et al.’s (1994) replication used geometrical 
shapes with lines that filled their interiors. These stimuli varied in terms of their shape 
(square or triangle), whether the internal lines were solid or dotted, and whether the shapes 
were large or small (ibid. p.354). 
The different logical structures, shown in terms of a spatial representation in figure 
2.1, are the six basic structures possible when dividing the eight objects into two mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive classes with four members each. While there are 70 possible 
arrangements of these objects (8!/(4!)’) into two mutually exclusive sets of four there are 
only six basic types. Using the cube representations in figure 2.1, any of the remaining 64 
possible structures can be obtained by rotations and reflections of one of the six cubes. 
These types will be described in more detail below. 
A trial consisted of the participant being shown an object on a screen, being 
required to make a guess regarding its category label and push the appropriate button, and 
then being provided with feedback in the form of the correct category label. A block 
consisted of 16 trials in which each object was presented, in random order, twice. The first 
block was divided into two sub-blocks of 8 trials during which each object was presented, 
in random order, once. In the remaining blocks each object could appear at any two points 
of the sequence. Learning continued until participants had made no errors for four 
consecutive sub-blocks of eight trials, or had completed 25 blocks, whichever occurred 
first. 
Each of the 120 participants learnt two category structures and were informed that 
the second problem was chosen independently of the first. Each pair of tasks occurred 
equally often, with the order balanced. Assignment of dimensions and physical values to 
the logcal structure was randomised for each problem type. 
As with Shepard et al. (1961) the idea was that differences in the rates of learning 
could only be attributable to differences in the category structure. 
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2.2.1 The category structures 
type IV 
type I1 type I11 
type V type VI 
Figure 2.1: Abstract representation of the category structures used in Shepard et al. (1961), 
and Nosofsky et al. (1994). Category assignment given by letter A or B and white spheres 
or black spheres respectively. The binary co-ordinates of each object in the space (q,r,s) are 
shown next to each example object. 
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As can be seen kom the cubes in figure 2.1, type I is a simple filtration task which 
requires knowledge of only one dimensional value (in the case shown, the shape of the 
object) to perfectly predict the category label. A rule for deciding category membership 
might state that if the object is a triangle it belongs in category A (and if it is a square then 
it belongs in category B). 
Type I1 is an example of an XOR or condensation task. Knowledge of the values of 
two dimensions (shape and colour in figure 2.1) is required in order to predict the category 
label. The rule would state that if the object is white and triangular, or black and square, it 
belongs in category A (and if it is white and square or black and triangular then it belongs 
in category B). 
Types 111 to V are somewhat different in that the requirement for knowledge of 
dimensional values may vary dependent on the object. They may be described as rule-plus- 
exception structures, for example in the type V structure all of the triangles except the 
large black triangle are members of category A and all of the squares except for the large 
black square are members of B. The differences between them are in the number of 
partially predictive dimensions involved in the structure. Type V has one such dimension 
(shape), type 111 has two (shape and colour) and type IV has all three. 
There are different rules possible to describe membership but all require, to some 
extent, the involvement of all three dimensions. The rule-plus-exception structure 
described above is one. Another might involve, for the type V structure, the fact that all of 
the small triangles are in A and all of the small squares are in B, otherwise if it is a black 
square or a white triangle, it is in A, and if it is a white square or a black triangle, it 
belongs in B. 
The latter rule is sequential in nature in that one can be certain of category 
membership by just knowing shape if, upon inspecting size one finds that the object is 
small. Half of the time only two dimensions are required. If the object is large then one is 
dealing with the top-half of the structure for type V which, being an XOR problem, 
requires knowledge of both dimensions, neither of which is size, hence all three 
dimensional values will have to be known half of the time. Adopting a rule-plus-exception 
representation requires knowledge of all three dimensions for every object presented in 
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order to determine whether or not it is an exception. The rule may be described fairly 
concisely, however, by stating the rule and enumerating the exceptions. These structures 
are discussed more below. Shepard et al. (1961) suggested that these tasks should be 
harder than the type I1 because they cannot be completely described in terms of the values 
of two dimensions. 
They should, however, be easier than the type VI structure. All three dimensional 
values are required before any object may be classified correctly. A rule for this structure 
may require enumeration of each category member. 
Alternatives are possible but do not seem to occur for experimental participants 
very often. One example from Shepard et al. (1961) involved sequential information. One 
participant stated the rule in terms of how many values had changed between 
presentations. If one value, or all three values change, then the object is a member of the 
other category. This rule emerged only in the transfer experiment where participants had to 
carry out repeated tasks of the same type. Alternatively one may recode the dimensional 
values to produce a parity problem (Nosofsky et al., 1994, note 1). Parity problems will he 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Nosofsky et al. (1994) also investigated the different learning rates at which 
patterns with different logical ‘status’ within the structures were learnt. Objects in types I, 
11, and VI are uninteresting with respect to this in that all objects have an equal logical 
status. This means that no particular object would appear to be any more difficult to 
categorise than any other. They expected that differences would emerge for different 
patterns in the type 111 to V category structures. Some of the stimuli seem to be more 
central to the category than others. Nosofsky et al. (1 994) describe the differences between 
the stimuli in terms of a spatial metaphor and whether they are central, peripheral, or 
exception members. 
A central member, according to Nosofsky et al. (1994), is one that ‘always 
participates in the single-dimensional rule and is never considered an exception, whereas 
peripheral members will sometimes serve as exceptions, depending on which dimension is 
used for the rule.’ (p. 356). Figure 2.2 illustrates the different roles of each object in 
category structures I11 to V. 
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It was expected that central members would be learnt with fewer errors than 
peripheral ones, and that the most errors should be made on exceptional objects (ibid.). The 
reason for this is dependent on the model used to describe the learning and representation 
process. Theories which suggest that responding to a stimulus is affected by the similarity 
of that stimulus to other stimuli, would predict that difficulty is a function of how similar 
an object is to members of its own category and its similarity to members of the other 
category. Central objects are obviously ‘closer’ to the other members of their category than 
penpheral ones, and so their category assignments will be easier to learn. 
This ‘stimulus generalisation’ approach and some of its alternative manifestations 
will be discussed below and in more detail in chapter 3. Another interpretation of the 
difficulty is provided by a rule-based approach. Here, a ‘central’ member would be 
characterised by its ability to participate in more perfectly predictive, two-dimensional 
‘rules’ than the other objects. Figure 2.2 illustrates these relations using arrows to indicate 
the direction of the other member of the ‘redundant’ pair. 
Category A in Type 111 has two central members; object 000 may be a part of the 
perfectly predictive ‘small triangles’ or ‘white triangles’ rule; object 010 may be part of the 
‘white triangles’ or ‘large white’ configural rules. The peripheral members only participate 
in one of these rules each. In type IV the difference is that there is only one central member 
per category. These participate in three perfiitly predictive configural rules. The peripheral 
members, again, participate in just one each. 
For type V the central object of category A falls within two perfectly predictive 
configurations, ‘white triangles’ and ‘small triangles’. The peripheral objects are only 
located within one configural rule each and the exception is not located within any. 
The difference in difficulty may arise from the fact that central members may be 
located in a rule more easily than peripheral or exception members. For type IV the central 
member is located in a rule which just requires the value of any two of the three 
dimensions. For types 111 and V, the situation is slightly more complex. The central 
members are located within rules that require knowledge of two dimensional values but for 
each central member, only two of the three possible configurations are relevant. Peripheral 





reduced to zero. Different peripheral members require different combinations of 
dimensional values. 
type I11 type IV type V 
Figure 2.2: Category structures I11 to V with objects labelled according to Nosofsky et al. 
(1994) classification as central (C), peripheral (P), or exception (E). Arrows indicate the 
direction of the other object in a perfectly predictive configural rule within which the 
object may be located. Category A represented by white spheres, category B by black. 
Note, only arrows for category A are shown. See text for further analysis. 
2.2.2 Results 
The Shepard et al. (1961) study produced a wide array of results consistently 
showing the predicted order of difficulty for the six tasks. The Nosofsky et al. (1994) 
partial replication showed the same order of difficulty at high levels of significance for 
average number of errors and number of trials to criterion. 
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Like Shepard et al. (1961) the replication also noted an overall practice effect 
between the two tasks each participant was required to carry out. The ordering was the 
same for the two problems with the same significance. No significant difference was noted 
between types 111 to V. The data represented in figure 2.3 is based on error averaged across 
the two problems in the Nosofsky et al. (1994) replication. 
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Figure 2.3: Mean probability of correct response per block (16 trials) of learning on each 
ofthe six category types from the Nosofsky et al. (1994) replication. 
With regards to the individual pattern difficulties, Nosofsky et al. (1 994) found the 
predicted order of pattern difficulty in tasks 111 to V. Central members were learnt with 
fewer errors then peripheral ones which were, in turn, easier to learn than exceptions. 
As discussed briefly above, Shepard et al. (1961) explored a variety of tasks 
involving the same basic structures to examine differences in performance. The transfer of 
training between consecutive experiments with the same structure (or rather reflections and 
rotations of the same structure) is one area where data was produced. While interesting in 
seeming to suggest higher order learning processes, the relevance of the data is 
compromised somewhat by the limitations described above, 
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Much of the analysis made by the authors (ibid.) was focussed on the basic effect 
of the difficulty of the task, as a function of its complexity. This relationship was most 
clearly indicated in the Shepard et al. study in the context of the initial difficulty of the task 
types, i.e. the average difficulty of each type of structure when being learnt for the first 
time. 
This aspect of the experiment may be the most salient with regards to offering clear 
constraints on modelling, as it marginalises the effects of different types of information on 
the task difficulty (e.g. familiarity). This was the focus of the Nosofsky et al. (1994) 
replication and analysis but, while relating to more sophisticated models, the issues raised 
by Shepard et al. were still the relevant issues, regarding the modelling of the data. 
2.3 Discussion: Shepard et aL’s (1961) analysis of the first 
problem difficulties 
The original importance of the results reported by Shepard et al. (1961) was two- 
fold. The first area relates to the fact that participants could, generally, reach criterion on 
all of the tasks. The second concerns the order of difficulty of each task. 
2.3.1 Object representation and cue conditioning 
As discussed in chapter 1, the study of category learning has its origins in research 
on instrumental learning. At the time of Shepard et al.’s (1 961) study, learning paradigms 
were generally simple in nature, typically characterised as versions of a type I category 
structure. The models developed to describe learning rates for these simple experiments 
were, generally, as complicated as required by the particular data being modelled. This 
would involve the model only being able to represent the learning of associations between 
individual features, or cues, and the response. The learning rate for each feature-to-label 
association would be a function of the conditional probability of the label being present 
given the presence of the feature. 
Shepard et al. (1961) suggested that this type of model may be realisable as a 
‘working’ model in terms of a perceptron (Rosenblatt, 1958). However, they also pre- 
empted Minsky and Papert’s criticism of this type of model (Minsky & Papert, 1969), by 
pointing out that these models would not be able to predict criterion, or even greater-than- 
chance performance on certain of the problem types in their experiment (Shepard et al., 
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1961, p.30-32). This is discussed particularly with reference to the type VI structure, but is 
also true of any structure where no single cue perfectly predicts the category label. 
The problems with these models relate to the way in which the object is 
represented. The learning model describes the way in which responses become connected 
with the representation of the object. The assumption had been that it was appropriate to 
represent the object in terms of the separate features of which it consists. Success in tasks 
where no individual cue predicts the category label, but combinations of cues do, suggest 
that this form of representation is not, by itself, sufficient to account for a wider range of 
human learning data. 
Shepard et al. (1961) suggested that models based on the cue conditioning 
approach but incorporating unique representations of the whole stimulus and, possibly, 
representations of configurations of cues would in principle be capable of performing each 
task. At the time, however, the lack of formal rules to account for how these models might 
learn meant that it was difficult to predict their asymptotic performance. As will be 
described in chapter 3, this type of model, now generally known as the configural-cue 
network, was tested by Gluck and Bower (1988b) and it failed to simulate the observed 
order of difficulty. 
2.3.2 Stimulus generalisation, selective attention, and complexity 
Another representational solution suggested by Shepard et al. (1961) is to use the 
stimulus generalisation model, described briefly above. This model was developed to 
account for data from identification experiments (Shepard, 1957). These experiments 
involve the participant having to learn to produce a unique response to each of a set of 
stimuli. These stimuli vary in terms of the number of features they have in common with 
one another. 
In order to account for identification data, the model suggested that the probability 
of confusing one stimuli for another, and consequently producing its response rather than 
the appropriate one, is a function of the number of features those stimuli have in common. 
The representations used are of the unique combinations of cues that describe each 
stimulus. Unlike the cue conditioning models, where representations are either present or 
absent for each object, the representations are ‘present’ or associable to varying extents, 
dependent on their similarity to the actual stimulus presented. 
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Like Nosofsky et al. (1994), Shepard et al. (1961) focussed much of their attention 
on the consistent ordering of difficulty noted for problem types when learnt for the first 
time. They specifically attempted to apply the stimulus generalisation model to the data. 
The stimulus generalisation model predicts that the difficulty of a task could be 
indexed by the ratio of the average similarity of an input to members of the wrong category 
over the average similarity to members of its own category. Categories made of members 
with little in common would be harder to learn than categories with members with a lot in 
common. 
The way in which similarity is calculated in these models will be described in detail 
in the next chapter, however, when applied to the category structures the order predicted 
by the model was not the same as that observed in the data. The prediction made of I<(III, 
IV, V)<II<VI (with differences fairly small between all types) is understandable given 
closer inspection of the category structures in figure 2.1. Categories in types 111 to V have 
members which are clustered together around tbeir central members (see figure 2.2), 
whereas for type I1 the membership of each category is split into two clusters located on 
opposite comers of the cube. 
Shepard et al. (1961, p.29) proposed that the reason for the failure of the model to 
predict the difficulties, was that it was unable to abstract, or selectively attend to, only 
those dimensions relevant to the task. The theory abstractly specified was attenuation of 
the extent to which differences in irrelevant dimensions mediate similarity judgements 
relative to differences in relevant dimensions. 
This, it was suggested, may result in the appropriate level of error for each type 
being predicted by the generalisation model. This was later demonstrated to be the case by 
Nosofsky (1984) who showed that by using appropriate ‘attentional’ parameters for each 
dimension, for each task, an accurate prediction regarding the level of difficulty could be 
made using these stimulus generalisation models. The details of this will be discussed in 
the next chapter but the relevant issue that emerges is that the relevance of a dimension is 
task dependent. As such it is something that a model based on stimulus generalisation will 
have to acquire from experience with the task, i.e. learn. 
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Shepard et al. (1961) concluded that the models of learning available were either 
not capable of predicting the task difficulties or not sufficiently specified to make detailed 
predictions. 
In an effort to quantify, in some way, just what it was about the problem structure 
that appeared to control difficulty, an interesting but somewhat different approach was 
taken. This approach took, as its starting point, the assumption that one could describe the 
tasks in terms of a binary search structure where the number of dimensional values 
required (assuming an optimal start of the sequence with no dimensions repeated), before 
the category membership may be unequivocally decided, corresponds to the length of that 
search (ibid. p.33). 
This is one measure of complexity, in terms of the proportion of the total number of 
‘bits’ available (three independent dimensions, with two equiprobable values each yields a 
total of 3 bits), required to make the decision, on average. This predicts that type I requires 
one bit, type I1 two bits, and type VI three bits. Because the types I11 to V need all three 
bits, but not all of the time and can sometimes be certain with just two, it can be said that 
these will have bit-rates of between two and three. In the appendix of the paper the authors 
attempted to define a measure of difficulty based on this ‘length of search’ model. 
This was expressed in terms of the distribution of uncertainty-reducing information 
across the task‘s dimensions. Assuming the optimal start point, and shortest sequence 
length, one could determine how much uncertainty (from a total of one binary digit or bit) 
is removed about the category label given knowledge of one, two, and three dimensional 
values (Shepard et al. 1961, appendix). 
The authors presumed that the difficulty of a task would depend on the number of 
dimensions one had to be simultaneously aware of to use the rule or extract the necessary 
information (ibid.). They suggested that a task would be more difficult as the amount of 
information in the second and third dimensions increased. They suggested an index of 
difficulty could be defmed by weighting the information in each term by a coefficient 
proportional to the number of dimensions involved in that term and then summing the 
products. 
With appropriate dimensional parameters the authors produced the correct 
ordering, but what this model says about the learning process is somewhat abstract. The 
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approach is returned to in chapter 4 in much more detail where an explicit signal 
processing approach to theories of learning and categorisation is described. 
Since the original study, models of human learning and classification have 
developed significantly. The purpose of Nosofsky et al.’s (1994) replication was to gather 
data that was detailed enough to enable the quantitative evaluation of some of the more 
influential models. This concerned the ability of the various models to quantitatively fit the 
block-by-block average error rates for the six category structures. These models are ‘full 
simulations’ in that they implement specific theories about representation and learning, to 
show trial-by-trial changes in performance. 
The relationship of these simulations to the problems involved in the Shepard et al. 
(1961) category structures is the subject of the next chapter. However, the assertions made 
that models may have to incorporate some means by which the complexity of the task 
mediates its difficulty, remain valid. The more modern analysis deals only with models 
that are, in principle, capable of performing the tasks. It therefore focuses on the extent to 
which task complexity is predicted by each model to affect difficulty. 
ChaDter 3: Learninp and representation in models of 
catezorisation 
This chapter deals with the various theoretical components of category learning 
models. As will be discussed, there are two central components to any theory of learning, 
one is a theory regarding the way in which events become associated with one another, the 
other is a theory regarding what it may be about a particular event which gets associated 
with a particular response. 
The development of models of learning illustrates this interaction of theories well. 
Models of learning have, as research has progressed, had to adapt in order to allow the 
predictions they make regarding certain stimulus sets to generalise to different types of 
stimuli. In many cases this has just involved the development of different means of 
representing the stimuli and applying the new representations to whatever theory of 
associative learning which was contemporary. 
As theory has developed, however, the representations that appear to be the most 
appropriate for particular stimuli have suggested more complex learning rules. These rules, 
which may be described as incorporating ideas of selective attention to the process 
modelled, involve task dependent ‘extraction’ of relevant information from a given 
representation. 
In this case the complexity of all aspects of the model increases as the 
representations must be ‘suitable’ to have relevant information extracted from them. The 
learning model must be able to generalise across cases where this process operates as well 
as cases where it does not. Learning, representation, and selective attention are described 
in turn in this chapter with particular reference to their relationships and, in some cases, 
inconsistencies. 
The following is not an exhaustive account of models of categorisation and 
learning. It is generally restricted to those models which either are connectionist in nature 
or which can be, and have been, used to inform the design of connectionist models. 
3.1 Learning theory and categorisation 
An analysis of the development of learning theory is informative with respect to the 
way in which models of categorisation, which fiequently involve learning, are constructed. 
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Early experimental work with animals revealed, as described in the previous chapter, that 
one could predict the responses of an animal to a particular stimulus using, most simply, 
information about the frequency with which the response to that stimulus was 
accompanied by reinforcement of some description. 
This observation applies equally well to the learning of the more complex stimulus- 
response relationships examined in categorisation research. As will be described, however, 
as the experimental paradigms used to investigate theories of learning have developed, 
factors influencing this simple frequency approach have had to be adapted. 
3.1.1 Early mathematical learning theories: Clark Hull and ‘habit 
strength’. 
Early attempts to formalise the relationship between a stimulus and a response 
generally consisted of attempts to derive ‘the learning function’ (Bush, 1960, p. 126). This 
would involve developing a mathematical expression which captured the relationship 
between, say, the number of times a response to a stimulus had been reinforced and some 
index of the likelihood of the stimulus resulting in the same response if it were to be 
presented again. 
An early pioneer in the area of mathematical models of learning was the researcher 
Clark Hull. His 1943 book, Principles ofBehavior, consisted of an attempt to advance 
research in behavioural science by offering testable formalisations of the ‘habit’. 
Hull described a habit as an ‘intervening variable’, hypothetical entity, or logical 
construct. He noted that while there were obvious risks associated with the use of such 
constructs in any scientific endeavour, the potential payoff, as shown by other sciences 
such as physics, was enormous (Hull, 1943, p.22). 
His concern was to develop mathematical models which could capture some of the 
basic data produced by experiments on animal learning or conditioning. The habit, for Hull 
was a ‘persisting state of the organism’ resulting from reinforcement (ibid. p. 102) which 
could be described in tams of a set of receptor-effector connections. He was not 
specifically referring to a particular mode of action or specific behavioural response as the 
term habit was broadened to include all of the possible reactions that might result from 
reinforcement. This would include not just an overt conditioned behavioural response but 
any other responses that might occur, for example galvanic skin responses. 
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Hull suggested that the habit could be described in terms of the notion of ‘habit 
strength’ with notation ,HR to indicate the strength of a habit, H, which consists of the 
production of response R when presented with stimulus S. He proposed that habit strength 
would increase with the number of reinforced responses in a way captured by the 
following function; 
HR = M - Me-“ (3.11, 
where M and i are positive constants and N is the number of reinforced responses to the 
stimulus (ibid. p. 119). As figure 3.1 illustrates, i controls the rate at which reinforcement 
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Figure 3.1 : Graph of equation 3.1 showing habit strength, sHR, with increasing, number of 
reinforced responses, N, for three different values of constant i. The constant M is set to 1 
for all graphs. 
Hull, wanting to define a ‘centigrade’ scale of units of strength which he referred to 
as ‘habs’, set M to 100. The basic intuition behind the selected function was that the 
strength of a habit would be increased by some constant value, i, each time it was 
reinforced towards some physiologically determined maximum. As it approached this 
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maximum, the effect of reinforcement would diminish according to how close to the 
maximum the strength actually was. 
This was based on observations concerning numerous measures of different types 
of response including ‘autonomic’ responses such as salivation and galvanic skin responses 
(where the maximum may be most clearly described as a physiological constraint), but also 
on behavioural action probabilities. His choice of the exponential function was actually a 
method of describing the curve produced by the ‘positive growth function’. 
The positive growth function was acknowledged by Hull to be one of many 
algebraic functions capable of producing a curve which could fit observed results. It was 
selected due to its usage at the time in fitting a number of empirical observations of various 
biological growth and decay processes (ibid. p.114). The function described in detail by 
Hull in the text, but not presented as a formal learning function, is as follows; 
ASHR = F(M-,H,) (3.21, 
where F is referred to as the growth factor for a given reinforcement context and is a 
positive constant (ibid.). F is related to i in equation 3.1 but, rather than consisting of a 
constant increment, F determines the fraction of the ‘unrealized potentiality’ transferred to 
the habit strength (ibid.). 
Hull, for some reason, regarded the formulation of equation 3.2 as ‘rather clumsy’ 
(ibid. p. 1 19) and decided to use the exponential formulation given in equation 1 to describe 
the accumulation of habit strength as a function of number of reinforced responses. 
Equation 3.1 enables one to acquire a value of a particular habit strength at a given stage in 
the learning experiment, its form being particularly useful for evaluating the interaction of 
habits acquired across a known number of trials. The two produce identical curves when 
the value of i is calculated, as stated by Hull (ibid.) according to the following formula, 
1 
1 - F  
i=log,-- (3.3). 
Hull went on to address the factors which might influence the parameter M in the 
above functions. He identified and proposed formalisms of varying specificity to address 
such issues as the amount of reinforcement given, time delay between response and 
reinforcement, and the delay between the stimulus presentation and the response. These 
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factors are not particularly relevant to this present work and so will not be described in 
further detail. 
Later chapters in Principles ofBehavior looked at issues regarding compound 
stimuli, stimulus generalisation and probabilistic relationships between habit strength and 
behavioural responding. Unfortunately these issues, which came to assume greater 
significance in psychological learning research, seem to be somewhat disconnected from 
the learning functions described in Hull’s work. It is thus not clear how all of the various 
components of his theories may be related to one another. 
3.1.2 Stochastic learning models 
Following Hull’s pioneering work, mathematical modelling in the behavioural 
sciences enjoyed a rapid rise in popularity. The proliferation of models was influenced 
strongly by developments in the mathematical analysis of experimental data using 
statistical techniques such as analysis of variance and information theory. Owing to this 
contribution, mathematical approaches to learning became much more focused on 
developing models capable of specifically representing changes in the probabilities of 
particular responses being produced under controlled circumstances. 
The successors to Hull’s models were, in many ways, fairly similar although there 
was a marked change in emphasis. The psychology of the 1950’s and 1960’s had moved 
away from using the physiological and motivational ‘constructions’ within which 
researchers like Hull located their theones. These were, ostensibly, abandoned altogether 
in favour of simply constructing mathematical models capable of representing and 
predicting experimental data. As an alternative to the use of physiological terminology, 
however, new constructions were adopted related to the engineering mathematics and 
statistics deployed in the discipline. 
One of the areas that had been particularly problematic was defining what was 
meant by ‘reinforcement’. William Estes, commenting on the development of statistical 
learning theory, suggested that a shift from defining what reinforcement was, towards 
making quanititative statements about how it operates was justified (Estes, 1959, p.404). 




experimental scenarios. The learning that occurred, for example, when a human participant 
was simply provided with one of two tones, dependent on their making an experimenter- 
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defined correct or incorrect response, was describable using similar basic 'rules' to the 
rules which might be used to describe the learning taking place in a rat being shocked for 
taking the 'wrong' turn in a maze. The characteristics of the learning were, therefore, 
separated from the reasons why this learning was taking place at all. 
The basic observation of Hull and other early researchers, that the probability of 
making a particular response increased as a function of the number of occasions on which 
this response was reinforced, remained a basic tenet of learning theories. The emphasis, 
however, shifted from the representation of specific stimulus-response relationships to one 
of describing the changes in response probabilities as a function of the statistical properties 
of the stimuli used in the experiment. 
The model of the decision and response aspect of the process was one of a 
stochastic system. The response produced was only probabilistically related to differences 
in whatever mediating pattern of response strengths one might care to propose. Learning 
could be described in terms of the changes in response probabilities which occurred when 
a response was reinforced or not. 
The models produced by researchers such as Bush and Mosteller (e.g. Bush & 
Mosteller, 1955, Bush, 1960), Estes (e.g. Estes, 1959, Atkinson & Estes, 1963), and Resile 
(Restle, 1955), could be similarly applied to predicting asymptotic performance after a 
certain number of trials or for computing trial-by-trial increments in response probabilities. 
Despite differences between the above researchers regarding the assumptions 
underlying the learning functions, the basic formulations were pretty much the same as 
each other, and also fairly similar to Hull. Bush (1960, p.132) gives the following 'rule' to 
describe the change in probability of a response class with probability p, where there are 
two response classes with probability assumed to be p and 1 -p, 
P.+l = aiP" + (1 - 4 4  (3.4). 
Here n is the trial number, (1-a,) is a rate parameter and hi is the asymptote of learning in a 
given experiment for this response. The function may also be expressed in terms of the 
change in response probability as follows, 
4 = (1 -%)(ai - P) (3.5). 
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In the case of these models the subscript i refers to the response and as such there is no 
obvious representation for the stimulus in the equation. The same is true of Estes’ stimulus 
sampling model. Estes (e.g. Estes, 1959) represented the function as, 
44 =eo - Pi) (3.6). 
In this function the asymptote is assumed to be 1 for the response i and the (I-%) is 
replaced by the parameter 8 which is referred to as the stimdus-sampling rate. 
In effect (I-ai) and 8 are doing all the work of representing the stimuli involved in 
the experiment. For the Bush and Mosteller model a, was a measure of the ineffectiveness 
of the stimulating event at altering response probabilities (Stemberg, 1963, p.22). Thus the 
higher its value, the lower the learning rate. It was conceived as, basically, a function of 
some measure of the average similarity between the stimuli (generally an array of stimulus 
elements) presented when one response was correct to the stimuli presented when the other 
was correct. The stimulus sampling rate, 8, relates to the proportion of relevant cues 
sampled on a trial. The assumption is that stimuli become conditioned in an all-or-nothing 
way to the reinforced response on each trial, dependent on whether they are perceptually 
sampled during that trial (Estes, 1959, p. 399). The 8 refers to the probability that relevant 
stimuli are sampled, or used to inform the decision, on a given trial. 
The rate parameter used by Restle (1955) was also called 8 and was, he suggested, 
related to the proportion of relevant and irrelevant stimuli, or ‘cues’ as he referred to them. 
Where r is the number of relevant cues on a trial and i is the number of irrelevant cues on 




This measure is, again, similar in intent to the stimulus sampling rate and the (1 -ai) 
figure used in the above equation. All of these measures are intended to represent, in some 
way, the similarity of the stimulus arrays, with the intention of operationalising the idea 
that learning is faster when the stimulus presentations requiring different responses are 
easy to differentiate from one another. 
Unfortunately one problem remains in that 8 is a parameter that actually must be 
estimated from experimental data, specifically using error in performance figures. Restle’s 
use of equation 3.7 was, as pointed out by Bush (Bush, 1965, p. 171), somewhat 
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unjustified as, in reality this parameter had to be estimated. The power of these means of 
characterising the stimulus set, lies in the fact that once theta or alpha was estimated from 
error data for one experiment, its value could be estimated with some success as a function 
of the relationships between stimuli on similar experiments. 
The above models are notable for the fact that they seem to characterise the 
stimulus set as a whole and attempt to describe its role in terms of single variables. They 
differ from Hull's treatment of the process as the development of a stimulus response 
connection in that they do not tend to address individual stimuli at all. 
The problems of estimating the parameters involved in terms of relationships 
hypothesised between different experiments according to the relationship between stimulus 
sets are both practically and theoretically considerable. With hindsight, these issues may 
have been more readily addressed by paying more attention to the individual relationships 
between stimuli and responses. 
The problems of the above models would be further exacerbated if one was 
attempting to apply them to concurrent learning tasks in which the characteristics of the 
stimulus set are changed at some point during training. Here the results of such a change 
are the data of interest. In this case some method of representing the relationship between 
individual stimuli and the response probabilities would be required to model any effects. 
3.1.2.1 Luce's identification choice model 
An early model which, in a way, addressed this issue was given by Luce (1963) 
based on a model published in 1964 by Bush, Luce, and Rose (1964), in the context of a 
psychophysical learning model for complete identification tasks. Assuming that j is the 
correct (determined by the experimenter) response to stimulus i and the conditional 
probability of j  on trial n given i is p,(jl i) then the probability on trial n+l given 
presentation of some stimulus k is, 
~ " + , ( ~ ~ j ) = ~ " ( ~ ~ j ) + ~ ( j , ~ ) e ~ [ ~ ~ ~  - P & I ~ ) ]  (3.8). 
Here q(i,k) is a measure of the similarity of stimulus i to stimulus k. It equals 1 if 
i=k. The parameter 8, is a rate parameter applying when k is present and S,, is known as 
the Kronecker delta which equals 1 when j=k and zero otherwise, (Bush et al. 1964, p. 
21 I). The Kronecker delta, in this context, means that the conditional probability increases 
if j is the correct behavioural response, its value being 1 in this case. It decreases i f j  is not 
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the appropriate response given input k. The conditional probabilities ofj given i, summed 
across all j thus remains at one. 
The model is a means of describing the nature of a distribution of response 
probabilities across a space or continuum in, or along, which stimuli may be located 
relative to one another. The training 'shapes' this distribution. Stimuli are assumed to be 
related to one another in terms of some measure of the distance between them on some 
experimenter-determined scale. No specific representations of the stimuli are present in 
this model. 
The model predicts that the conditional probabilities of different responses given 
different stimuli alter as a function of the similarity of the stimulus to the one that is 
actually being presented. An important property of the model is that it enables one to 
calculate the asymptotic conditional probability of a response given any stimulus in terms 
of its similarity to only the stimuli that have been presented. This measure was also 
developed by Shepard (1957) as a means of predicting confusion errors. For the 
identification task the expected conditional probability of producing response j when 
presented with stimulus i as the number of trials, n, approaches infinity is as follows (from 
Bush et al. 1964, p. 21 l), 
The parameter b(k) is a response bias where b Q  =p(k) B(k), where p(k) is the 
probability of the response across the experiment and B(k) is the learning rate for that 
response as shown in equation 3.8 (ibid.). Taking probabilities of different responses and 
their learning rates to be equal, the equation reduces to the similarity of the input i to the 
stimuli j, for which j is the correct response. This is divided by the sum of the similarities 
of the stimulus i to all stimuli k for which k is the correct response (including j). 
This has contributed to the idea that the capacity to associate stimuli with responses 
emerges from 'detectors' of some description for items that have actually been presented. 
The model will be described in more detail in the section on stimulus representation, 
below, as it has proved to be highly influential in the field of category learning. 
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The increment function is, however, a significant development on the Hull model. 
By including the parameter q(i,k) control is enabled over the level at which association 
develops between a particular stimulus and a response according to the extent to which the 
detector or ‘representation’ is ‘activated’ by the current stimulus. 
While Hull acknowledged that stimulus energy would probably have some role in 
the accumulation of habit strength (Hull, 1943, p.181) he failed to include it in his model 
describing the increment. As such, the inference may be that all connections or habits 
contributing to the effective reaction potential, even if made active only as a result of 
stimulus generalisation, would be conditionable at an equal rate. 
3.1.2.2 Response probabilities and choice functions 
Another advance on the Hullian approach is the inclusion of a simple function to 
determine choice probabilities. While Hull incorporated ideas of stimulus generalisation 
into his work, his method of handling ‘conflict’ between competing responses was 
somewhat awkward to interpret. 
The Luce (1963) and Bush et al. (1964) model is specifically a model for 
generating choice probabilities. This contrasts, to some extent, with earlier stochastic 
models which generated response Probabilities. In these models the rules described above 
applied to situations where there were two responses, with p(i) being calculated and the 
other assumed to be I-p(i). For larger response sets one might have to suggest that each 
had its own probability with the outcome, or choice, being determined by normalised 
probabilities. 
The determination of choice probabilities, in terms of the sum of evidence in favour 
of one alternative over the sum of evidence in favour of all alternatives, is based on axioms 
and theorems developed in Luce’s highly influential work Individual Choice Behavior 
(Luce, 1959). 
The basic choice axiom proposes first a fmite subset, T, of the universal set U, 
where for every subset, S, of T, its probability P, is defined. Where the probability that 
subset S is selected from subset T is given by PT(S), the probability that an element of S, 
called x, is selected Ps(x), is given by the following, 
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(ibid. p. 7-12). 
What this is saying is that the probability of selecting x from S is the probability of 
selecting x fkom T, i.e. in general, divided by the probability of selecting S from the larger 
set T. Put differently this is also describable as the probability of x divided by the sum of 
all probabilities of the set for which x is a member. 
The above axiom refers to situations where, firstly one must assume that only one 
member of the set T can be selected at a time such that the sum of the probabilities of 
selection for set T is one. Secondly, one can exclude ‘irrelevant’ alternatives fkom the 
calculation such that the subset, T, is finite with its individual probabilities known. This 
includes the assumption that none of the probabilities are one or zero. If zero, the element 
could be excluded from the set T as an irrelevant alternative. If one, then, according to the 
fact that the sum of the probabilities of members of T is one, the set T would contain only 
one member. 
Luce’s choice axiom defines what is meant by choice in this context. In practical 
terms, the experimenter decides on appropriate responses for the experiment in such a way, 
generally, as to eliminate any bias on the part of the participant towards one alternative 
over the others. This may or may not require training or instructions, depending on the 
experiment and the participant. 
The alternatives thus defined, it is generally assumed that other behaviours may be 
disregarded for the purposes of data collection. This makes sense in, for example, a 
category learning experiment when the responses of interest may just be the label button 
pushes. While the participant may exhibit a stronger galvanic skin response to exception 
members of a category, the evidence that learning has occurred is taken from the button 
pushes and the feedback which results. 
Luce developed the implications of this axiom with regards to its applicability to 
the behavioural sciences. One of hls concerns was with the idea that for various 
experimental paradigms the interest was in terms of the relationship between individual 
stimuli and the response probabilities. In this case, one is talking about conditional 
probabilities of a response, given a stimulus. In a simple learning scenario, for example, a 
participant is first trained to respond ‘A’ when presented with stimuli x and y, with x and y 
presented, alone, on separate trials with equal frequency. This training continues until 
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performance has reached some criterion e.g. the probability of responding A given x or y is 
close to unity. 
In the next phase the participant is shown a compound of x and y, xy. Typically 
performance generalises to the compound stimulus to some extent. In this case, however, 
the determination of response probabilities cannot just be a matter of summing the 
individual response probabilities as these will sum to greater than unity. 
Luce suggested that conditional probabilities might be described in terms of the 
sum of any evidence in favour of the selection divided by any evidence in favour of all of 
the selections. Theorem 3 in his work (ibid. p. 27) gives the probability of selecting x from 
subset T, PT(x), as follows 
(3.11). 
In this case v(x) is assumed to be the value of x according to some ratio scale. The theorem 
is important because it attempts to characterise choice behaviour as being representable in 
terms of a numerical scale. It suggests that the probability of selecting an alternative is a 
function of just the relative weight of evidence. In order to be able to say this, however, 
one needs to define a scale to describe what constitutes evidence in the first place. 
Generalisation indicates that one cannot ignore the influence of previously 
presented similar stimuli on the probability of a response. The Luce ( 1  963), and Bush et al. 
(1 964) model, described in section 3.1.2.1, captures this in terms of its prediction of 
asymptotic performance, shown in equation 3.9. Here, the asymptotic conditional 
probabilities consist of the sum of evidence (based on similarity alone), in favour of a 
particular choice over the sum of the evidence in favour of all of the choices. The scale 
chosen is one which enables similarity measures to be added such that the alternative with 
the greatest total of ‘similarity’ has the highest probability of being selected. 
Luce also addressed the issue of calculating response probabilities as a function of 
the dzfference between the evidence for each alternative as a means of accounting for 
certain data from psychophysical research. What Luce describes as the Fechnerian position 
suggests that the ability to discriminate between different extents along a single sensory 
continuum may be described by some function of the difference between those extents. 
The observed relationship is that the ability to discriminate between two stimuli is a 
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function of the ratio of those two extents. This captures the observation, for example, that 
discrimination between the volume of two tones is greater when the two volumes are 
subjectively low than when they are high, despite the difference on the continuum being 
the same. 
This simple relationship does not apply to all scales. While it may apply for such 
dimensions as ‘loudness’ or brightness, other relationships are observed for other 
dimensions. Discriminablity between different frequencies of tone, for example would 
appear to follow a cyclic pattern based on harmonics, and temperature discrimination 
would appear to have two ‘ends’ with discriminability decreasing as stimuli become colder 
or hotter (see Shepard, 1987, 1994 for further examples of different modality dependent 
generalisation relationships). 
Luce reconciled this Fechnerian position with the observed data by suggesting that 
if one first took the logarithms of the continuum values and then used their distance from 
each other in a logistic function, the result was the same as that predicted by the ratio of the 
two values. So, for the probability of selecting x, as the louder, when presented with a pair 
of tones x and y, p(x,y), 
(3.12) 
where v(x) is the value given to x in terms of a continuum scale of volume, k > 0 and 
(3.13). 1 
k 
U = -logev+a 
The parameter a is another constant. 
The function works by first converting the v values into their logarithms. This 
scale, when plotted against the ratio scale yields a curve showing decreased difference 
between log v and log v+n as v increases where n remains constant. As v drops below 1, 
log v becomes negative approaching minus infinity as v approaches zero. This means that 
the measure U is more sensitive to small differences between levels of v when v is low than 
when v is high. 
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These values obtained, a ratio measurement becomes inappropriate as the U values 
may be negative. The logistic function in the second part of equation 3.12 is therefore, a 
means of ‘squashing’ the difference between the two U values, as they may vary between 
minus and plus infinity. It also yields the same probabilities as the top function in 3.12 
when k= 1 and a=O. 
This is a fairly important observation in terms of modelling because it highlighted 
the scope for alternative solutions to the same problem. The approach of Luce was, in a 
way, to make a ‘module’ of the choice function. If one’s model could not be made, by 
suitable parameter estimation on the choice function then, due to the axiomatic nature of 
the choice function used, it may be appropriate to address other aspects of the model while 
leaving the choice function largely intact. 
Luce, in the above example, achieved a fit to the data on painvise comparison by 
‘pre-processing’ the continuum. If the values representing the evidence for a ratio choice 
measure are first converted into log values and then compared with a logistic then the 
differences are captured and the functions are equivalent. Thus Luce may retain the logistic 
choice function by altering the representation of what constitutes ‘evidence’ as far as the 
choice function is concerned. 
The ratio approach implies that the decision process is one which involves a finite 
set of alternatives whose probability of occurrence is neither zero nor one. In a learning 
experiment one would be assuming naivety on the part of the participants at the beginning 
but require some guess on each trial. Because the measure of probability from relative 
evidence is undefined when the sum of the evidence for all alternatives equals zero, this 
initial condition must be simulated using bias or ‘background noise’ (Nosofsky et al. 1994) 
constants which give all of the alternatives a baseline amount of evidence. These 
parameters may or may not be equal but may be any positive real number. 
Figure 3.2 shows plots of the ratio and logistic representation of response 
probabilities, given different levels of difference between a measure of evidence in favour 
of alternative x and evidence in favour of alternative y (set to zero in this figure). In this 
figure the logistics are produced using the lower function of equation 3.12, with u(x) and 
u(y) simply represented by the evidence measures multiplied by a gain or slope parameter 
k. The ratios are produced using the upper function of equation 3.12. The bias parameters, 
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b, (equal for each alternative) are simply added to each of v(x) (just x here) and v(y) which 
being zero means that the ratio is b/x+b. 
The bias parameters, if not related to the task, have two functions. The first is to 
‘enable’ a decision when no other evidence is available. The second is dependent on the 
size of the bias parameters and concerns their role in early learning by such a system. The 
bias parameters, even if they are all equal, will tend to slow the impact of learning related 
to the learning rate parameter used as they represent a constant level of error in the system. 
This can be seen in figure 3.2. With extremely low bias, i.e. a value lower than the learning 
rate, early learning can be very rapid. 
For the logistic approach the decision process is again one which assumes a finite 
set of alternatives, each with a level of evidence in favour of them. The absolute level of 
this evidence is unimportant as the function deals with the differences between evidence 
for alternatives rather than the ratio. Having said this, however, it can be seen f?om figure 
3.2 that the logistic curve is at its steepest when the magnitudes of difference are smallest. 
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Figure 3.2; Logistic versus ratio estimates of the probability of x given evidence of x as x- 
axis labels and evidence for y set to zero. For the ratio, two different levels of bias, b, are 
shown whereas ‘gain’ or k is altered in the logistic plots. 
Experimental evidence suggests that decision-making is compromised by some 
events and enhanced in others. The logistic displays the same characteristics as a ratio 
function, if the events which compromise decision making are represented as being able to 
reduce the difference between levels of evidence in favour of alternatives. Similarly those 
events which enhance decision making must be represented in a way which leads to 
increases in the differences between levels of evidence. 
This property tends to shift the focus of attention onto the nature of ‘evidence’ for 
the choice function i.e. how is its accumulation related to the characteristics of stimuli and 
their relationship with reinforcement? One corollary of this is that it identifies ‘evidence’ 
with concepts such as associative, or habit strength as the ‘evidence’ may be regarded as 
the sum of these strengths. 
The logistic is more immediately applicable to formulations such as Hull’s as 
measures of response strength could be negative. Hull’s approach to describing choice 
38 
probabilities was also dependent on some measure of difference between the strengths in 
favour of alternatives. In this case the combined contributions of excitatory and inhibitory 
habit strengths for each alternative were subject to a random process described by Hull as 
‘behavioural oscillation’. This resulted in a ‘momentary effective reaction potential’ for 
each alternative, which was made up of the summed response strength plus or minus a 
value determined by a normally distributed noise process (Hull, 1943, chapters XVII and 
XVIII). In this case response probabilities would be a function of the difference between 
the summed response strengths for each alternative and the variance of the noise 
distribution. 
As pointed out by Saul Sternberg, the similarities between the logistic function and 
the cumulative normal distribution used by Hull to determine the effects of behavioural 
oscillation make Luce’s approach somewhat compatible with Hull’s (Sternberg, 1963, p. 
30). Hull’s habit strengths may simply be viewed as levels of evidence, which are 
compared in some way by a decision or choice function. 
The logistic has also been taken up in various forms as a general means of deriving 
response probabilities from ‘response strength’ scales of various types and has proved 
highly influential in connectionist models. The logistic function, and its often used 
generalisation when dealing with more than two response classes, 
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where v(x) is response strength and y are the alternatives, is particularly useful in 
generating choice probabilities from response strength scales which include negative 
strengths. 
As discussed above, however, it may commit one to a particular method of 
representing events in the model such that the logistic may be used as a component of a 
model fitting experimental data. The next sections on representation and ‘selective 
attention’ will further illustrate the role of commitment to model components in 
determining architectures. 
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3.1.3 The Rescorla-Wagner learning rule. 
3.1.3.1. Three problematic observations from learning research 
As stated in the previous section, the stochastic learning models described above 
may have certain problems when it comes to representing experiments in which the stimuli 
or the reinforcement schedule change. The alternative approach, which may be described 
as connectionist in outlook, was to attempt to represent the role of individual stimuli as 
contributing evidence towards a decision. 
The differences between this and Hull’s approach would be in the inclusion of 
specific models of how generalisation affects learning and the use of a relatively 
straightforward function for deriving response probabilities from relative evidence. The 
use of individual stimulus representations, with their own potential contributions to 
evidence, enabled modelling the effects of changing the stimuli or the reinforcement 
schedule. 
Among this type of experiment were a few which could not be adequately 
represented by versions of the model described above. The following three observations, 
taken together seemed to indicate that these inadequacies could not be ameliorated by 
using different ways of representing the stimuli or the response strength. 
1. Transfer to compound: 
In this case an animal is first trained on the reinforced pairing of stimulus x and 
response A, and then tested on a compound of stimulus x and a second stimulus y. 
Typically it is observed that some of the training on x to A transfers to the xy 
compound such that p(A) is significantly greater than chance. 
2. Transfer to component: 
This experiment is the reverse procedure to the above. The animal is first trained to 
associate compound xy with rewarded response A. The animal is then tested on 
stimulus x alone (or y). Here it is typically observed that the training on xy to A 
transfers to the situation where x or y are presented alone. 
3. Blocking: 
This experiment has three parts, beginning with training on the pairing of x and A. This 
is followed by training with the xy compound and A. The final phase is a test phase in 
which the component y is presented alone. In this condition the typical observation is 
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that there is little or no transfer of training from xy to y. As observed by Kamin (1969), 
with substantial pre-training on the x and A condition, almost no conditioning occurs 
for y to A. Conditioning of y is said to have been blocked. 
Blocking is something which has been observed in a variety of experiments with 
human and animal participants, for a review see Kruschke and Blair (2000), and posed a 
problem for the learning rules described above. The learning rules described in the 
previous section imply a certain amount of stimulus independence with respect to learning 
and reinforcement. The influence of each over the probability of response is a function of 
its own history of association with the rewarded response and this increments (or 
decrements) according to the difference between its individual ‘control’ and the maximum 
possible for this reinforcement schedule. 
Blocking of conditioning cannot be readily predicted by the stochastic and Hullian 
learning models, regardless, it would appear, of the stimulus representations used. Simply 
using the individual stimulus components, x and y, with a basic stochastic or Hullian 
learning model will predict that y will be conditioned to A on the xy compound trials at as 
rapid a rate as x was conditioned to A on the x to A trials. 
The way in which stimulus generalisation models, such as that of Luce (1963) and 
Bush et al. (1964) would cope with such a problem is complicated. Firstly, by the nature of 
the predictions it makes and, secondly, by the representation of ‘similarity’ between events 
with different numbers of ‘dimensions’ or features. This will be discussed in more detail 
below in the section concerning stimulus representation. 
The solution suggested was that, as far as the increment to associative strength was 
concerned, the multiple representations acted as a compound such that all active 
representations might get the same increment on each trial. This increment is determined 
by the combined associative strength of the stimulus representations. 
3.1.3.2. Reinforcement reconsidered: surprise and learning. 
The basic intuition of Kamin (1969), shared and formalised by Rescorla and 
Wagner (1972) was to suggest an elaboration to the nature of the reinforcer. Despite the 
claims of Estes, mentioned in section 3.1.2 (Estes, 1959, p.404), the way in which 
reinforcement affected learning did require some further examination. 
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In this case the elaboration was to include the idea of ‘surprise’ or ‘expectation’ to 
the increment. In effect, the model learns nothing about a stimulus’ relationship with a 
reinforced response if that response is already ‘predicted’ by other stimuli present. 
Formally, Rescorla and Wagner (1972) returned to a more Hullian interpretation of 
theoretically ‘unbounded’ associative strength, suggesting that for their analyses ‘it will 
generally be sufficient simply to assume that the mapping of [. ..response strengths.. .] into 
magnitude or probability of conditioned responding preserves their ordering’ (ibid. p. 77). 
Indexing the associative strength between a stimulus i and a response j as Vi, the 
increment to associative strength added to V, after each trial is determined as follows; 
(3.15). 
The parameters related to the response, j, are the maximum or minimum ‘amount’ 
conditionable given a particular reward and response; Lj, and a ‘rate’ parameter for that 
rewarded response; p,. The rate parameter is assumed to be in the unit interval. The 
lambdas for each response correspond to a ‘target’ for the associative strength on each 
trial. A response may have more than one lambda depending on the context in which the 
response is produced. As with the Kronecker delta in Luce’s identification choice model 
described above, the lambda represents whether the response was reinforced or correct or 
not. The ‘correctness’ of the response depends on the stimulus shown. In a task such as a 
categorisation or identification task the lambda for a response may be one, when the 
response is the correct response, and zero when it is the ‘wrong’ response. 
The ai parameter is a rate which applies to the stimulus component. This was 
assumed to be unique to that particular stimulus element and was used by Rescorla and 
Wagner (1 972) to approximately indicate ‘stimulus salience’ capturing the idea that some 
stimuli are more reinforceable than others regardless of the reinforcement used. The role of 
these parameters will be discussed in more detail below as alternative solutions to the 
blocking problem may be produced by varying a, according to various contingencies 
during the learning process. Generally the Rescorla -Wagner model held CL, to be a 
constant property of the stimulus, represented by a value in the unit interval. 
The model enables blocking to be predicted, using simple stimulus representations, 
according to the following reasoning. Afier x has been conditioned to some level of 
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responding with respect to A, the presentation of xy, including as it does x, will result in 
little difference between the sum of associative strengths and the maximum. Regardless of 
how y is represented in the compound xy, it will only be conditioned to the extent of the 
difference between the maximum, h, and the associative strength of however x is 
represented in the compound xy. This level of conditioning will be further attenuated by 
the fact that if y is, in principle, conditionable when xy is present, so too is x. 
Another general assumption of the model is that the stimulus must actually be 
present on the trial for its associative strength to contribute to the response. Salience is a 
term used to denote some aspect of a stimulus which has been observed to be related to 
reinforceability. Intensity is one example of this where, say, a loud tone is observed to be 
conditioned at a higher rate than a quiet one. As will be discussed later ‘salience’ may 
cover too wide a range of interacting processes to capture adequately using a single 
parameter. 
‘Presence’, however, will be assumed to be an obvious component of ‘salience’ 
This is generally denoted in the Rescorla-Wagner model by writing the rule in equation 
3.15 as 
(3.16) 
where S is the set of stimulus elements presented on that trial (Sutton & Barto, 1981). 
3.1.3.3. The use of Rescorla-Wagner rule 
The Rescorla-Wagner rule, despite various shortcomings has been hugely 
influential and ‘provoked’ a large amount of research in the area of animal learning. It has 
also been described as “the primary export of traditional learning theory to other areas of 
psychology” (Miller, Bamet, & Grahame, 1995, p. 381). One of the main areas for export 
of the rule is in the use of connectionist models of categov learning (Siegal & Allan, 
1996). 
3.1.3.3.1. Widrow-Hoff and Rescorla- Wagner 
Rescorla and Wagner’s assertion was that learning took place according to the 
discrepancy of events from an organism’s expectations (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972, p. 75). 
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Their formalism of this intuition may be regarded as an iterative function of response 
strengths, stimulus ‘presences or absences’, and discrepancy. This function results in a 
reduction in discrepancy from expectations to some minimum determined by a function of 
the correlation between the stimuli and the responses. Sutton and Barto (1981) identified 
the Rescorla Wagner rule with the Widrow-Hoff (Widrow & Hoff, 1960), least mean 
squares (LMS), or delta rule. This rule was developed to solve sets of linear equations by a 
technique known as ‘gradient descent on error’. 
In this technique one identifies a set of coefficients by which one set of variables, 
which may be called the input, may be multiplied to approximate the values of another set, 
which may be called the output. In this case the coefficient between input i and output j, 
known as weight wij, is modified according to the following rule; 
AwV = X{C [ zj - ~ w ~ x ~  ; ) (3.17). 
The zj is the value of the output variable j, xi is the value of the input variable i and c is a 
rate parameter. The rule is also known as a Least Mean Squared rule because, given 
enough iterations the coefficients or weights will arrive at a solution which minimises the 
mean of the squared error, where error for each output variable j is the value in parentheses 
in equation 3.17. Whether this is capable of reducing the error to zero is dependent upon 
whether the problem is linearly separable. 
Linear separability may be described for simple stimulus events using set notation. 
Figure 3.3 shows an example where the input consists of four ‘events’, x1 to x,, with output 
events A and B. The diagram represents the task in terms of the members of two sets. One 
set consists of input events that occur when A is the output and the other contains input 






Figure 3.3: Separability of input given output shown using sets. The top part illustrates the 
inputs and the outputs with assumed weights between each input and each output. The sets 
beneath are A, inputs which occur when A is the output and B, inputs which occur when B 
is the output. In the separable case the intersection between A and B contains no members. 
In the inseparable case some input events occur in the intersection between A and B. 
The task can be said to be linearly separable when, 
A - B > O  
and x:p(xIA)=l 
X E ( A - B )  
and B - A > O  
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where A-B is the set of input events occurring when A is the output minus those members 
which also occur when B is present, and B-A is the set of inputs which occur when B is the 
output minus those elements which are also members of set A. 
The dependency on ‘unique’ members of A and B is because members of the 
intersection may predict either A or B when present. Where the relationship between an 
input and the outputs is probabilistic, for example x1 is followed by A three-quarters of the 
time and B the remaining quarter and there are no members of the set A-B present when x, 
is present, the task is not strictly linearly separable. In this case the network or rule may 
approach a state of its weights where ‘error’ is minimised but performance will not be 
perfect. 
The conditional probabilities of an input occurring given the output signal are 
necessary to ensure that there is no ‘gap’ in the coverage. If these probabilities summed to 
less than one then there would be times at which no member of the set A-B was present 
when A was the output. 
As pointed out by Sutton and Barto (1981), the Widrow-Hoff, or delta rule is 
basically identical to the Rescorla-Wagner rule, the main difference being an overt 
partitioning of the contribution made by a stimulus into an activation and a weight 
component. Such a partition was implicit in the set theoretic notation used in equation 
3.16. In this case the set theoretic notation sufficed as the stimulus representation used was 
one which would give a value of one to present stimuli and a value of zero to those that 
were absent. 
3.1.3.3.2. Connectionist networks and categorisation 
A category, as far as this research is concerned, is a collection of events which, 
while not necessarily occurring at the same time, are associated with the same response. A 
category structure may be described as linearly separable if the collection of events 
associated with one category label minus all those events which are members of other sets, 
is such that one member occurs with each instantiation of the label. 
The same ‘rules’ apply to category structures as to other input-output mappings if 
they are learnt, in some way, using a gradient descent technique such as the Widrow-Hoff 
or Rescorla Wagner rule. These rules made the behaviour of network implementations of 
46 
the Rescorla Wagner rule fairly predictable under specified circumstances such as a fixed 
category structure. 
Gluck and Bower (1988a), identifymg this logical link between learning theory and 
categorisation, developed a connectionist implementation of the Rescorla-Wagner rule, 
coupled with a logistic choice function to see how it would predict certain category 
learning phenomena. The model used simple stimulus representations but developed the 
learning and activation functions along lines comparable with those of Sutton and Barto 
(1981). This meant that the ‘activation’ of the node was represented in both the response 
strength generation, and the increment to the associative strength. 
The initial model was surprisingly simple, using binary-valued activation for the 
representation of the presence or absence of stimulus components. It was, however, 
successll in ‘predicting’ a phenomenon known as base-rate neglect (Gluck & Bower, 
1988a) (which will be discussed below). The representations used in this ‘component cue’ 
network were somewhat limiting due to their inability to deal with category structures 
dependent on configural relationships between stimulus components (which are linearly 
inseparable for the component cue form of stimulus representation). 
One aspect of any category learning task, such as that of Shepard et al. (1961), is 
that it requires adequate representations of the stimuli. Rescorla and Wagner did not 
commit to using terminology such as ‘representation’ (Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). 
The model is ostensibly concerned with the relationship between particular stimuli and 
particular responses. The stimuli used and the relationships learnt in the experiments 
discussed by Rescorla and Wagner were of a fairly simple nature. Stimuli such as tones 
and lights could be accurately modelled by simply representing each stimulus as a separate 
‘element’ which was either contributing all of its associative strength to a response choice 
when present, or contributing nothing at all when it was absent. 
As research into category learning progressed, network models were developed 
with alternative methods of representing the stimuli. As will be discussed below, using 
different representations can lead to different model predictions when using the same 
learning function. In terms of developing a model of category learning, this leads to a 
question as to what to do when the model does not predict the data. Should one alter the 
model of representation or alter the learning rule, or do both? 
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Despite the widespread use of the Rescorla-Wagner rule in models of learning of 
different types, the rule does have some persistent problems with the modelling of certain 
observations. In some cases, as the sophistication of category learning models has 
developed, these shortcomings have been addressed. Somewhat paradoxically though, 
models incorporating more complex representations and the relationships they imply 
between stimuli are occasionally unable to continue representing some of the basic data 
from which the Rescorla-Wagner rule emerged. Some of the difficulties with the basic 
Rescorla-Wagner model, potential solutions, and the occasional resultant loss of 
generalisation will be discussed in the next two sections of this review, and returned to 
later in the thesis. 
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3.2. Representation of the stimulus 
The previous section addressed theories regarding the way in which ‘evidence’ in 
favour of a decision to respond in a certain way accumulates according to the conditions of 
reinforcement associated with that response, It also dealt with functions which seemed able 
to characterise the way in which evidence in favour of alternative responses may be 
compared, in order to provide an estimate of different response probabilities. These latter 
functions indicated that evidence might be compared using either a ratio or a difference 
measure between their ‘levels’. This section addresses the ways used to represent where 
this evidence comes iiom. 
3.2.1. Stimulus representation and learning 
It is difficult to say exactly how a stimulus ultimately contributes to the production 
of a response. All that can be done is to identify what information is required by a given 
model of the decision process and a given model of the way learning occurs, in order for it 
to able to represent the observed behaviour. 
This seems to be a job of representing which aspects of stimulus variation seem 
best related to variation in response patterns. All of the learning rules described above 
attempted to incorporate, in some way, variables representing different properties of the 
stimuli with respect to learning. For some models, such as the Rescorla-Wagner model, 
this was in terms of individual salience parameters for each associable stimulus element. 
The stochastic learning models, such as those proposed by Restle, and Bush and Mosteller 
attempted to define the properties of the entire stimulus set using a single value. This value 
was generally derived from some ratio of relevant to irrelevant stimulus components. 
Both of these measures were represented in terms of fixed parameters, either 
pertaining to individual stimuli or the learning rate in general. The idea of linear 
separability discussed in the previous section, however, suggested that the ability of a 
learning plus choice model to represent observed data may be substantially improved by 
altering the representation of the stimuli in the model. 
For an associative learning model, the stimulus representation determines how 
many associative connections are contributing how much to a decision process. It is a 
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statement about what it is ‘about’ the stimulus presented which gets associated with a 
response. 
If two events may be perceived as different from one another they may be 
associated independently with different responses. This independence implies, as far as a 
learning rule is concerned, that the two events may be represented as having their own sets 
of associative weights. The ‘theorem’ described above is somewhat circular, as the only 
way of demonstrating that two events are discriminahle from one another is by getting a 
participant to respond in one way if they think that event 1 is occurring, and another if they 
think that event 2 is occurring. The discriminability of the events is then a function of the 
reliability with which the participant can produce the ‘discriminating response’. 
3.2.2. Detectors in models of learning 
A description, which captures the connectionist idea of an input representation, is 
that of the ‘detector’. The detector may be described as some entity which is maximally 
responsive to the presence of some particular event. The detector is thus capable of 
delivering the activation component of the ‘evidence’ and learning functions if the 
activation is a measure of the presence of the event. 
What the detector is detecting is the modeller’s idea of what it is about an event 
which may be ‘captured’ or used to inform response probabilities. One may assume at least 
one detector for each event of interest. The justification for this step may be that the 
participant can discriminate between the events, therefore separate associative channels 
capable of developing different response strengths may be involved. The input to these 
channels must differ depending on which event is actually occurring. 
3.2.2.1. Compound stimuli and configural detectors 
Another basic finding from learning theory illustrated clearly that whatever these 
detectors were capable of representing, they must be capable of representing compound 
stimuli or configural cues as something separate to their components. The basic finding is 
that training on a set of associations between x and A, y and A, and the compound xy and 
B is routinely possible for animals. The implication is that animals can discriminate 
between x and xy to some extent such that a separate association strength for the 
compound is indicated. 
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In terms of connectionist modelling this task is basically an analogue of the 
exclusive OR (XOR) task which was used by Minsky and Papert (1969) to outline the 
linear inseparability problem for a certain class of network models. The XOR task 
involves, for a two-input two-output network, the learning of the following mappings 00- 
A, Ol-B,lO-B, and 11-A. There is no arrangement of weights possible between x and y and 
A and B which allows this mapping to be ‘learnt’ by the network. 
The problem generalises beyond compounds of two stimulus elements. Higher 
dimensionality, or arity, linear inseparability can be described as instances of a ‘parity 
problem’. 
A parity problem or a d-bit parity problem (e.g. Bishop, 1995) is one that involves 
a system trying to reduce mean squared error given a binary input vector with d elements, 
and output mappings of; A when there is an even number of ones in the vector, and B 
when there is an odd number of ones. In terms of a learning experiment, the participant is 
shown stimuli from a set of d possible stimuli. They are rewarded for responding A when 
there are an even number of stimuli and B when there is an odd number of stimuli; they are 
not informed that this is a parity problem. 
In the Shepard et al. (1961) category learning tasks the type VI is an example of a 
parity problem. In this case inspection of figure 2.1 shows that, when represented as binary 
sequences, members of category A have an odd number of ones and members of category 
B have an even number or zero. The type I1 task is a not a parity problem in three 
dimensions but is in the two dimensions required as a minimum for performance of the 
task. 
As reported in Shepard et al. (1961), the re-coding of the type VI problem in terms 
of a parity problem is quite a rare occurrence. When it occurs it strongly improves 
performance on reflections and rotations of the type VI structure, which are also parity 
problems. Parity problems get harder as the dimensionality in which they occur is 
increased. This may be seen in terms of the comparative difficulty of type I1 and VI tasks 
as noted by Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994). It is also seen at a basic level, 
in terms of the relative difficulty of condensation and filtration tasks (Kruschke, 1993). 
This is a different conceptualisation of the problem in that the condensation task 
may be represented by binary vectors with the same mapping as that given for the XOR 
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problem described above. The filtration task has the mappings 00-A, 01-A, lO-B, and 11- 
B. The filtration task is easier to learn than the condensation task which agrees with the 
idea that task difficulty may correspond to the number of dimensions at which the problem 
is a parity problem. Taking zero to be an even number the filtration task is only a parity 
problem from the point of view of x, whereas the condensation problem is a parity problem 
at two dimensions. 
There are a number of ways of addressing the problem; the simplest first is the 
configural representation. If a person can do an n bit parity problem then they must have n 
bit representations of the vector or they have re-coded it such that it can be expressed as a 
parity problem. Data regarding category learning of stimuli at different arities suggests that 
firstly, re-coding by participants in terms of a parity problem is rare and, secondly, that the 
results may be modelled simply using representations with the same arity as the parity 
problem. 
The assumption is that when x and y are presented together they may be 
represented in terms of an event which is unique to that particular configuration. This event 
is represented using a separate set of connections or weights to the decision process and a 
separate activation value (e.g. Wagner & Rescorla, 1972). 
Using this configural representation with a choice rule and a learning scheme such 
as the Rescorla-Wagner rule, the new model is capable of simulating the compound- 
component discrimination experiment as well as the blocking and the transfer 
performances described in section 3.1.3.1. This performance is somewhat dependent on the 
model one uses to determine bow the different sources become active. 
The simplest approach to this is to suggest that the xy detector is not responsive to 
the presence of x or y alone, whereas the x and y detectors will activate in the presence of 
compound xy, as well as when their stimulus is present alone. To suggest that x and y 
detectors do not activate in the presence of compound xy will remove the ability of the 
model to generalise performance to the compound xy (problem 1, section 3.1.3.1). 
The simple configural approach given will enable transfer to compound, despite the 
fact that learning to the compound will be blocked by the presence of perfectly relevant x 
and y cues. Transfer to component will be achieved because x and y detectors are active 
and learning during the compound trials. 
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The number of configural detectors for a given stimulus set is, to some extent, 
dependent on one’s interpretation of the detector itself. From a computational point of 
view, a set of detectors with the same arity as the input vector are all that is required to 
solve any one-to-one mapping problem. One would also appear to need some means of 
representing the individual elements to allow transfer to and from compound stimuli. As 
such the minimum set of detectors required, so far, is one detector for each of the elements 
and one for each ‘total’ stimulus presented. 
For the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks this minimal representation would require that 
each member of each substitutive feature pair have a detector to itself and each total 
stimulus have one detector each. With all values of q, r, and s this will result in six ‘one- 
dimensional’ detectors and eight, three-dimensional detectors, 2d + 2d, where d is the 
dimensionality of the stimuli or number of pairs of substitutive features. 
Using this approach causes problems in terms of representing the differential 
difficulty of parity problems at different arities. This is revealed by category learning 
experiments such as that of Shepard et al. (1961). This model would predict a difference 
between a filtration and a condensation task, but would not be able to predict the difference 
in difficulty between the type I1 and type VI category structures (ibid.) shown in figure 2.1 
of the last chapter. In any filtration problem the element detectors will gain control over 
responding quite quickly owing to the fact that they are activated much more frequently 
than each of the three-dimensional configural detectors is. In any condensation task, 
regardless of its arity, control will have to be developed by the three-dimensional 
configural detectors. Their frequency is identical regardless of the task and as such 
learning of type I1 and type VI should proceed at an identical rate. 
3.2.2.1.1 The basic confgural-cue network 
There are two solutions to this problem. The first is to apply some measure of 
similarity as the basis of a detector activation function. As will be described below, in this 
case generalisation may enable the different difficulties of different arity parity problems 
to be predicted. 
The second way to solve it is to imply that each stimulus set is represented in terms 
of the activity of a set of detectors corresponding to the powerset of features. For the 
Shepard et al. (1961) tasks, the powerset representation would require detectors for each q, 
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r, and s feature, each combination of q & r, q & s, and, r & s, features and each 
configuration of q, r, and s features. This yields a total of 26 detectors which may be 
grouped into seven sets according to the component pairs represented. As with the binary 
value stimulus elements this corresponds to q. r, s, qr, qs, rs, and qrs, one detector being 
active from each set. 
Using this representation predicts the difference in difficulty between the type I1 
and type VI structure in terms of the different frequencies of relevant configurations of 
stimuli. Each of the arity two representations, required for the type I1 to be learnt (it being 
inseparable with one-dimensional detectors) is present on one quarter of the trials whereas 
for the type VI each of the necessary arity three representations are active on only one 
eighth of the trials. 
The configural-cue model was implemented by Gluck and Bower (1988b) using a 
simple Rescorla-Wagner learning rule and a logistic choice function in order to assess its 
ability to predict the difficulty of the Shepard et al. (1961) category structures. There was 
no direct representation of similarity in the activation functions with each detector being 
active only when its particular ‘cue’ or configuration was present. The model was 
implemented with a single output node using values for lambda of 1 for one category and 
-1 for the other. While it predicted the relative difficulty of types I, 11, and VI, it predicted 
the overall order to be different to that observed. The configural-cue model predicted that 
for early blocks I11 and IV were learnt with fewer errors than types I1 and V. Later in the 
simulation though I1 and IV change order such that the final order is I, 111, 11, IV, V, VI. 
Nosofsky et al. (1994), in their partial replication of Shepard et al. (1961), tested 
the configural-cue model using a slightly different learning rule and a ratio-based choice 
function in order to establish a quantitative fit to the learning data using parameter 
optimisation. They revealed a best fit which resulted in an ordering pattern and crossover 
qualitatively identical to that found by Gluck and Bower (1988b). 
The reason why the configural-cue model does not predict the correct order of 
difficulty will be discussed in more detail below and in the next chapter. The failure of the 
basic configural-cue model to reproduce the order of difficulty observed by Shepard et al. 
(1 961) and Nosofsky et al. (1 994), however, indicates only that this type of representation 
with the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule and a logistic or ratio choice function is 
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inadequate. Attempts to get a model using a configural-cue representation to reproduce this 
order have consequently focused on altering the way in which detectors become associated 
with responses. These attempts involve adding extra weights controlled by their own 
learning rules to the model as an augmentation of the basic associative rules. These 
modifications will be discussed in more detail in the third section of this chapter when 
models of selective attention are discussed. Before that, the next sub-section deals with 
other models of stimulus representation. 
3.2.2.2. Similarity, generalisation, and the psychophysical model 
As discussed in the previous sections, generalisation of response control between 
similar stimuli is a central part of any theory of learning. In terms of the activation of a 
detector or set of detectors representing stimuli, one’s model of generalisation may 
determine, to a great extent, the activation function for each detector. 
The use of contingency tables to represent confusability originated with 
psychophysical research into such areas as discrimination and identification performance. 
In this domain it is traditionally known as a confusion matrix. In the table one may 
represent the different responses by their own row and the stimuli by their own column. In 
each cell the number of times a participant made a particular response when presented with 
a particular stimuli is recorded. These numbers may be converted into joint probabilities 
p(stimulus, response) by dividing the number in the cell by the total number of responses 
made. Generally only one response is made per trial, where only one stimulus is presented, 
in the case of identification. For discrimination tasks two stimuli may be presented with the 
participant required to respond with one behaviour when they think that, say, tone stimulus 
1 is the louder and respond with the other when they think stimulus 2 is the louder. 
Obviously, only one cell in each row contains ‘correct’ responses. The remainder 
are generally known as ‘confusions’. While the error could be random, the analysis of 
these results, on an enormous number of occasions with a wide variety of sensory continua 
has revealed that this is extremely unlikely (see Shepard, 1987 for a brief review). The 
probability of responding that stimulus x has been presented in an identification task when 
it was, in fact, y decreases as a function of the ‘distance’ between x and y on the 
continuum. 
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In his review of detection and recognition theory in 1963, Luce describes the 
development of the similarity measure used in the model described in section 3.1.2.1. The 
basic property of the similarity measure is that if one has a continuum representation of a 
particular stimulus’ level or intensity, it is demonstrated that the probability of conhsing 
this stimulus for another, with a different level, is a function of a constant raised to the 
negative power of the difference between the two levels on the continuum scale. 
In order to determine the choice probabilities of responding that x has been 
presented rather than y, when a stimulus i has been presented between them on the 
continuum scale, one simply compares the similarity of the stimuli to the two ‘detectors’. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates graphically the relationship between distance on a scale, similarity, 
and the kind of response probabilities observed. 
In this case, two stimuli have been presented at level 1 and level 5 on the 
continuum. The participant is told the appropriate response for each stimulus. Testing with 
stimuli in between 1 and 5 reveals a sigmoid pattern of response probabilities as shown 
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between distance along a continuum of a stimulus i, its similarity 
to a stimulus located at 1, s( 1 ,i) and to another at 5 , 4 5 4 .  The probability estimate, p( 11 i) 
is calculated from the ratio of similarity to 1 over the sum of similarities to 1 and 5.  A 
‘linear’ estimate of conditional probability is also shown. Both probability measures share 
the point of maximum uncertainty at halfway between the two stimuli. 
The simple linear distance function; 
(3.18) 
where 1, is the level of i on the scale will yield the diagonal dashed line shown in figure 3.4 
which is at odds with the observed distribution. The ratio of similarities, however, 
produces something approaching the observed distribution. 
SI i 
Sli +ssi 
p( l  I i) =- (3.19) 
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Here s , ~  is the similarity of the input, 1, to i and, assuming that the similarities are 
symmetrical, the similarity of i to 1.  The similarity of two stimuli i and j on a continuum, 
x, for use in the above probability estimate, is given by, 
(3.20) -+-x,l sg = e  
where x, and x, are the levels of i and j on continuum x and c is a scaling parameter, c20. 
The scaling parameter is at the heart of the relationship between the similarity measure and 
the response probabilities. The scaling parameter here is generally constant across the 
scale. For figure 3.4, c is set to unity. Increasing the parameter will increase the gradient on 
the similarity curves, the result of this being a steepening of the sigmoid choice probability 
curve around the mid-point, with it approaching asymptote on either side at a more rapid 
rate. 
For this model it is the scaling parameter that has to be estimated from 
experimental data by minimising the discrepancy between the choice curve predicted and 
that observed. This parameter determines what size of difference on the continuum, with 
its arbitrary scale, may represent a unit of ‘psychological distance’ or psychological 
difference. For figure 3.4, for example, if the observed curve between 1 and 5 units on the 
scale of interest was steeper around the mid-point than that shown, the implication would 
be that one unit on the measured scale corresponded to more than one unit in psychological 
space. This would mean that c would have to be increased to ‘scale’ the input. 
This similarity measure is the same as that used by Luce (1 963) in his identification 
choice model and Bush et al. (1964) in their more general treatment of the approach, its 
value is represented in equations 3.8 and 3.9, given in section 3.1.2.1, as q(ij). 
3.2.2.3. Exemplar representations, similarity, and categorisation 
As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, Shepard et al. (1961) considered that 
the relative difficulty of category structures might be modelled in terms of how similar the 
members of different categories are to each other. The stimuli used for categorisation 
experiments were generally ones which may have been described in terms of collections of 
features rather than differences along different continua. 
In this case there is a difference in the kind of scales used to measure the distance 
between two objects. For the experiments carried out in psychophysics, the stimuli would 
vary along continuously differentiable quantitative scales. These scales would typically be 
ratio scales. In the case of categorisation experiments and many of those in animal 
learning, the differences between stimuli tended to be of a substitutive nature with respect 
to their features or components. A feature would either be present or absent, or two 
features such as a square and a triangle may form a mutually exclusive pair, one of which 
is always present in a presented set of features or object. 
3.2.2.3.1. The context model 
In 1978 Medin and Schaffer proposed a new model of category judgement and 
learning which was based in the idea that people made categorisation decisions based on 
the retrieval of information from ‘exemplars’ stored in association with the category ‘label’ 
or rewarded response. The exemplar is an individual instance of an object or total stimulus. 
The representation of the stimulus here is in the form of one ‘node’ or detector per 
stimulus instance. The learning rule proposed for this model will be discussed later but, 
concentrating on the detector, the activation function for this representation is of interest. 
Evidence contributing to a category decision would be retrieved from each stored 
exemplar by a particular input, according to the similarity of the stored representation to 
that input. A ‘multiplicative’ similarity rule was proposed based on the intuition that the 
presence or absence of some features would be more diagnostic of category membership 
than others (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). 
The multiplicative rule represented the presence of a feature with a one and its 
absence, or alternate form, with another number whose value was in the unit interval. The 
multiplicative rule meant that if the presence of a feature was a necessary condition of 
class membership, then its absence in a particular stimulus could be represented by a zero. 
Regardless of the number of other valid features present in the object, once their product 
was multiplied by the zero, the similarity, and thus the contribution, of the stored exemplar 
to the category judgement would be zero. 
The determination of the value of such parameters in a given experiment will be 
discussed below but, the similarity of an object i to a stored exemplar j, si with number of 
features is determined as follows; 
(3.21). 
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The value fk is the Similarity value for feature j where 05 fk< 1 if that feature is absent or 
different in the object and 1 if it is the same. In the case where all fk are equal to a single 
value s when the feature is absent or different, the similarity may be described in terms of 
the number of feature values for the exemplar j which are different in the object i, d, , as 
follows, 
s U = s d v  (3.22). 
In order to predict the probability of a particular category decision, given a 
particular test stimulus, Medin and Schaffer (1978) used the sum of the similarities of the 
input to the stored members of that category divided by the sum of the similarity to all 
stored exemplars. So the probability of selecting category A from categories A and B, 
given test stimulus i is, 
To make predictions regarding experimental data on assignment of transfer stimuli, 
the f parameters must be estimated from the training data. Medin and Schaffer did this by 
optimising parameters to achieve a close quantitative fit of predicted error to the observed 
error frequencies for the experiment. 
Medin and Schaffer compared the performance of the context model with that of 
component cue models and also a prototype model on tasks involving performance on new 
objects similar to members of training sets whose assignments had previously been learnt. 
The category structures were ‘ill-defined’ or not linearly separable using component cue 
representations so the superiority of performance by the exemplar model is unsurprising in 
this respect. 
The basic idea of prototype models (e.g. Rosch & Mervis 1975) is to assume that 
category learning establishes a category prototype, or average member, for each category 
based on the frequency of occurrence of different features within each category. The 
probability of category membership for a particular stimulus is calculated in terms of its 
‘prototypicality’ which may be described in terms of the similarity of the input to the 
category prototype. 
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These mathematical models appear to have little capacity to generalise beyond 
some ‘family resemblance’ structures, where membership may actually be a function of 
proximity to the prototype. The type N category structure of Shepard et al. (1961) shown 
in figure 2.1 is an example of a family resemblance structure in three dimensions. The 
prototype, or central members may be described in terms of having feature values of all 
ones or zeros. The more ones a stimulus has, the closer it is to the prototype and, the 
argument goes, the more readily it will be assigned to that category. Other structures from 
the Shepard et al. (1961) experiment cannot be readily predicted using a prototype 
approach (Estes 1994, p. 51-54). The type I1 and type VI structures, for example, have 
their prototypes ‘located’ in the same place; i.e. they are identical for each category. 
The experiment designed to contrast the performance of the context model from the 
prototype model involved a family resemblance structure in four dimensions. There were 
sixteen stimuli, nine of which were presented during training. These, significantly, 
surrounded (in terms of number of different features) but did not include the prototypical 
member for one of the categories. 
The prototype model would predict that when that prototype was presented as a 
transfer input it should lead to the appropriate category response much more frequently 
than would a member of the training set with just one feature different to the prototype. 
This is because the prototype is effectively already represented as the average training set 
member, with proximity to that member determining level of ‘output’ from the prototype. 
The context model would predict that the previously presented exemplar would be 
classified more accurately than the prototype because they would be closer to the other 
members of the category than the prototype, which would have to be at least one feature 
different to all other members. The results contradicted the predictions of the prototype 
model, but were predicted to some extent by the context model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978, 
Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992). 
3.2.2.3.2. The identification-categorisation relationship: the mapping hypothesis. 
The resemblance between Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) conception of the 
determination of response probabilities and that presented in Shepard’s model of stimulus 
generalisation (Shepard, 1957) and Luce’s identification choice model (1963) was 
examined in detail by Robert Nosofsky (Nosofsky, 1984, 1986). Nosofsky related the 
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identification model with the context model of categorisation via the mapping hypothesis. 
The hypothesis originated in Shepard et al. (1961) as a way of describing the difficulty of 
the categorisation tasks in terms of the similarity of members within categories and the 
dissimilarity of members of different categories. 
This involves the assumption that an identification learning experiment could be 
conducted with the stimulus set. The frequency of each stimulus-identifying response 
could be presented in an identification-confusion matrix, with one row for each stimulus 
presented and one column for each identifylng response. Having done this, one could 
estimate the difficulty of a categorisation task, where stimuli were grouped into two equal 
sets. According to the mapping hypothesis, the probability of assigning each stimulus to 
the correct category would be a function of how likely the participant was to confuse the 
stimuli, in the identification experiment, for stimuli which were, in this case, members of 
the same category (Nosofsky, 1984, p.105). 
A formal representation of the mapping hypothesis is given by Bush et al. (1964) in 
the context of identification experiments where, when presented with a stimulus k during 
training the participant was, with probability represented by n(il k), given feedback saying 
that the stimulus was, in fact, j. As with the identification choice function in equation 3.9, 
this function describes the expected conditional probability of producing response j when 
presented with stimulus i as the number of trials, n, approaches infinity (from Bush et al. 
1964, p. 212), 
h=l k=l 
P(k) is the probability of stimulus k, 06) is the response-determined learning rate of 
response j, and, as above, q(i,k) is the similarity of i to k. If one assumes the learning rates 





The numerator is the sum of the similarities of i to all m k multiplied by the 
probabilities that when k was presented, j was the rewarded response. The denominator is 
the sum for all m responses, h, of the similarities of i to all m k multiplied by the 
probability that k was assigned to response h. 
In a category learning experiment such as the Shepard et al. (1961) paradigm, the 
probability of rewarded response will be one or zero. With only two responses A and B, 
four of the stimuli, k, have n(Al k) =I and n(BI k) =0, the remaining four have n(Al k) =O 
and n(B( k) = l .  This reduces the function to that effectively used by Medin and Schaffer 
(1978) given in equation 3.23, and described by Nosofsky (1984) as a bias-free version of 
Luce’s (1963) choice model for stimulus identification. 
3.2.2.3.3. Identification, categorisation and similariq. 
It is important to note that despite the similarity of equations 3.25 and 3.23, they 
are actually referring to different things. The Luce (1963) and Bush et al. (1964) equations 
both refer to asymptotic response probabilities for both previously presented and transfer 
stimuli. Equation 3.23 refers to only the response probabilities for transfer stimuli 
presented after asymptotic training on a set of similar, but non-identical, stimuli. It is also 
applied as a learning rate estimate as it was, in a way, by Shepard et al. (1961) and to the 
same structures by Nosofsky (1984). The six category structures are all ‘learnable’ 
typically to a criterion of no errors across 32 consecutive trials. 
This suggests, as an implication of the identification choice rule, that the similarity 
between the objects presented is, effectively zero if measured in terms of their 
psychophysical dimensionality. The similarity/ generalisation referred to in category 
learning tasks, where the stimuli consist of substitutive (and one assumes perfectly 
discriminable) feature collections, is of a somewhat different nature to generalisation, as 
used in identification and recognition paradigms. The latter form of generalisation is 
related to some assumption of limitation in the capacity of sensory systems to resolve 
differences of less than a certain absolute magnitude. The effect of this cannot be removed 
by learning. 
In common, the two forms may both influence the rate at which asymptotic 
response probabilities are reached. As suggested above the only asymptotic probabilities 
that featural object similarity will control is that of transfer stimuli. This is, of course, 
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unless the task is not linearly separable at the arity of the exemplars themselves. For 
example, some stimuli are sometimes members of A and the rest of the time members of 
B, such that these stimuli are identical to stimuli in both categories. Whatever the nature of 
this generalisation, it may be removed by learning and, as such does not represent a limit to 
the ability to categorise the stimuli. 
Despite this important difference, the nature of the generalisation function for 
objects such as those used in Shepard et al. (1961) may be described in similar ways. 
Nosofsky (1984) considered the multiplicative similarity rule of Medin and Schaffer 
(1978) in relation to the negative exponential used in psychophysical models. 
In the identification choice model and in multidimensional scaling theory, 
similarity is regarded as a decreasing function of ‘psychological’ distance. Such a model, 
when applied to multidimensional stimuli, involves the stimuli being located in points in a 
psychological space with as many dimensions as the objects have. Their similarity is then a 
function of the sum of the distances between them on all dimensions. 
The distance metric used in multidimensional scaling (MDS) theory is known as a 
Minkowski-r metric and takes the following general form where d, is the distance between 
stimuli i and j, 
(3.26). 
Each x is a dimension with i, and j, representing the scaled (using identification and MDS) 
values of stimuli i and j on that dimension. The value of r, when 2, renders the 
‘psychological distance’ a function of the Euclidean distance in n, dimensional space. It 
has been found that Euclidean distance (r=2), only seems to provide adequate confusion 
estimates for stimuli composed of what may be described as integral dimensions. 
Integral dimensions are those which appear to ‘combine’ into unanalysable wholes 
when together in the same stimulus (Nosofsky, 1984). An example appears to be the 
dimensions of hue, brightness, and saturation with respect to colours (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 
1996). These may be contrasted with separable dimensions which appear to remain 
psychologically distinct when combined in a stimulus. The stimuli used in categorisation 
and learning experiments, particularly those described so far, tend to be of this type. 
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For separable dimensions, a Minkowski-r metric of 1, also known as the 'city- 
block' metric, or one which describes the 'Hamming distance' (Gluck, 1991) is generally 
used. Whereas the Euclidean metric is a straight-line distance between points, the city 
block metric may be described as the distance between two points when one can only 
travel along one dimension at a time. It is important to note that the r metric is an estimated 
parameter. It should be emphasised that an r metric of two enables better fits to data for 
stimuli composed of dimensions described as integral, whereas r=l seems to fit stimuli 
describable as composed of separable dimensions. 
Some justification from categorisation research for the distinction between 
analysable and non-analysable, applied to dimensions for which r values of 1 and two are 
appropriate, emerges when concepts of selective attention are considered. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section on selective attention. 
Nosofsky (1984) pointed out that one could provide a certain amount of 
psychological justification for Medin and Schaffer's (1978) multiplicative similarity rule 
by identifying the relationship between it and the distance measure. This comes from the 
assumption that distance influences decision processes according to the exponential decay 
function used in Luce's (1963) model. In this case the fd values for the multiplicative 
similarity function in equation 3.2 1 are each determined using the exponential decay 
similarity function given in equation 3.20. Relative to equation 3.20, f, is the component 
similarity of two objects relative to component x and d," is the difference between two 
objects i and j on that component, either zero (the same) or one (different), 
f ,  =e-": (3.27). 
The scaling parameter c controls 'effect' of the difference, the higher the value of c, the 
lower f will be when d=l. The similarity of two objects, i and j, may thus be expressed in 
the following ways; 
I 
Nosofsky (1984, p. 107), where d," denotes the difference between i and j on component 01 
dimension x. 
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3.2.2.3.4. Application of the exemplar similarity approach to Shepard et al. (1961) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Shepard et al. (1961) attempted to predict the 
relative difficulty of the six category structures using a stimulus generalisation approach 
equivalent to the above. As also pointed out, the approach failed to predict the observed 
relative difficulties. 
Table 3.1 shows the similarity of each of the eight objects (from Shepard et al., 
1961) to each other, assuming that each dimension contributes an equal amount to the 
similarity measure. When one feature is different, the similarity between two objects is, 
consequently, s. According to the multiplicative similarity rule, when two features are 
different the similarity will be s2, and with three different it will be s3. This is equivalent to 
saying that c, in equations 3.27 and 3.28, is equal for all dimensions or feature pairs. 
Identical stimuli have a similarity of one. 
The table enables ‘prediction’ of the confusion matrix for these eight stimuli where 
the probability of confusing 000 for 001, for example, may be estimated by dividing the 
value in the cell (000,001) (row, column), by the sum of the values in the row 000. 
The mapping hypothesis, as described above, suggests that the difficulty of a 
category structure may be described in terms of the probability of confusing a stimulus 
from category B with other members of category B. In the table this may be evaluated for 
the type I structure by simply dividing, for each stimulus the sum of the similarities in the 
bold-headed columns by the sum of all the similarities in that row. 
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Table 3.1: Representation of the similarity matrix for the eight stimuli from the Shepard et 
al. (1961) task with a binary number representation of each heading each column and row 
(see figure 2.1). Bold type shows members of category B in the type I category structure. 
Assuming a value for c of one, and the distance represented by one feature 
difference to also be one, the appropriate ratio for each stimulus and each category 
structure can be calculated. Table 3.2 shows the ratios, as determined using equation 3.23, 
as they apply to the four members, in each structure, of category B. 
As can be seen, the rank ordering of the average conditional probability is I, IV, 111, 
V, 11, and VI. This is the same order as that reported by Shepard et al. (1961) for their 
estimation, and subsequently by Nosofsky (1984). As can also be seen there are differences 
in the conditional probabilities predicted for different members for the types 111, IV and V 
structures. Central members of the category (see figure 2.2) have the highest probabilities 
followed by peripheral members, followed, in the case of structure V, by exception 
members. Manipulating the value of c for the similarity functions does not have any effect 
on the overall ordering of the data, provided, of course, that 00. 
67 
category structure 
member of B I U I11 lv V VI 
1 0.73106 0.60678 0.60678 0.64020 0.51592 0.54934 
2 0.73106 0.60678 0.60678 0.64020 0.69763 0.54934 
3 0.73106 0.60678 0.73106 0.64020 0.64020 0.54934 
4 0.73106 0.60678 0.73106 0.82191 0.64020 0.54934 
average 0.73106 0.60678 0.66892 0.68563 0.62349 0.54934 
Table 3.2: Probability of response B, given each of the members of category B, for each of 
the six category structures according to equation 3.23 and the relative similarity measures 
given in table 3.1. The bottom row shows the average probability. 
3.2.2.3.5 Learning in exemplar models: the exemplar network 
The choice of learning rule for exemplar models of identification and 
categorisation, is a matter which highlights the difference between these models and the 
identification choice model of Luce (1963) and Bush et al. (1964). As discussed above, the 
mapping hypothesis relating categorisation and identification is concerned with a different 
‘type’ of similarity and generalisation to that represented in psychophysical models. In the 
case of categorisation models, the ratios derived from an identification confusion matrix 
may generally be applied to learning rates rather than asymptotic response probabilities. 
Early variants of the context model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978, Estes, Campbell, 
Hatsopoulos, & HurwitzJ989) were tested using a learning model which simply involved 
adding an exemplar to a category each time one was presented and associated with the 
category label. Each time a stimulus is presented, the response probability for a category, 
A, may be determined by the ratio of similarities of the stimulus to exemplars previously 
‘placed’ in category A, divided by the similarity of the stimulus to all exemplars. 
As discussed in section 3.1.2.2, the learning curve produced by this approach is one 
that tends to approach the asymptotic values defined by the Luce model. There is no 
leaning rate parameter for this model as the change in probability is determined by the 
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effect of the addition of one exemplar to a particular category. As also described in 3.1.2.2. 
the rate, in this case, will be controlled by the addition of bias or background noise 
parameters to the choice ratio function. These control the rate at which the model’s choice 
probabilities move away from chance, in terms of the rate at which the addition of new 
exemplars marginalises the influence of this bias parameter on the choice function. 
Evaluating the exemplar model in relation to component cue networks, Estes et al. 
(1989) suggested that the problem of these low asymptotic response probabilities, 
described as the ‘overlap problem’ (Rudy & Wagner, 1975), may be eliminated by the use 
of associative weights on each exemplar. The alternative is to suggest that the similarity 
parameters, or the gradient on the decay function, alter across the course of learning such 
that generalisation decreases as learning progresses. This leaves the problem of the 
exemplar model being unable to account for transfer performance at asymptote as, by this 
point, it is no longer able to generalise (Estes, 1994, p. 76). 
As will be discussed below, some models based on the exemplar representation 
effectively do both, i.e. alter similarity measures and use adaptive weights on each 
exemplar detector (e.g. Kruschke, 1992). These models incorporate assumptions regarding 
selective attention to particular stimulus dimensions and will be described in detail in the 
next section. 
In the simple exemplar network model, however, rather than adding an exemplar 
each time a stimulus is presented, the exemplar is conceptualised as a detector with an 
associative weight connected to each of the category decisions. This weight simply gets 
incremented by a variant of the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule according to the activation 
of the detector (related to the similarity of the stored exemplar to the stimulus presented), 
the ‘teacher signal’ at each category label node, and a constant learning rate. 
Variants of this model were developed and tested by Kruschke (1992), Nosofsky, 
Kruschke, & McKinley (1 992), and Estes (1 994) on various category learning experiments 
where its performance was generally superior to that of the context model of Medin and 
Schaffer (1978). In particular, Nosofsky et al. (1992) applied the model to a replication and 
extension of the inverse prototype experiment described in Medin and Schaffer (1978). 
The extension of the experiment involved tracking the inverse prototype effect at regular 
intervals across the training phase where transfer stimuli were presented after every four 
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blocks of training data. The model performed better than the context model on this 
extension, a superiority which may be attributed to the use of the Rescorla-Wagner 
learning rule (Nosofsky et al. 1992). 
The reason for this success is that the Rescorla-Wagner rule enables exemplar 
based detectors to develop inhibitory associative weights with respect to the categories 
they are not members of. These inhibitory weights may, as learning progresses, cancel out 
the excitatory contribution made by generalisation-activated exemplars belonging to a 
different category. 
The learning rate may still be predicted as being proportional to the intra-category 
similarities and inter-category differences of stimuli. In this case it determines the rate at 
which an exemplar’s associative weights are modified in favour of its category, compared 
to the rate at which it is receiving the opposite pattern of signals due to its activation by 
generalisation from a member of the alternative category. 
At this point, however, the difference between the effects of generalisation in 
categorisation models such as the exemplar network and that represented by models such 
as Luce’s identification choice model (1963) (as discussed in section 3.2.2.3.3) becomes 
signifcant. As discussed, the generalisation in the Luce model relates, at asymptotic levels, 
to some limitation of sensory capacity which does not appear to be compensatable by 
learning. In categorisation tasks the measure is one of generalisation of response. For many 
of the stimuli employed in category learning tasks, the probability of actually confusing 
one stimulus for another is likely to be vanishingly small. The measure used is based on 
multidimensional scaling, where the participant is asked to state which of two stimuli a 
third probe stimulus is more similar to. 
For familiar, readily discrimininable stimuli, when learning has proceeded to 
asymptotic levels, generalisation is not observable. This either indicates that its effect is 
‘concealed’ by the interaction of positive and negative associative weights (as suggested 
by the exemplar network approach), or that it is simply not occurring at all. In solving the 
overlap problem using the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule, the exemplar network loses the 
capacity to represent the sensory capacity limitation which results in psychophysical 
measures of confusability. 
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3.2.2.4. Comparison of the exemplar and configural-cue forms of representation 
Comparison of exemplar models with other approaches is a complex affair due to 
the different assumptions each model usually makes regarding the representation of the 
stimulus. For example, in the case of the configural-cue model, as described above, the 
similarity of two stimuli is ‘manifested’ at the level of the combined contributions from 
multiple representations or detectors. In the exemplar model, the activation of the detectors 
themselves is a function of their similarity to the input. 
The similarity functions of the two approaches may be contrasted in terms of the 
different accounts given by each model of the process of generalisation. In the exemplar 
model, generalisation occurs due to partial activation of the representations of whole 
stimuli due to their similarity to the one presented. The decision process is compromised 
by generalisation because members of different categories will make, albeit attenuated, 
contributions to each category decision in favour of the category to which they belong. 
In the case of the configural-cue model, generalisation takes place not because of 
some discrimination failure, but due to the use, in a decision process, of cues and cue 
configurations which are not unique to the stimuli presented. Where these cues and cue 
configurations are shared by stimuli from other categories, the decision process may be 
similarly compromised. 
The similarity function of the configural-cue model, with respect to the initial 
similarity of stimuli, may be calculated in terms of the number of features and feature 
configurations each stimuli has in common. Assuming a situation where, for example, a 
configural-cue network has been trained to asymptote on a single three-dimensional 
stimulus, one could say that equal associative strength would accrue to each of the seven 
cue and cue configuration detectors which represent the stimulus. On being shown a 
second stimulus with a given number of features, d, different from the trained example, the 
similarity measure, in terms of response strength which may be delivered to the decision 
process may be evaluated as follows; 
where n is the number of dimensions in i, and d is the number of different dimensional 
values in j. The value 2”-1 always gives the number of ‘spaces’ required by a configural 
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cue model to represent a stimulus with n dimensions and also the number of detectors 
which will be active, one from each space, when a stimulus with n dimensions is 
presented. 
Like the exemplar similarity function, this function also provides exponential decay 
of similarity as the number of features different, or the Hamming distance, increases 
(Gluck, 1991, Shanks & Gluck, 1994). One difference, however, is that when a stimulus 
has no features in common with one represented by a configural cue network, the 
similarity is zero. Another difference is that the gradient of the similarity function changes 
according to the number of features the object has. The gradient is inversely proportional 
to the number of features. 
Applying this function to the confusion matrix approach and the mapping 
hypothesis for the Shepard et al. (1961) stimuli yields the similarity measures shown in 
table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Representation of the similarity matrix for the eight stimuli from the Shepard et 
al. (1961) task with a binary number representation of each heading each column and row 
(see figure 2.1). These measures are produced using equation 3.29 as a similarity function 
for the configural-cue network. As in table 3.1, bold type shows members of category B in 
the type I category structure. 
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These values can be used in the same way as for the exemplar model, above, to 
calculate the ratios for each stimulus and each category structures. This results in similar 
patterns of individual ratios and average choice ratios for the structure as indicated by table 
3.4. 
category structure 
member of B I I1 III IV V VI 
1 0.73684 0.57895 0.57895 0.63158 0.52632 0.52632 
2 0.73106 0.57895 0.57895 0.63158 0.63158 0.52632 
3 0.73106 0.57895 0.73684 0.63158 0.63158 0.52632 
4 0.73106 0.57895 0.73684 0.8421 1 0.68421 0.52632 
average 0.73684 0.57895 0.65790 0.68421 0.61842 0.52632 
Table 3.4: Probability of response B, given each of the members of category B for each of 
the six category structures according to equation 3.23 and the relative similarity measures 
given in table 3.3. The bottom row shows the average probability. 
The reason why the order suggested by the confusion matrix is not precisely 
simulated by the configural-cue network model (see section 3.2.2.1.1), is due to the way in 
which learning takes place with this form of representation. While learning is dependent, to 
some extent, on these similarity measures, this is only the case because high intra-category 
similarity and low inter-category similarity corresponds to larger numbers of valid features 
and feature combinations. 
As will be discussed in the next chapters, learning rates in the configural-cue model 
may not be perfectly described in terms of simple relationships between the quantity, 
frequency, and validity of its representations with respect to a particular task. While types 
I11 to V structures have more valid representations than the type I1 structure, the different 
logical status of stimuli within the type 111 to V structures means that there is a strongly 
interactive character to the relationships between them. 
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In relation to the identification and classification of continuous-dimension stimuli, 
the basic configural-cue model clearly has something of a problem. This has, to some 
extent, been addressed by a variant proposed by Shanks and Gluck (1994) known as the 
consequential region model. This model is based on theories summarised in Shepard 
(1 987) regarding the mathematical modelling of generalisation. 
According to Shepard’s theory, a stimulus may be described as having what is 
described as a consequcktial region. This region may be represented in terms of a 
probability distribution with respect to its elicitation of a particular response. The approach 
is similar to the Luce model described above, and other theories relating classification and 
identification learning to the establishment of a distribution of response probabilities across 
the ‘stimulus space’ (e.g. Fried & Holyoak, 1984). Learning establishes the shape of this 
distribution and determines the degree to which the consequential regions of different 
stimuli overlap. 
While the approach is most clearly represented by an exemplar-similarity approach, 
Shanks and Gluck (1 994) suggested that one might achieve the equivalent by simply 
‘quantizing’ stimulus dimensions and allowing multiple detectors per dimension. These 
detectors, with a finite range, may or may not have overlapping receptive fields and the 
receptive fields may be of different sizes relative to the region of interest for the 
experiment. 
While this model may be fairly ‘expensive’ with respect to the number of detectors 
actually required, it was demonstrated by the authors to allow similar performance with 
respect to modelling identification and classification data to exemplar network models. 
This ‘overlapping consequential region’ approach has also been explored in relation to 
another, more recent model of categorisation given by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (in press, 
also Tenenbaum, 1996). Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ model is principally a Bayesian model 
of category learning rather than a connectionist one, but it is fairly similar to the Shanks 
and Gluck (1994) consequential region model. It has, similarly, been applied successfully 
to the representation of a range of category leaning data involving continuous-dimension 
stimuli. 
More research is indicated with respect to the application of this approach to 
modelling category learning, particularly in relation to situations in which selective 
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attention to dimensions is implicated (as will be discussed below). It does suggest that 
early reservations, regarding the ability of configural-cue networks to represent 
generalisation across continuous-dimension stimulus spaces, may be readily addressed by a 
reconceptualisation of the nature of the detector or stimulus representation. It is important 
to note, however, that for stimuli which are very similar to one another, such that one may 
not be able to reliably discriminate between them, the same problems apply to these 
approaches as to the exemplar network. 
Another related problem would be that the number of consequential regions per 
dimension must be limited in some way in order to ‘control’ learning rates. The larger the 
number of simultaneously active detectors on a given trial, with a constant learning rate 
parameter, the faster learning will be. Using a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule will result in 
‘instant’ asymptotic learning, if the learning rate parameter is greater than or equal to one 
over the number of simultaneously active representations. The resolution offered by this 
model may, therefore, be limited and also inflexible (without also assuming some change 
in the learning rate parameter). 
3.2.3. Generalisation between stimuli with different numbers of features 
Numerous observations in category learning research pose problems for 
connectionist models based on either exemplar or configural-cue representations of stimuli. 
The relationship between these problems and the mode of representation used in the model 
is, in many cases difficult to determine. As will be discussed in the next section, some of 
these problems appear to find solutions in the form of various algorithmic augmentations 
of basic models, incorporating processes which may be described as selective attention. 
The incorporation of these processes to particular models, however, does not necessarily 
enable a judgement to be made regarding which form of representation is most suitable. 
3.2.3.1. Component and configural control over responding 
Despite the success of exemplar based approaches in modelling category learning, 
a number of observations from research on associative learning appear to pose difficulties 
for this mode of representation. One of the main problems with the exemplar approach is 
its method of describing the generalisation of response strength between component and 
compound stimuli. 
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The exemplar approach appears to suggest that each stimulus, be it a compound of 
stimulus components, or simply those components presented in isolation, if it is presented 
and the response reinforced, should be represented by a separate exemplar. This is similar 
to the configural-cue approach, but the role which these exemplars play in control over 
responding is often modelled in different ways, depending on the data being simulated. 
The observation of transfer to compound from component would appear to require 
that the component exemplar is present at the same time as the compound representation. 
The compound, having not being presented, will have no associative strength of its own 
and as such the transfer observation would have to be accounted for by the influence of the 
component exemplar. 
The representation of transfer from compound to component, using the exemplar 
approach, is generally achieved in exemplar networks by assuming that the compound 
exemplar mediates responding, but that the similarity parameter for the absent component 
of the compound is, effectively, increased to one. In terms of the exponential similarity 
calculation given in equations 3.27 and 3.28, it requires an additional parameter to the 
distance measure for each feature (equation 3.26). Ths parameter multiplies the distance by 
zero if the feature is absent. While the similarity is still an exponentially decaying function 
of the distance between the exemplar and the stimulus, the distance for an absent feature is 
represented as being zero, such that exemplar activation is just a function of those features 
which are present. 
What this effectively means, is that the activation of a compound detector given a 
particular stimulus is unity when the stimulus presented may be described as a subset, of 
any size, of the compound (e.g. Estes et al. 1989, Kruschke, 1992, and Nosofsky et al. 
1992). The implication of this is that transfer to compound, following learning trials with a 
component, should be perfect. The other implication is that when training takes place on a 
single feature x and on a compound xy, both detectors will be active when x alone is 
presented. 
This interpretation of the model was invoked by the above authors to enable the 
context model and the exemplar network model to try to account for a phenomenon 
observed in associative learning known as base-rate neglect. Base-rate effects are observed 
in category learning experiments when one category occurs more frequently than another. 
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In a classic experiment by Gluck and Bower (1988a) (replicated by Estes et al. 
1989), for example, category A occurred on 0.25 of the trials and category B on 0.75. One 
of the features (of the four features used) occurred with a ikequency of 0.6 if the category 
was A and 0.2 if the category was B. With respect to the feature itself the probability of 
category A equals the probability of category B given the presence of the feature. If shown 
the feature in isolation then the normative probability p(Al feature) = p(B I feature) =0.5. 
Participants typically, do not take into account the base-rates of the categories when 
assessing the probability of membership, and assign a much higher probability to p(A I 
feature) than p(B 1 feature). 
A simple component cue network accounts for the effect in a straightforward way, 
due to the interactive behaviour of Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) learning rule. Because 
the cue above is the best available predictor of category B and the worst available predictor 
of category A, it tends to develop a higher associative weight with respect to B than it does 
to A. 
Interestingly, neither the configural-cue model nor the exemplar network is 
particularly good at modelling this effect without substantial modifications (Nosofsky et 
al. 1992, Estes et al. 1989, Landenowski 1995). Base-rate effects will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section as models which appear to be able to represent them seem to 
require some form of selective attention. 
Returning to the exemplar interpretation of transfer to and from components, the 
following situation appears to obtain. In order to explain transfer from component to 
compound, both the component and compound detectors must be active at the same time 
when the compound is being presented. In order to account for the generalisation of 
response strength from a compound to a component, however, the compound is described 
as being fully activated by any subset of its components. Recalling the observation from 
3.1.3.1, that training on x to A then xy to A followed by subsequent presentation of y alone 
seems to indicate blocking of any learning about y and A, constraints are imposed on any 
exemplar based explanation of this process. 
This would imply that during the training on x to A, an x exemplar is instantiated 
which then accumulates high levels of associative strength with respect to A. Presentation 
of xy paired with A should instantiate the xy exemplar whilst at the same time activating 
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the x exemplar to enable transfer. Because compound to component transfer is full in the 
exemplar model, the activation of x when xy is present must be sufficient to leave little or 
no error in the prediction of A given xy. If there were a ‘gap’ some associative strength 
would accrue to the xy exemplar. If this occurred then presentation of y in the following 
test phase would result in full transfer of response strength to y, which is a subset of xy. 
This account of blocking results in serious problems for the model being able to 
account for the ability to learn a compound-component discrimination such, as x to A and 
xy to B as, once instantiated, both representations will be equally active on each trial. 
Creating an asymmetry with respect to the similarity of compound and component would 
appear to be justified here. 
In order to allow the component-compound discrimination, the most practical step 
would probably be to allow the complete activation of the component in the presence of 
the compound, but to attenuate or eliminate the activation of the compound in the presence 
of the component alone. This, of course, would remove the ability of the model to account 
for compound to component generalisation. The most straightforward way of 
accommodating this may be to suggest that x and y exemplars are instantiated by the 
presence of an xy compound, and may acquire associative strength independently. The 
result is clearly a variant of the configural-cue model. 
Yet another observation from associative learning, however, poses problems for 
the configural cue model (and consequently any variant of an exemplar model able to 
represent the various transfer, discrimination, and blocking results described above). 
Shanks, Charles, Darbi, and Azmi (1998) reported, with human participants, that a training 
phase on x to A and xy to B, followed by a training phase on y to A, did not interfere with 
the previously learnt x and xy discrimination when these were presented in a subsequent 
test phase. 
This observation is problematic for configural-cue models, as these predict that a 
proportion of the association between xy and B will be a result of the accumulation of 
response strength for B by the y representation. The reversal of its association during the y 
to A training phase should, according to the model, have a serious affect on the response 
probability p(BI xy). 
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Shanks et al. (1998) interpreted this result as favouring an exemplar based 
approach, but only if that approach involved compound and component representations 
having activation functions which registered that x and xy were dissimilar. To offer an 
explanation, an exemplar model would have to assume that when xy was present, x and y 
component exemplars were much less active than when their component alone was 
present. When x or y was present, the xy exemplar would have similarly attenuated 
activation (ibid.). 
3.2.3.1.1. Pearce’s augmented conjgural-cue network 
A model which offers this type of representation is a form of hybrid between 
exemplar and configural-cue theories and is best captured by that proposed by Pearce and 
Hall (1980) (also in Pearce l987,1994a, 1994b, Pearce &Redhead, 1993). This model was 
developed to account for the observation that when learning a stimulus-response pairing of 
the form x to A, xy to A and xyz to B, learning of the x to A pairing was more rapid than 
learning of the xy to A pairing. 
The basic configural-cue network model predicts that the learning of xy to A 
should be more rapid because the x and the xy representation will be active during xy 
trials. For the x component alone, only one ‘detector’ is active and so the response strength 
should be less (Pearce, 1994a). 
In order to account for this, Pearce’s model proposed a form of activation for 
detectors based on the number of features each had in common with the presented 
stimulus. In the case of the above stimulus set, xy and xyz, for example, should be more 
similar to one another than x and xyz because they have more components in common. 
This should lead to greater generalisation of learning signals and consequently attenuate 
learning. 
The activation function in Pearce’s model provides yet another means of 
implementing the exponential decay of similarity with feature or Hamming distance. In the 
Pearce model (Pearce, 1987) the activation of a detector A, with A components, given the 
presentation of stimulus B with B components, or a(A I B) may be given by the following; 




Where AnB is the number of features A and B have in common. An alternative 
formalisation of this similarity function was given in Pearce (1 994b), 
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a(A 1 B) = kn B($ x$)] (3.3 1).  
If the detector is regarded as representing a vector in a feature space, with a co-ordinate of 
1 for the presence of a feature and zero for its absence, the similarity function is basically 
the cosine of the angle between vector A and vector B squared (ibid.). The activation 
function is basically symmetrical, in that the activation of x in the presence of xy is the 
same as the activation of xy in the presence of x. 
Learning in Pearce’s model is effected by a variant of the Rescorla-Wagner 
learning rule. The exception is that, despite the total response strength being a sum of the 
activity of all detectors on a given stimulus presentation, associative strength only accrues 
to the ‘focal’ detector, i.e. the one that represents perfectly the current stimulus (ibid.). 
The model can therefore predict the discrimination problem described above as 
well as compound to component and component to compound transfer, albeit at an 
attenuated rate compared to the basic configural cue model. Attenuation of this transfer in 
either direction has been a feature of its observation since first investigated by learning 
theorists (see, for example Hull, 1943, chapter XIII). Transfer to component is generally 
observed to be greater than half but less than full, with transfer to compound being less 
than double but greater than either component alone (ibid.). This attenuation is, 
significantly, not predictable by the basic configural-cue model. 
The model also predicts that learning about a relevant redundant cue, as in the 
blocking paradigm, will be attenuated, although it does not appear to be able to represent 
complete blocking due to the symmetricality of the similarity function. Whatever does not 
generalise from x to xy will be learnt by xy and generalise, to some extent, from xy to y. 
This problem, as pointed out by Shanks et al. (1998) and Shanks, Darby, and Charles 
(1998), also appears to restrict the ability of this model to account for the resistance to 
interference effects described for humans in the previous section. 
In addition, Pearce’s model will be similarly unable to predict performance on the 
Shepard et al. (1961) category learning tasks. With this type of stimulus set, where all 
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stimuli have the same numbers of features, the model should behave in a similar manner to 
the exemplar network and the basic configural cue network. 
These observations of Shanks et al. (1998) and Shanks, Darby, and Charles (1998) 
would appear to be quite damaging for all of the connectionist models presented above, 
particularly if they are to be used to predict other basic findings in human associative and 
category learning research. Whether they can be explained by modification of the models 
to incorporate selective attention learning processes or through use of alternative forms of 
representation seems uncertain. This resistance to interference appears to imply that there 
may be an extra ‘dimension’ to learning in the form of what these authors refer to as 
elemental versus configural processing. 
It would appear that human performance on certain tasks indicates that sometimes 
people’s learning may be best described in terms of elemental or component 
representations. For other tasks, such as in the resistance to interference tasks described 
here, people appear to use a strategy indicating that configural or ‘whole stimulus’ 
representations are being used. At the moment there do not appear to be any models 
capable of offering a principled account of what factors are likely to promote one type of 
learning over another (Shanks et al., 1998, p.1377). 
3.2.4. Stimulus and task dependent representations? 
The foregoing summary of methods of representation employed in connectionist 
models of learning, indicates a wide array of techniques available to address various 
experimental findings. It may be argued that many of the models described above were not 
specifically developed to explain the observations of Shepard et al. (1961), with respect to 
the relative difficulty of their category learning tasks. Similarly, models such as the 
exemplar network model were not specifically developed to account for simple associative 
learning experiments where stimuli consist of collections of ‘elements’ and vary according 
to the presence or absence of these features (Kruschke, 1996a, p. 23). 
Connectionist models may be said to begin with the hypothesis that ‘events’ may 
become associated with reinforced responses, according to some fairly simple rule 
describing changes in response probability as a function of the frequency of reinforced 
responses contiguous with that event. This ‘rule’ may be described in a number of ways. 
The methods, described in section 3.1, include simple response probabilities, or the 
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accumulation of some measure of response strength which may be readily converted to 
response probabilities for the purpose of making quantitative predictions. 
One thing which appears to distinguish connectionist models from other 
mathematical models of learning, is their commitment to some form of theory regarding 
which specific characteristics of an event may get associated with a particular response. 
This commitment, as may be apparent, is by no means a straightfonvard undertaking. It 
requires one to propose what type of ‘intra-systemic’ event will accumulate and retain 
control over responding across learning trials and, for some experiments, across concurrent 
tasks. It is also an essential commitment in that the connectionist approach requires that 
each discriminable event, when a contiguous response is reinforced, be capable of exerting 
some form of independent control over responding. 
The well-documented phenomenon of generalisation adds M e r  complications to 
this commitment. It would appear to require that whichever way one decides to represent 
this intra-systemic event, its control over responding would appear to be a function of 
some measure of its similarity to other events which may or may not be explicitly 
represented in the model. The various models described above deal with generalisation in 
different ways. Sometimes this depends on the nature of the stimuli being represented; 
sometimes it is based on other theoretical considerations. 
For simple stimulus events, such as those which may be described in terms of the 
presence or absence of certain features or elements, generalisation may be described in 
terms of some measure of what the stimuli have in common and/ or what is different about 
them. Set-theoretic models such as Amos Tversky‘s contrast model (Tversky, 1977, Gati & 
Tversky, 1982, Sattath & Tversky, 1987) represent a useful framework for analysing 
similarity in these terms. The basic expression of similarity in Tversky’s model is given in 
terms of the similarity of stimulus a, with feature set A, to stimulus b, with feature set B, or 
S(a,b) as follows; 
S(a,b) = e f A  n B) - @(A - B) - @(B- A )  (3.32). 
Where S and fare interval scales and 8, a, and p are parameters greater than or equal to 
zero (Tversky, 1977). A-B consists of the number of features in a that are not in b, or the 
distinctive features of a. 
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Tversky suggest that this theorem does not define a single similarity scale, but 
rather a family of scales dependent on the values of 8, a, and fi (ibid.). If, for example 
a and fi are set to zero then similarity may be just be a function of the features that a has in 
common with b. Such a function is described by the configural-cue similarity function 
given in equation 3.29 and the similarity function used by Pearce in his augmented 
configural-cue model given in equation 3.3 1. If the similarity of stimulus, a, to a ‘stored’ 
stimulus representation forb is defined in terms of the distinct features, then similarity will 
be a function of the features that are in b but not in a, i.e. B-A. In this case a function 
representing this might be the distance metrics used in the exemplar similarity functions 
described above (Gati & Tverski, 1982). 
Tversky’s main point seems to be that the similarity function itself may depend on 
the stimuli being compared and on the type of decision which is dependent on this 
measure, such that a single function may be inappropriate for representing the entire 
spectrum of findings in generalisation studies. Whether this means that more than one 
model of stimulus representation is required, or whether the generalisation function may 
be, in some way, selected according to task constraints is uncertain. 
One thing that seems quite clear is that the representational schemes proposed 
above, when implemented in terms of a connectionist network with basic learning 
schemes, are inadequate to explain numerous observations. While the Shepard et al. (1961) 
tasks provide one indication of this inadequacy, further constraints are provided by other 
learning tasks. 
The Shepard et al. (1961) tasks are quite limited in terms of the constraints they 
impose on connectionist models of representation and learning. The stimuli used, for 
example, all have the same number of features or dimensions and the categories have the 
same fiequencies. No transfer stimuli are presented such that a model capable of predicting 
the task difficulties does not necessarily have to offer any theories regarding how a 
participant may respond to new stimuli following learning of the tasks. 
As discussed above, the representation of these stimuli for the purposes of deriving 
an identification-confusion matrix may be achieved using a number of schemes. Without 
further modification each predicts a similar erroneous ranking of task difficulty. Each of 
the forms of representation, however, may be differentiated according to the predictions 
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they make with respect to other tasks. This is frequently a function of the way in which 
each model represents generalisation. 
As will be discussed in the next section, numerous experiments, including the 
Shepard et al. (1961) tasks, seem to indicate that generalisation is a flexible process. For 
example, generalisation does not operate equally with respect to all of the dimensions of a 
stimulus. Where the stimuli are not specifically dimensional and are based on features, 
then this process may be described in terms of a requirement to represent the differing 
‘salience’ or diagnosticity of different features with respect to the extent to which they 
inform decisions made about them. 
In a sense the problem is one of controlling generalisation according to the 
requirements of the task. This control appears to be something that is learnt. This requires 
that either a) some modification is made to the basic learning algorithms employed orb) 
‘secondary’ learning processes are proposed which operate in parallel to basic learning 
algorithms and control dynamic parameters within a basic learning algorithm. 
The control of generalisation is, obviously, a function of the way in which this 
generalisation is represented in the first place. As such the methods of control will depend 
on the method of stimulus representation employed. 
Another feature, which is important from a modelling perspective, is that allowing 
a model to represent adaptive variability in its mode of generalisation provides it with new 
degrees of freedom with respect to its performance on all tasks. As with all cognitive 
modelling, the new capacities added to a model should not compromise its ability to 
perform as well as the un-augmented model, unless it can be demonstrated that the new 
capacity will not be manifested in the performance of the ‘old’ task. 
84 
3.3. Variability in the associability of stimuli 
As discussed above, models of learning and categorisation are typically designed 
with a particular set of experimental data in mind. An analysis of the differences in the 
number and levels of independent variables between experimental designs must therefore 
inform the expectation that the performance of these models should generalise to other 
tasks. 
Numerous factors have been identified which can have an effect on associative 
learning. The similarity of the stimuli requiring different responses to one another is one 
independent variable which may be reliably related to learning rate. Representing this 
effect in a connectionist model would appear to be dependent on the use of appropriate 
representations of the intra-systemic events resulting from the presentation of a stimulus. 
The particular models of ‘detectors’ employed in connectionist models addressing 
generalisation phenomena are such that they are responsive either individually or en masse 
to the information which predicts generalisation. The identification and characterisation of 
a statistical relationship between independent and dependent variables is, in a sense, a 
basic model of that relationship (e.g. Estes, 1991). It may simply describe the shape of that 
relationship, as with the exponential growth function describing the relationship between 
frequency of reinforced responses to a particular stimulus, and the probability that the 
response will follow the stimulus on a given trial. The connectionist model attempts to 
suggest what kind of representations and information transmissions may be responsible for 
the observed curve. 
The characterisation of connectionist architectures as communication systems will 
be explored in detail in the next chapter. It is important, however, to emphasise that the 
identification of a relationship between an independent and dependent variable may be 
interpreted as identifymg a source of information for the mediating system. It is, to use 
biologist Gregory Bateson’s definition of information, ‘any difference that makes a 
difference’ (Bateson, 1979, p.228). In order for this difference to make the kind of 
difference it is observed to make in experimental participants, one’s model of the 
participant’s processing must be capable of being affected in some way by the difference. 
Sometimes this extra source of information may not have to be explicitly 
represented by a ‘dedicated’ process or variable in the model. For example, certain base- 
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rate effects, described briefly above, may simply manifest their effect via the behaviour of 
the same learning algorithms and representations used to model certain tasks where 
category frequency is equal. 
One might regard the ability of a model to capture observations, such as that of 
base-rate neglect, as an ‘emergent’ property of the model designed specifically to model 
other effects. Unfortunately, as also mentioned above, the component cue models, for 
which base-rate neglect appears to be an emergent property, are incapable of representing 
learning of component-compound discriminations. For models which are capable of this, 
the kind of base-rate neglect observed in experimental participants is not an emergent 
property (Nosofsky et al. 1992, Landenowski, 1995). 
As will be discussed below, the modelling of the effects of certain stimulus 
characteristics or differences in tasks, using a connectionist model, may require explicit 
representation, in some form, of the variable in question. One example of this may be the 
perceived intensity of a stimulus. Without some means of representing intensity 
differences it seems likely that it would be impossible for a model to capture the ability of 
experimental participants to be able to discriminate between stimuli with different 
intensities. 
For others such as task complexity in the Shepard et al. (1961) category structures, 
the differences between category structures consist of the different relationships between 
stimuli within and between categories. While one could suggest some objective measure of 
the complexity of a category structure which correlates with subjective difficulty, it seems 
unlikely that this variable is going to be explicitly represented anywhere in the cognitive 
architecture in such a way as to ‘control’ learning rates. 
Examples of operational definitions of complexity may be Shepard et al’ s (1961) 
measure of the distribution of information across the stimulus dimensions, or Feldman’s 
(2000) index of the Boolean complexity of a category structure. The former measure was 
discussed briefly in the previous chapter and will be described in more detail in the next 
chapter. Feldman’s measure involves expressing the criterion for category membership 
within a structure in terms of a propositional concept. It is basically a formal version of 
Shepard et al‘s (1961) assertion that difficulty was a function of the minimum length, in 
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number of clauses, of the rule required to describe how to assign any stimulus to a 
category. 
This example highlights the differences between the connectionist approach and 
that used in the stochastic learning models described in section 3.1.2. If one can identify a 
‘quantity’ using some analysis of the task which correlates with its subjective difficulty, 
one can propose a model of the type described in section 3.1.2 which is capable of 
representing the different learning curves. For example learning curves for each of the 
Shepard et al. (1961) tasks which reflect their subjective difficulty may be plotted using 
the following function where the change in the probability of responding ‘A’ given a 
member of category A, or ‘a’, as a stimulus is produced as follows; 
+(A la) = e(i-p(A(a)) (3.33). 
Where 8 is either a greater-than-zero decreasing function of the Boolean complexity of the 
task (after Feldman, 20001, or a decreasing function of some measure of the distribution of 
information across the stimulus dimensions for the task. 
This approach is not particularly helpful for producing connectionist models 
capable of capturing the subjective difficulty of a category learning task. In this case, the 
interesting questions are how something like task complexity may affect learning? What 
kind of generalisable representations and/ or learning rules are indicated by the fact that 
complexity does seem to have the effects it does on learning? 
3.3.1. Factors affecting the associability of stimuli 
Some of the factors which affect stimulus associability may be conceptualised as 
dimensions along which stimuli may, themselves, vary. It would seem that these 
differences might be most appropriately represented at the level of the stimulus 
representations. This would appear to be a problem of working out what kind of 
representations can facilitate the modelling of observed discriminatory performance across 
these dimensions. At the same time it may be the case that the values occupied by stimuli 
on certain dimensions may affect the rate at which they get associated with particular 
responses. Providing a model, particularly a connectionist model, capable of capturing 
both observations would appear to be a far from straightforward task. 
Some factors relate to prior knowledge regarding the stimuli or previous contexts in 
which the stimulus has appeared. In this case the problem of modelling ‘previous events’ 
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can only really be approached, in a generalisable way, by looking at concurrent learning 
tasks in which the previous experience of a participant is, to some extent, ‘known’ by the 
experimenter. 
Other factors may be dependent on the context in which a stimulus or stimulus 
component occurs. These may include, for example, the structure of the entire task or the 
relationship between the stimulus and other stimuli presented on the same or previous 
trials. In this case the focus of modelling may be on ways in which the stimuli are 
represented in a model, the way they all (including the context) are associated with 
particular responses, and the way in which these associations are maintained or not 
between trials or tasks. 
Frequently in learning theory these various factors tend to be grouped under the 
label of ‘salience’. Increasing salience implies increasing associability, with salience taken 
to mean whatever independent variable was increased, resulting in an increase in the rate at 
which stimulus was observed to get associated with a response. 
Tversky (1977) suggested a division of a stimulus or feature’s salience into two 
types of factor that he labelled ‘intensive’ and ‘diagnostic’. Intensive factors may be 
described as those which pertain to what might be described as the perceptual aspects of 
the stimulus such as brightness, loudness or clarity. Diagnostic aspects pertain to what 
Tversky describes as the ‘classificatory significance’ of a stimulus or stimulus component 
(ibid. p. 342). The diagnosticity of a stimulus is equated with the prevalence (or 
significance) of classifications which are based on that stimulus or component (ibid.). 
The representation of intensive factors is somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis 
but provides an interesting challenge for models of representation. The way in which they 
are represented appears, to some extent, to be a function of the experiment being modelled. 
For some experiments it appears to be appropriate to represent salience as something that 
has an effect on algorithms controlling stimulus associability. For others, such as the 
psychophysical studies described in section 3.1.2.2, intensive salience ought to be regarded 
as a dimension across which stimuli vary. 
Diagnosticity, however, appears to be the focus of numerous models in both 
categorisation and associative learning theory. The following section will deal, in the main, 
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with issues regarding the contribution of the diagnostic aspects of salience to models of 
learning and categorisation. 
3.3.2. Stimulus-specific learning rates 
Despite the widespread influence of the Rescorla-Wagner rule in learning theory, 
there are a number of experimental observations for which, regardless of the 
representations used, it is unable to offer a simple account. Some of these observations, 
such as the Shepard et aZ(1961), data relate to the ability of models to predict the relative 
rates at which tasks will be learnt. Others relate to the ability of models to predict 
performance across concurrent tasks or situations. 
Of this latter type a number of observations !?om learning theory would appear to 
indicate that learning may not only involve the development of some measure of 
associative strength between a stimulus and a response. In addition it would appear that 
experimental participants appear to develop some ‘knowledge’ regarding the diagnosticity 
of a stimulus or even stimulus dimension, which transfers between concurrent tasks. When 
a stimulus has been diagnostic for a particular task, it would appear that learning about it 
on a subsequent task is enhanced. Similarly, if a stimulus has previously been irrelevant 
with respect to predicting a classification, learning a new task where it is relevant seems to 
be attenuated. 
3.3.2.1. The conditioned stimulus pre-exposure effect and learned irrelevance 
One fiequently observed manifestation of this transfer of knowledge is known as 
the conditioned stimulus (CS) pre-exposure effect or latent inhibition. It is frequently 
observed that unreinforced pre-exposure to a stimulus attenuates learning about that 
stimulus when conditions are changed, such that it becomes a reliable predictor of 
reinforcement. This attenuation is observed relative to new stimuli introduced at the time 
reinforcement is introduced. It is also noted that the pre-exposed stimulus does not become 
a conditioned inhibitor for the reinforced response in that its presence does not, in any way, 
attenuate learning for new stimuli. The basic Rescorla-Wagner rule is not capable of 
predicting this phenomena (see Mackintosh, 1975, and Miller et al. 1995 for a review of 
the problem). As the evidence suggests that the pre-exposed stimulus does not act as an 
inhibitor, the only ‘place’ for its associative strength to go is ‘zero’ which will put it on an 
equal footing with any new stimulus introduced. 
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A similar observation is noted when stimuli are pre-exposed in a manner that is 
uncorrelated with reinforcement. Prior to testing relative to new stimuli, the stimuli are 
presented in a context where reinforcement is occurring but is uncorrelated with any of the 
stimuli presented. Subsequent learning about these stimuli, relative to new ones, is 
similarly attenuated. This phenomenon is generally described as ‘learned irrelevance’. 
As Wagner and Rescorla (1972), and Mackintosh (1975) have pointed out, the only 
way in which the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule can be made to account for these 
observations is to propose stimulus specific learning rate parameters. It is suggested that 
these will decrease in the event of non-reinforced or uncorrelated pre-exposure to a level 
below that of a new stimulus such that, relative to these stimuli, learning is attenuated. 
The CS pre-exposure effect and learned irrelevance are extremely significant with 
respect to the use of the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule. If, in order to offer some 
explanation of it one has to propose that the values of ai for individual stimuli may vary as 
a function of experience, then there seems little reason to suggest that aparameters should 
not change during the course of any other kind of learning. The conditions that one 
suggests as being responsible for the alteration of these parameters during, in particular, 
uncorrelated pre-exposure are just as likely to obtain during learning of other kinds. 
As pointed out by Mackintosh (1975) and Miller et al. (1995) this opens up the 
possibility that many of the observations predictable by the unique features of the basic 
Rescorla-Wagner framework may be predicted in terms of variation in learning rate 
parameters. In fact, any use of the Rescorla-Wagner rule in which a values for stimuli 
remain constant ought, in a way, to include an account of why they are constant under 
these particular conditions. 
3.3.2.2. Mackintosh’s theory of attention and associative learning 
Neil Mackintosh’s 1975 paper ‘A Theory of Attention: Variations in the 
Associability of Stimuli with Reinforcement’ summarises numerous observations of the 
role of different aspects of both intensive and diagnostic aspects of salience in associative 
learning. It also offered insights, which are still relevant (e.g. Kruschke, in press a), into 
how salience may be represented in models of learning. 
Mackintosh equated the learning rate parameter with a process involving attention. 
Similar to the stimulus sampling approaches of Estes (e.g. Atkinson & Estes, 1963) and 
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Restle (1955), the parameter was related to some dynamic probability that a particular 
stimulus would be ‘reinforced’ on a particular trial. Having these parameters alter on each 
trial was meant to represent the fact that associative learning not only involves the 
accumulation of associative strength between a stimulus and a response, but also involves 
a process whereby the relative relevance of stimuli with respect to a task is learnt. The 
hypothesis is that participants learn to ignore irrelevant stimuli and, conversely, pay 
attention to the relevant ones. While this process is approximated, under many conditions 
by theories such as the Rescorla-Wagner rule in terms of differential rates of learning as a 
fhction of diagnosticity, the CS pre-exposure effect and learned irrelevance indicate that 
associative weights can not be the whole story. 
Mackintosh’s theory regarding dynamic, stimulus-specific learning rate parameters 
was to suggest that ai would alter as a function of how well, relative to other stimuli 
present on a trial, stimulus i was capable of predicting the outcome. Formally, the theory 
suggests that where h is the asymptotic maximum conditionable on a particular trial (or the 
‘target’ value) and Vi is the current associative strength of i with respect to the response, 
then, 
The right-hand difference measure is between h and the sum of all of the other stimuli, j, 
present on that trial. Also, 
Aai  is negative if l/Z - Kl2 A --XT (3.35). 1 j t i  I 
The model assumes that O< ci < 1 and also suggests that the size of the change in a will be 
proportional to the difference between the two differences (Mackintosh, 1975, p. 287-288). 
The basic idea behind the model is that at the point of reinforcement (when h is 
determined) the discrepancy between each stimulus’ unique contribution to response 
strength and h i s  compared to the discrepancy which would result if it were absent. If this 
discrepancy is greater than or equal to that which would occur in the absence of the 
stimulus then the ci parameter for that stimulus will decrease. The rationale being that its 
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contribution is, at best, redundant. The learning rate parameter will increase if the 
discrepancy for a particular stimulus, i, is less than that which would occur in its absence. 
Mackintosh expressed reservations about decreasing c1 when the difference in 
discrepancies was zero. Given that he felt that the magnitude of the change in the learning 
rate parameter should be proportional to the differences in discrepancies it may be 
‘preferable’ if the change was zero when the difference in discrepancies was zero. The 
decrease, however, seemed necessary if the CS pre-exposure effect were to be explained 
using the model (ibid. p. 289). 
As Mackintosh explains, the model predicts the CS pre-exposure effect by 
assuming that a stimulus, when presented in the absence of reinforcement enters into the 
comparison relationships shown in equations 3.34 and 3.35 with a set of background or 
contextual stimuli. Because it does not signal anything that the background stimuli do not 
already signal, its learning parameter will decrease. In this case if the background stimuli 
are conceptualised as being more numerous than one then the learning rate parameter for 
the stimulus in question will decrease because its contribution will be less than the sum of 
these stimuli. In fact, the learning rate parameters for all of the background stimuli will 
decrease for the same reason. Also, if at least some of the background stimuli are present 
before the stimulus for which the pre-exposure effect is being tested, then the learning rate 
parameter will decrease for this stimulus because its contribution is, again, less than rather 
than equal to the sum of the other stimuli. 
The necessity for the decrease based just on redundancy of the stimulus (i.e. where 
its contribution is equal rather than less) appears to depend on whether one conceptualises 
the background as a ‘unitary’ compound or a set of stimuli. As will be discussed below, 
however, it may also become a factor when dealing with learning in compound stimuli. 
3.3.2.2.1. Alternative interpretations of observations @om associative learning 
It is important to note that Mackintosh’s model is not a connectionist model. It is 
basically ‘a program for a theory’ (ibid. p. 295) which proposes a set of rules which might 
apply to the representation of dynamic learning rate parameters. 
Mackintosh actually suggested that the incorporation of stimulus-specific learning 
rate parameters might remove the need for the Rescorla-Wagner rule as a theory of 
learning. In his descriptions of learning, the form adopted represented something of a 
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return to the Hullian concept where the increment to associative strength was a function of 
an individual stimulus’s discrepancy from the target value or h on that trial, rather than that 
of the combined response strengths. 
In the Mackintosh model, observations such as blocking may be accounted for by 
the reduction in the learning rate parameter for the redundant relevant cue introduced in the 
compound. Because its contribution will be less than that provided by the already ‘trained’ 
component it should only accumulate strength until such point as its learning rate 
parameter is reduced to zero. This should attenuate learning about the redundant stimulus, 
without recourse to a single increment signal determined by summed response strengths. 
overshadowing. When two stimuli are equally intense, but one is more rkliably correlated 
with reinforcement than another, very little response strength tends to accumulate for the 
less diagnostic stimulus. The Rescorla-Wagner rule predicts this in that the superior 
reinforcement schedule of the ‘overshadowing’ stimuli means that it acquires strength 
much more quickly. This reduces the overall error signal available to affect the less valid 
stimulus. The Mackintosh solution is that the less valid stimulus, due to its inferior 
reinforcement schedule, will generally not predict anything that is not better predicted by 
the more valid stimulus. Its learning rate will subsequently decrease as its relative 
irrelevance is learnt. 
Another frequently observed effect in associative learning is known as 
As mentioned above, Mackintosh’s theory is more of a framework of speculations 
which may be used to inform or guide more specific models. It does leave a number of 
questions open with regards to the relationship between the proposed attentional 
parameters and certain problems of learning and representation. 
Mackintosh proposes, for example, that associability weights may also have a role 
in controlling the contribution of stimulus representations to the decision process. As will 
be discussed below, this suggestion has tended to be adopted by more recent models that 
incorporate selective attention processes. In this case the associability parameter may be 
better described as a secondary weight with its own learning process. 
As will be discussed in the next section, certain observations suggest that these 
associability weights may, in some cases be dimensional rather than simply related to 
individual stimulus representations. Mackintosh suggested that such an interpretation may 
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be required to account for the results of experiments concerning dimensional relevance 
shifts. Numerous researchers (e.g. Kendler & Kendler, 1968, Zeaman & House, 1974, 
Kruschke, 1996b) have noted that if the response assignments of multidimensional stimuli 
are changed at some point during training, the new assignments are easier to learn if the 
change involves the same dimension being relevant than if the relevant dimension is 
changed. 
The shortcomings of Mackintosh’s approach are to some extent acknowledged in 
the conclusion to his article. In the context of this analysis they most obviously relate to its 
ability to handle configural learning and discriminations. The theory seems to relate best to 
an elemental approach to associative learning. Equations 3.34 and 3.35, above, indicate 
obvious problems with the learning of a compound association. Because each component 
of the compound would be making the same contribution to response strength, the 
implication is that each one’s learning rate should fall. 
This cannot really be mitigated by making the change to learning rates zero when 
the contribution of the stimulus is equal to that of other stimuli present on the trial. The 
problem would simply return if the compound consisted of three components. In addition, 
if the requirement for configural representations is acknowledged, any compound of two 
stimuli may be represented by three ‘detectors’. Each cannot have its own weight without 
all of those weights falling towards zero during any learning where all were equally valid. 
This would be particularly problematic if the weights were also determining the 
contribution to response probabilities. 
As mentioned above Mackintosh’s theory was only intended as a framework. Its 
most significant contribution, as will be detailed below, is the idea that the utilisation of a 
particular stimulus or stimulus dimension is likely to be a function of its diagnosticity 
relative to other stimuli present on the trial. Results from concurrent learning tasks such as 
those involving learned irrelevance and relevance shifts seem to require the operation of a 
second learning process that is dependent on the relative validity of stimuli or stimulus 
components. Taking into account such processes also appears to be central to any attempt 
to model category learning experiments such as the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. 
The ways in which these processes may be implemented in a connectionist model 
are likely to be substantially dependent on the way in which stimuli are represented. As 
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will be discussed below, there appear to be a number of ways in which such ‘selective 
attention’ processes can be implemented for even a single representational scheme. 
3.3.3. Dimensional attention: The generalized context model and 
ALCOVE 
One of the most influential models of attentional processes in category learning 
extends from the application of the intuitions of Shepard et al. (1 961), in relation to the 
task-dependent control of generalisation in exemplar representations. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Shepard et al. attempted to model the observed difficulty of their six 
category structures in terms of what was later described as the mapping hypothesis 
(Nosofsky, 1984) (see section 2.2.4.2 and 3.2.2.3.2). 
The failure of the approach to predict the observed difficulties prompted Shepard el 
al. (1961) to propose that some process of abstraction or selective attention might be 
involved. This process, it was suggested, would mediate the involvement of the different 
stimulus dimensions such that generalisation would be just a function of the dimensions 
relevant to the particular task. 
3.3.3.1. Robert Nosofsky’s Generalized Context Model (GCM) 
In examining the mapping hypothesis, Robert Nosofsky (1984) investigated Medin 
and Schaffer’s (1978) hypothesis, that selective attention of some description may play a 
role in determining the similarity parameters of the context model (described in section 
3.2.2.3.1). In the context model these parameters were fixed. This ‘fixity’ was justified in 
terms of the assumed equal intensive aspects to the salience of stimulus dimensions. 
Nosofsky (1984, 1986) suggested that participants may distribute attention across 
different stimulus dimensions in such a way as to optimise performance, that is, maximise 
their percentage of correct responses on a task. To incorporate the selective attention 
process in a formal model, Nosofsky proposed an augmented version of the Minkowski r- 
metric formula (the general version of which is given in equation 3.26). Here the 
psychological distance between stimuli i and j, d,, is given by the following; 
In this case the dimensions are indexed by the subscript k so xB is the value of stimulus i 
on dimension k. The parameter c is a scaling parameter which is meant to represent some 
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measure of the overall discriminability in the psychological space, its value being greater 
than or equal to zero, r is the distance metric used, described in section 3.2.2.3.2. The 
‘attention weight’ for a particular dimension k is represented by w,. Nosofsky makes the 
assumption that 0 I wk I 1 and Cw, = 1 (Nosofsky, 1986). As described in section 
3.2.2.3.2, the similarity is then the exponent raised to the negative power of the distance. 
The attention weights for a particular dimension mediate the influence of 
‘distance’ on that dimension on the overall similarity function. Figure 3.5 illustrates the 
effect of changing attention weights on the activation functions of detectors in a two- 
dimensional space. Panel A illustrates the distribution of similarities to three exemplars 
where the dimensional attention weights are equal (0.5) showing equal decay of similarity 
with distance along either dimension. 
The lower panel of figure 3.5 shows the effect of differential attention with, in this 
case, enhanced attention to y. Nosofsky‘s attention optimisation hypothesis (Nosofsky, 
1986) proposes that these weights will adjust to minimise average error on a particular 
task. If a dimension is irrelevant to a particular categorisation then the weight for that 
dimension will fall. This will reduce the effect of distance across the irrelevant dimension 
on detector activation. 
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W, = wy = 0. 5 
W, = : 0.1 ,wy = 0.9 
Figure 3.5: Distribution of similarity-based activation (s) for three exemplars located at 
(1,3), (3,1), and (3,3) in a two-dimensional space (x,y). Relative to equation 3.36 c = r = 1. 
Panel A shows an equal distribution of attention. Panel B shows the effect of extra 
attention to dimension y. Note decreased sensitivity to difference on the x dimension and 
steeper generalisation gradients along with respect to y. 
With the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks, some dimensions are more relevant than 
others. In the type I task, for example, only one dimension is relevant. When the attention 
optimisation hypothesis is combined with the mapping hypothesis the suggestion is that 
attention to different dimensions will adjust to minimise the confusion errors with respect 
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to different values of the single relevant dimension. While limited capacity is not 
necessitated by the optimisation hypothesis, the limited capacity embodied by the 
normalisation of attention weights means that the GCM, with maximal attention to the 
valid dimension, will have zero attention weights for the two irrelevant dimensions. 
In this case, each time an exemplar is presented to the network with this 
distribution of attention, all of those exemplars with the same value of the relevant 
dimension as the presented exemplar will activate maximally, and all those with the other 
value will be activated minimally. Effectively each exemplar is confused, completely, for 
every other exemplar with the same value on the single attended dimension. 
Category Optimal w values for dimension 
structure 9 r S 
I 1 0 0 
I1 0.5 0 0.5 
I11 0.35 0.3 0.35 
IV 0.33 0.33 0.33 
V 0.46 0.27 0.27 
VI 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Table 3.5: Optimal dimension weights for Shepard et al. (1961) category structures shown 
in figure 2.1 given c value of 5. Adapted from Nosofsky (1 984). 
Using a parameter optimisation procedure (see Nosofsky, 1984), Nosofsky 
calculated the optimum attention weights for each of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks given 
a value for c of 5 (for equation 3.36). With reference to figure 2.1 the optimum weights for 
each of the dimensions q, r, and s are given in table 3.5. 
These weights may be applied to the exemplar activation equations given in 
equations 3.36 and 3.28. Using these, one may construct a confusion matrix which may be 
collapsed, using the mapping hypothesis, to give the ratio for calculating choice 
probabilities based on the sum of similarities to members of one category over the sum of 
similarities to all exemplars (given for the context model in equation 3.23). If the attention 
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weights are different then the identification confusion matrix will be different. Note that 
the identification confimion matrices will be the same for types IV and VI where the 
weights are equal. 
As with the context model and the configural-cue model, these matrices may be 
used to determine the average probability of confusing a given exemplar for a member of 
its own category. These are given in table 3.6 and, as can be seen, they now predict the 
correct ordering of subjective difficulty for each task. 
category structure 
member of B I I1 III Iv V VI 
1 0.99331 0.85979 0,72354 0.74996 0.60683 0.65879 
2 0.99331 0.85979 0.72354 0.74996 0.87422 0.65879 
3 0.99331 0.85979 0.85195 0.74996 0.77518 0.65879 
4 0.99331 0.85979 0.85195 0.9323 0.77518 0.65879 
average 0.99331 0.85979 0.78775 0.79555 0.75785 0.65879 
Table 3.6: The predictions of the GCM in terms of probability of confusing a member of 
category B for a member of category B, given optimal attention weights shown in table 3.5 
and a c value of 5.  Bottom row shows average probabilities of confusing an exemplar for a 
member for its own category. 
As mentioned above, the attention weights in the GCM are determined by a process 
of constrained parameter search. In the case of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks the 
constraint involved is one that minimises predicted error by the model. This involves 
finding attention parameters that maximise intra-category similarity and inter-category 
differences. The goal being to minimise the predicted probability that a stimulus will be 
confused (according to the mapping hypothesis) for a member of the category it does not 
belong to. 
Note that this Parameter optimisation is for the basic context model which, as 
discussed above, suffers from the overlap problem. This may enable the subjective 
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difficulty to be predicted but it does not enable the generally perfect asymptotic 
performance of participants on the tasks to be predicted using the context model’s learning 
rules. Except for the type I task, perfect or near perfect performance cannot be predicted by 
the GCM. As discussed above, a solution to the overlap problem for the context model 
may be developed by ‘attaching’ associative weights to the exemplars and allowing them 
to learn according to some variant of the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule. 
The idea that attention weights will develop according to this constraint is the 
attention optimisation hypothesis. As discussed in section 3.1.3.3.1, learning rules such as 
the Rescorla-Wagner and Widrow-Hoff rule implement a similar constraint. Associative 
weights, when represented as a position in a ‘weight space’, generally head towards 
locations which minimise the mean squared error of the network (i.e. its discrepancy from 
the target values of its various outputs). The implication is that attention weights are learnt 
according to some similar constraint, at the same time as association weights between 
exemplar-based detectors and responses are developing. 
3.3.3.2.John Kruschke’s ALCOVE 
One effective solution to the problem of modelling the ‘learning’ of attention 
weights within an exemplar based network was presented by John Kruschke in the form of 
the Attention Learning COVEring map or ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). This model 
proposes that attention weights are learnt at the same time as the association weights, 
developing according to a process of ‘back-propagation’ of error. 
Standard back-propagation of error (Rummelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) was 
developed as a means of overcoming the limitations of a standard component cue network 
or single layer perceptron with respect to linearly inseparable problems. The basic 
architecture proposes a layer of ‘hidden units’ between elemental input nodes and output 
nodes. The hidden layer nodes (which receive weighted input from all input nodes and are 
fully connected to the output nodes) develop what may be described as internal 
representations of the various features and feature correlations required to minimise mean 
squared error for the task. 
Standard back-propagation will not be discussed in detail here. Despite the 
enormous popularity of networks based on this technique in certain areas of cognitive 
modelling, it is generally incapable of representing much of the data which emerges from 
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the study of categorisation (see Gluck, 1991, Kruschke, 1992, and Kruschke, 1993 for 
examples). The basic idea behind back-propagation, however, is that the layer of input 
units develop connection weights to those hidden units which are active at the same time as 
them, according to how well the hidden units predict the ‘reward’ signal at the output 
layer. 
ALCOVE uses a variant of the basic back-propagation scheme to develop attention 
weights according to how well variation in their dimensional values correlates with 
variation in the category label. The basic architecture of ALCOVE is shown in figure 3.6, 
as ‘set up’ for the three-dimensional category structures of Shepard et al. (1961). 
Figure 3.6 shows three dimensional attention weights. These weights modulate any 
distance measure across the dimension to which they are attached. The distance measure 
determining the activation of the exemplar detector in ALCOVE is the same as that given 
in equation 3.36 for the GCM. The activation, a, of any exemplar detector, i, given 
presentation of a stimulus, j, is given by the following function; 
Here i, is the value on dimension x detected by the exemplar detector, and j, is the value on 
that dimension which pertains to the input stimulus j. 
Activation from the exemplar detectors is passed via weights between each 
detector, i, and each alternative in the decision process, 1. The total delivered response 
strength, to a label, or its activation, a, is evaluated for each stimulus presentation 
according to the following function; 
a, = C a i w i ,  
i 
(3.38). 
Activations of the label nodes may be converted into response probabilities in one 
of two ways. In Kruschke’s original presentation of the model (Kruschke, 1992), the 
response probabilities were determined using a logistic based function or ratio of the 
exponentiated activation of one node divided by the sum of exponentiated activations (as 
in equation 3.13). For a later application, which involved producing a quantitative fit to the 
replication of the Shepard et al. (1961) experiments, the response probabilities were the 
simple ratio of the activation of one label node over the sum of activations. Note this 
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requires that negative activations are truncated at zero, and a background noise or bias 
parameter be involved as described in section 3.1.2.1 (Nosofsky et al, 1994). 
X 
Figure 3.6: Basic architecture of ALCOVE as set up for the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks 
with three-dimensional input, one exemplar detector, i, for each of the eight patterns used, 
and two category label nodes, 1. Notation used follows that in the text. 
3.3.3.2.1. Associative learning in ALCOVE 
For the changes in association weights between exemplar detectors and category 
label nodes, Kruschke employs a variant of the Rescorla-Wagner rule. The variation 
concerns the use of what Kruschke calls ‘humble teachers’ (Kruschke, 1992, p.24 & 39). 
The assumption behind humble teachers is that participants only receive nominal feedback 
regarding category membership and do not receive any information about degree of 
membership. To implement these intuitions Kruschke truncates the effect of the teacher 
signal to zero if the activation of the category label node exceeds one, where the stimulus 
was a member of that category. If the category label node’s activation is less than minus 
one (or zero in the case of Nosofsky et al.’s (1994) ‘background noise’ version) when the 
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stimulus was not in that label’s category, the teacher signal is also truncated at zero. 
Formally, the teacher signal for a label node 1, or t,given presentation of stimulus j, is 
expressed as follows (fiom Kruschke, 1992, where response probabilities are calculated 
using a logistic); 
max(+l,a,) i f j  E I 
4 = {  min(-l,u,) i f j e I  
(3.39). 
This is incorporated into the following learning rule which determines the increment to the 
weight between exemplar detector i and label node 1; 
A W ~ ~  = n,(t, -.,)ai (3.4% 
where h, is a learning rate parameter which applies to the association weights in the 
model. 
As Kruschke (1 992) points out, the use of humble teachers does not make that 
much difference to the predictions made by ALCOVE. Nosofsky et al. (1994) suggest that 
when examined quantitatively (with free parameters optimised to minimise discrepancy 
between the model’s predictions and experimental data) the humble teachers do result in 
slightly better fits to data. 
It ought to be noted, however, that the category label activation (or any measwe of 
theoretically unbounded summed response strength) is only related probahilistically to the 
occurrence of a particular response. It may be the case, therefore, that the magnitude of any 
teacher signal may be better related to the probability of a particular response occurring 
than to the underlying response strength. 
3.3.3.2.2. Attention learning in ALCOVE 
The changes which accrue to attention weights are determined by what may be 
regarded as signals passed back via the exemplar detectors, to the dimensions on which 
they are dependent. The rule given by Kruschke (1 992, p. 24) for changing the attention 
weight for a dimension x given presentation of a stimulus j is as follows, 
where il, is positive learning rate parameter for the attention weights. If the attention 
weight drops below zero as a result of this change its value is clipped at zero. In the first 
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published report on ALCOVE (ibid.) attention weights were otherwise unbounded. The 
model was tested with respect to its ability to generate quantitative fits to the Shepard et al. 
(1961) category learning tasks by Nosofsky et al. (1994). In this model the incremented 
attention weights were normalised prior to the beginning of the next trial such that they 
summed to unity, as in the GCM (Nosofsky, 2000, personal communication). As will be 
discussed below, this normalisation is important for ALCOVE to be able to make the 
predictions it does regarding the Shepard et al. (1961) category structures. 
The way attention learning operates in ALCOVE is fairly subtle. ALCOVE 
effectively tests each dimension for relevance on each trial where a teacher signal is 
present. The last component of equation 3.41 means that the attention weights only receive 
increment signals via those exemplar detectors activated by generalisation. For the 
exemplar representing the actual stimulus this last difference measure will be zero for all 
dimensions. 
Objects activated due to generalisation receive error signals which have a size 
proportional to their activation and a direction which is a function of their output weight. 
These error signals are reversed in sign due to the -Aa at the start of the learning rule. If the 
exemplar is predicting the right label it gets a negative error signal and if it is predicting 
the wrong label it gets a positive signal. This signal is passed back through the dimensional 
detectors where it is multiplied by the distance between the detector and the instantiated 
input. This is the distance multiplied by the total (not weighted according to current 
attention weight) specificity (the c parameter). 
The net effect is that the ‘correct’ object representation does not affect attention 
weights as all of its distances are zero. Those activated by generalisation, however, do. If a 
detector is activated by generalisation across a particular dimension and is predicting the 
same label as that which has actually occurred, it passes a negative signal to the dimension 
weight. This ‘works’ because it is an indication (under the constraints of the particular 
experiment) that variation in the input on that particular dimension is not related to 
variation in the category label. If it was, then a different dimensional value should result in 
a different label. 
The dimension weight gets a large negative signal if the detectors active as a result 
of generalisation across it are predicting the same label as that which has occurred, and a 
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large positive signal if they are predicting a different label. Positive signals increase the 
proportion of overall specificity ‘used’ which means that the size of subsequent signals to 
this dimension will fall, as there will be less generalisation of activation across the 
dimension. Negative signals mean that the dimension has a lower weight which means that 
activation will generalise even more across the dimension. 
When applied to the Shepard et al. (1961) category structures the version of 
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) with unbounded attention strength and logistic choice function 
readily predicted the observed ordering of difficulty. There were some problems with the 
‘shape’ of learning curves produced by this model when compared with the curves 
produced from human data by Nosofsky et al. (1994) (shown in Figure 2.3). These ‘fits’ 
were improved by Nosofsky et al. (1 994) and much of this improvement may be attributed 
to the use of a limited capacity assumption with respect to the dimensional attention 
weights. 
Examination of Kruschke’s original simulation results (Kruschke, 1992, p. 28) in 
relation to the later data from the Nosofsky et a1 (1994) replication of the Shepard et al. 
(1961) tasks indicates two potential difficulties. The first is the late manifestation of 
superiority for the type I1 task over the types 111 to V; the second is a somewhat close 
proximity of the type VI learning curve to the curves for tasks I11 to V. 
These two problems are related and, as mentioned above, are both ameliorated by 
incorporating the assumption of limited capacity by using normalised attention weights. 
Beginning as it does with a number of detectors equal to the number of stimuli (each with 
their own associative weights) ALCOVE enhances the learning rates for tasks where one 
or more dimensions are irrelevant to the task via a form of recruitment. As the attention 
weight for an irrelevant dimension drops towards zero its ability to control detector 
activation decreases. For the type I task, with two irrelevant dimensions, this results in four 
detectors becoming active for each stimulus presentation (i.e. the four nodes with the same 
value as the stimulus on the relevant dimension). The rate at which the network learns the 
task thus approaches four times that of the initial network where only one exemplar was 
maximally active per trial. With the type 11, as the attention weight for the irrelevant 
dimension drops towards zero, the number of detectors active on each trial approaches two. 
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The faster the attention weights alter, the faster this ‘recruitment’ advantage may be 
manifested. 
When all dimensions are relevant to the task, the initial relative difficulty of the 
tasks will be a function of the generalisation relationships described in section 3.2.2.3.4. 
Using unbounded attention weights actually favours attention learning in the type VI 
structure. Examination of the category structures in figure 2.1 reveals that all of the nearest 
neighbours to detectors in the type VI structure are in the opposite category. As far as the 
simple stimulus generalisation model is concerned, this accounts for the advantage of the 
types I11 to V structures over the type VI. All generalisation for the type VI structure 
reduces the probability of selecting the correct category, whereas for the types I11 to V 
generalisation will sometimes result in confusion for a member of the same category. 
With unbounded attention weights the generalisation problem for the type VI 
structure may disappear, particularly as learning progresses, in a way which is dependent 
on the size of the attention learning rate parameter. Equation 3.41 means that when 
detectors from the opposite category are activated by generalisation across a dimension, 
the attention weight for that dimension will increase. Kruschke (1 992) reported that the 
attention weights for the type VI generally increased across learning whereas those for the 
type I11 to V remained close to the initialised values of 1/3. For these structures sometimes 
a dimension is relevant and sometimes it isn’t. 
Normalising the attention weights enables the attention learning rate parameter to 
be increased, thus enhancing the rate at which types I and 11, with their irrelevant 
dimensions, are learnt but not affecting the rate at which the type VI is learnt relative to the 
types I11 to V. Because these four tasks require all dimensions, their relationships to one 
another will be largely similar to that displayed by a model with no attention weights. 
Attention learning in the exemplar network model, it must be pointed out, does not 
necessarily enhance the ability of exemplar-based networks to simulate human 
experimental performance. Nosofsky and Palmeri (1 996) applied the exemplar network 
model to a task involving the classification of integral dimension stimuli. As discussed in 
section 3.2.2.3.2, integral dimensions are those which appear to combine into relatively 
unanalysable wholes when present in the same stimulus. For these stimuli, experimental 
data is best simulated using exemplar-based models when the r metric in the distance 
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function (see equation 3.27) is set to a value of 2, facilitating an Euclidean distance 
measure. 
Nosofsky and Palmeri (1996) generated experimental stimuli consisting of different 
patches of colour varying on the three dimensions of hue, brightness, and saturation. They 
then tested participants on learning tasks involving the same abstract category structures as 
those used in Shepard et al. (1961) to examine the order of difficulty displayed for these 
structures using integral dimension stimuli. In this case participants generally learnt the 
types 111, IV and V structures with less errors than they did the type I1 structure, the order 
being I, IV, 111, V, I1 and VI. 
As discussed in previous sections this is the order predicted by the exemplar model 
when no processes of dimensional attention are operating, as given in table 3.3. Nosofsky 
and Palmeri (1996) subsequently attempted to fit ALCOVE to the data and discovered that 
the best fitting parameters, somewhat unsurprisingly, involved the attention weight 
learning parameter being set to zero. They regarded this as an indication that selective 
attention processes may be considerably attenuated when the stimuli concerned vary on 
integral dimensions rather than separable ones. 
3.3.4. Modular approaches to attention 
The approach to attention learning in the GCM and ALCOVE is to locate attention 
weights on the dimensions of the stimuli presented. This is one option with respect to the 
way in which the observed effect of attention may be mediated. Unfortunately, ALCOVE 
suffers from the same problems as the simple exemplar network when it comes to 
representing learning and transfer involving stimuli with different numbers of components. 
Despite its effectiveness with respect to tasks such as the Shepard et a1 (1961) 
category structures and the dependence of this effectiveness on its selective attention 
processes, it is difficult to see how ALCOVE could address observations such as that of 
learned irrelevance, compound-component discriminations, base-rate effects, and even 
blocking of conditioning. The addition of ALCOVE’S attention learning mechanism to the 
basic exemplar network does not seem to assist the model in relation to making plausible 
predictions about some fairly basic observations of associative learning. 
A second family of models which formalise intuitions regarding processes of 
selective attention make use of a modular organisation. Unlike models such as ALCOVE, 
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attention or modular weights are, generally, proposed to lie between stimulus 
representations, or detectors, and the decision process. 
These models were not motivated by the shortcomings of models such as ALCOVE 
with respect to representing things like learned irrelevance, blocking, and compound- 
component relationships. In some cases these models have their origin in more 
‘engineering’ or abstract theoretical considerations. In these cases they have been imported 
to the study of learning on account of their ability to implement forms of attention using 
representations other than the exemplar-based detector. In other cases the models have 
emerged to address shortcomings of models such as ALCOVE in accounting for data from 
other category learning experiments. 
3.3.4.1. Dynamic Learning Rate @LR) models 
One approach to implementing something like selective attention in a connectionist 
network is to propose, as Mackintosh (1975) did, dynamic learning rate parameters for 
each stimulus component or representation. A method of implementing these parameters in 
connectionist networks was proposed by Richard Sutton (Sutton, 1992) and implemented 
in the form of a psychological model first by Gluck, Glauthier and Sutton (1992). The 
algorithm, known as Incremental Delta-Bar-Delta (IBDB), was proposed by Sutton as a 
means of accelerating learning in networks using the Least-Mean-Square learning system 
by altering the learning rate parameter for a connection as a function of its history of 
changes. 
The logic behind the algorithm was that if a series of weight changes for a 
particular connection are all in the same direction, then the weight could probably reach its 
asymptotic value quicker if the learning rate parameter was larger. If, on the other hand, 
changes are in alternating directions then the weight is probably overshooting its 
asymptotic value and as such a smaller learning rate may be justified (Gluck et al. 1992). 
This is applicable to a learning task where some stimuli are more relevant to 
predicting the outcome than others. Stimuli for which successive teacher signals associated 
with the stimulus’s activation are in the same direction are likely to be well correlated with 
the outcome. Stimuli for which error signals switch direction may be irrelevant to the 
prediction of the outcome. 
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The model represents the history of associative weight changes using a memory 
variable. This controls alteration of the learning rate parameter according to whether the 
current teacher signal is in the same direction as those which have recently occurred when 
the representation has been active. The model uses the same method for calculating the 
teacher signal as the Rescorla-Wagner rule. 
Gluck et al. (1992) applied the algorithm to a configural-cue network design in 
order to represent category learning data, and found that it was better able to represent 
human data than the standard configural-cue model of Gluck and Bower (1988b) (see 
Gluck et al. 1992 for details). 
One notable problem with the standard configural-cue model is that it tends to 
distribute response strength across a variety of nodes in a way that does not perfectly 
represent their individual diagnosticity with respect to the task. This is both a strength and 
a weakness of the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule. 
It is a strength in that it is this which enables the basic configural cue network to be 
able to learn a compound-component discrimination task. Significantly the DLR model is 
likely to find this task fairly difficult, as the components will be receiving positive teacher 
signals when they are present alone and negative ones when presented as part of a 
compound. Their learning rates are thus likely to decrease due to their lack of correlation 
with the teacher signals for each outcome. 
It appears to be a weakness in that it results in the model allocating too much 
weight to partially valid nodes, particularly prior to asymptotic levels of learning. This 
would appear to be the weakness located by Gluck et al. (1992) in their investigations, and 
also a weakness of the model with respect to the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks (Nosofsky et 
a1.,1994). 
3.3.4.1.1. Application of the DLR approach to the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks 
As discussed in previous sections, the standard configural-cue model appears to 
perform badly with respect to predicting the subjective difficulty of the six category 
structures. One reason for this is that it appears to assign too much weight to cues and cue 
configurations which may be regarded as only partly diagnostic. As Nosofsky et al. (1994) 
pointed out, this was only a problem with respect to the partially valid one-dimensional 
cues for the types 111 to V structures. Most of the problem seemed to originate from the 
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fully valid two dimensional cues which, when totalled across the two or three ‘spaces’ in 
which they occurred, were more numerous than the number of valid cue configurations 
present for the type I1 task. 
Reasoning that this was unlikely to be remedied by the DLR model with a separate 
learning rate for each cue and cue configuration, Nosofsky et al. (1994) tested a variant of 
the model which they called the Dimensionalized Adaptive Learning Rate Model (DALR) 
(ibid.). The difference between this model and the model described above is that while 
each connection has its own history parameter in the DALR, learning rates are shared by 
‘spaces’ such that there are just seven adaptive learning rates (9, r, s, qr, qs, rs, and qrs) for 
each output node. These rates are described as linked for a space in that each update is 
dependent on the particular node which is active. The update, however, is to the shared 
learning rate parameter. 
The best fits of this model, while producing a qualitative fit to the total error data, 
were fairly poor. The superiority of the type I1 task over tasks I11 and IV was only marginal 
and also emerged only after about three training blocks. Nosofsky et al. (1994) noted that 
the DALR still seemed to give too much weight to the doublet cues in the type I11 and IV 
structures. The reason for this may be predicted to some extent from the operation of the 
IBDB algorithm when coupled with the ‘dimensionalisation’. In the case of the spaces 
where the fully valid doublet cues occur, each will have two cues which are perfectly valid 
and two which will not be valid at all. On half of the trials, therefore, the learning rate for 
the space will be reliably increasing whilst on the other half it has a 50% chance of 
increasing and a 50% chance of decreasing. The net result is likely to be an overall 
increase. The fact that the rate of increase will be less than for a fully valid space will be at 
least partially offset by the larger number of cues involved. 
3.3.4.2. Mixture of experts (ME) models 
Mixture of experts architectures comprise a ‘family’ of models which propose task 
decomposition and processing by sets of ‘local’ experts or modules (Jacobs, 1997). 
Modularity, to varying extents, appears to be a characteristic of nervous systems where 
certain areas appear to be distinct from others in terms of the sources of their inputs and 
destinations of outputs. This has motivated the specific designs of a number of so-called 
‘neural’ models such as Adaptive Resonance Theory or ART (see, for example, Grossberg, 
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1987, Carpenter & Grossberg, 1993, for reviews) and the Categorizing and Learning 
Module or CALM (Murre, Phaf, & Wolters, 1992). In addition it has been demonstrated 
using connectionist networks, that dividing the architecture into modules with some degree 
of functional specialisation may enhance the ability and efficiency of those networks to 
learn certain tasks (e.g. Rueclcl, Cave, & Kosslyn, 1989, Jacobs, Jordan, & Barto, 1991, 
Jacobs, Jordan, Nowland, & Hinton, 1991). 
Despite the success of approaches such as ART in being able to represent observed 
cognitive capacities, they do not seem particularly suited to modelling the fine details of 
category learning data. The mode in which stimuli are regresented in Adaptive Resonance 
Theory, for example, which is likely to involve unique representations for each stimulus 
with little or no generalisation between them, would appear to preclude the possibility of 
them being able to model the Shepard et a1 (1961) data. As such this section will 
concentrate on some of the approaches which have been specifically applied to category 
learning data. 
The basic design of such models may be most readily related to that proposed by 
Jacobs, Jordan, Nowland, and Hinton (1 991) (see Jacobs, 1997, for a review of various 
contributions to the model’s design). In this scheme a set of modules containing detectors 
for different aspects of the input receive teacher signals and contribute to the decision 
process via a set of nodes described by Jacobs, Jordan, Nowland, and Hinton (1991) as a 
‘gating network‘. This distinguishes the approach from that used in the DALR, as for the 
DALR the parameters between the modules and the decision process only mediate learning 
rates. This captures the intuition of Mackintosh (1975), described above, that attention 
parameters of some description may have to control the effect of connections on 
performance as well as the learning rates of those connections. 
The gating network effectively selects whichever module is predicting the outcome 
most successhlly as the principal contributor to the decision process. In the Jacobs, 
Jordan, Nowland, and Hinton (1991) model this process was stochastic, with the gating 
nodes’ activation to each module determining the probability that that model would be the 
one which ‘made the decision’ on behalf of the system. Some variants of the model, e.g. 
Jacobs, Jordan, and Barto (1991), alter these probabilities based on whether the 
performance of the system is significantly improved by previous updates. Others, such as 
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an implementation developed by Erickson and Kruschke (1998), use adaptive weights 
which are modified by gradient descent on error between the nodes in the modules and the 
gating node. The latter variant is somewhat different from the Jacobs, Jordan, Nowland, 
and Hinton (1991) model in that the gating nodes’ activation is deterministic rather than 
stochastic. In both cases the gating node activation is normalised in some way such that 
enhanced contribution from one module is at the expense of contribution from others. 
The gating nodes also gate teacher signals to the nodes in the module they receive 
input from. The approach is also reminiscent of Mackintosh’s approach, in that learning 
within modules is local to that module (Kruschke, in press a). For the stochastic 
implementation, in a situation where only one node per module is active at any one time, 
this is equivalent to learning based on the summed activation at the decision as the decision 
is only based on the activation of one module. For implementations, such as Erickson and 
Kruschke’s (1998) model, the learning is actually local (although still gated by the 
normalised gating node activities). 
There are a large variety of models based on this type of architecture, all of which 
employ slightly different learning, gating, and representational assumptions. The model of 
Erickson and Kruschke (1998) known as ATRIUM (Attention To Rules and Instances in a 
Unified Model), for example, used a full implementation of ALCOVE, including 
dimensional attention weights, for one module and a set of ‘rule-representing’ nodes as 
another module. 
The model was designed to account for the learning of exceptions in a mostly one- 
dimensional rule-based category structure. It has been noted (e.g. Nosofsky, Palmeri, & 
McKinley, 1994, Palmeri & Nosofsky 1995) that models such as the context model or 
ALCOVE fail to account for the ease with which people learn structures which are 
generally defined by simple rules but include a few exceptions. ALCOVE and the context 
model would require attention to all dimensions for the model to be able to represent 
learning of the exceptions. This distribution of attention would significantly attenuate 
learning, relative to that which seems to occur, of the more frequent stimuli to which the 
rule applies. 
Nosofsky, Palmeri, and McKinley, (1994) and Pahneri and Nosofsky (1995) 
proposed a form of ME architecture known as RULEX (rule-plus-exception model) which 
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involves mostly rule-based learning. This is supplemented by the occasional exemplar 
representation that gets ‘instantiated’ when the outcome of a particular trial is the opposite 
of that predicted by the rule. The model has a stochastic gating mechanism that decides 
whether the network is going to make the decision based on the rule or on the presence of 
an exception and, eventually, learns to pay attention to its exception representations at the 
appropriate times. 
ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) makes use of a module containing what 
are, effectively, component cue representations which are supposed to represent simple 
rules, and a high dimensionality (usually with as many dimensions as the stimuli used) 
module to represent exceptions. Which module the decision process ‘pays attention’ to 
when a particular stimulus is presented, depends on whether that stimulus has previously 
been an exception to the rule or not. 
When an exception is presented,the model generally allocates most of the resultant 
error signal to the high dimensionality module, thus leaving any component cue rule 
representation largely intact. As such, large associative weights only acumulate to the 
sources in the high-dimensionality module which are representing exceptions. The decision 
process is thus able to ‘prioritise’ input fiom each of its modules. Because of the way the 
error signal is allocated to modules according to whether they conform to the rule or are 
exceptions, the model ‘knows’ that if it is receiving a substantial signal from the high- 
dimensionality module, then the stimulus is probably an exception. 
It is not clear how models such as RULEX and ATRIUM would be used to model 
learning of the Shepard et aZ(1961) tasks. ATRIUM uses a full version of ALCOVE, 
complete with dimensional attention learning, as its mechanism for learning exceptions 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). As such, it is difficult to see whether it makes any falsifiable 
claims about how catgeory structures with and without rule-plus-exception aspects would 
be learnt. 
Generally the ATRIUM model is fit to experimental data using a parameter 
optimisation procedure. One of the estimated parameters used in the model is a ‘gate bias’ 
which decides, initially, how much ‘attention’ should be paid to the exemplar module 
relative to the rule, or component cue module. Using the process it is easy to see that the 
difficulty of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks could be well represented by simply setting this 
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gate bias to a sufficiently high value to guarantee that ALCOVE does all of the work 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998, p.119). 
3.3.5. Rapid attention shift models 
A final class of models to be discussed here incorporate algorithms to generate 
rapid shifts in attention weights after feedback has been presented and before the 
associative weights are adjusted. This type of model was first developed by John Kruschke 
(Kruschke, 1996a) in order to model certain base-rate effects. Since then a number of 
models have been proposed by Kruschke and his colleagues incorporating the idea of rapid 
attention shifts. This section will first detail the base-rate effects that motivated the 
development of rapid attention shift models. Following this the variety of models 
incorporating rapid attention shifts will be discussed. 
3.3.5.3. The inverse base-rate effect and base-rate neglect 
Kruschke developed his model, called ADIT for Attention to Distinctive Input to 
model an effect known as the inverse base-rate effect. The effect, noted by Medin and 
Edelson (1 988) involves participants tending to make a rare category assignment when 
presented with a pair of cues, one from each of the rare and common categories. 
The replication reported by Kruschke (1996a, experiment 1)  involves a fictitious 
medical diagnosis problem, in which participants are presented with a set of symptoms and 
have to make a diagnosis regarding which of four diseases the ‘patient’ is thought to have. 
While the experiment (which will be detailed in a later chapter) involves four disease 
classifications the effect can be explained in terms of just two, a common disease, indexed 
C and a rare disease, indexed R. For the learning phase of the experiment p(C) = 0.75 and 
p(R) = 0.25. The symptoms presented are a perfect predictor of the common disease, PC, a 
perfect predictor of the rare disease, PR, and an irrelevant symptom, I. Only two distinct 
sets are presented during training. When the common disease is present the symptoms 
presented are the pair PC and I, when the rare disease is presented the pair is PR and I. 
The inverse base-rate effect is noted in a test phase at the end of training, when 
participants are presented with individual symptoms and different combinations of the 
symptoms, and expected to make guesses regarding the most likely disease. Participants 
display a base-rate effect when tested with symptom I and tend to identify the symptom 
with the more common disease. Despite the fact that the symptom is, in fact, non-valid, 
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participants assign it to the class in which they have seen it most often. When presented 
with the pair PC+PR, participants show the inverse base-rate effect in that they tend to 
diagnose the rare disease more often than the common one. 
The effect is described as ‘inverse’ because the base-rate would suggest that when 
presented with conflicting symptoms, there should be no more evidence in favour of one 
symptom than another. To ‘break’ the tie one might assume that participants would just use 
the base-rate information and select the common disease as more likely. 
Base-rate neglect was described in section 3.2.3.1. Here the situation involves a cue 
which appears equally often in the context of each category such that the probabilities of 
each category, given the presence of the cue, are equal. One of the categories is, however, 
rarer than the other such that the probabilities of the cue, given each category, are different. 
The relations described in section 3.2.3.1, from Gluck and Bower (1988a) are shown in 
table 3.7. 
Gluck and Bower generated test stimuli which, taken together, conformed as 
closely as possible to the structure given in table 3.8. One constraint was that the ‘null’ 
stimulus was not presented (i.e. a ‘pattern’ with none of the cues present), and this resulted 
in a slight difference between those probabilities given in the table and the frequencies for 
the experiment. This does not affect greatly the conditional probabilities of the categories 
given the cue and, in particular, has no effect on these conditional probabilities for cue 1, 
which is the cue of interest. 
cue p(cue I R) p(cue 1 C) p(R I cue) p(C I cue) 
1 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5 
2 0.4 0.3 0.31 0.69 
3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.8 
4 0.2 0.6 0.14 0.86 
Base-rates p(C) = 0.75, p(R) = 0.25 
Table 3.7: Cue-category relationships from Gluck & Bower (1988a). R denotes rare 
category and C denotes the common category. 
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When tested with cue 1, alone, towards the end of training, participants showed a 
robust tendency to assign it to the rare category R. In a way this can be described as a 
pattern of base-rate neglect with respect to the cue’s relationship with each category. The 
probability of each disease given the cue is equal and the participant may be expected to 
break the tie by resorting to the use of base-rate information. 
As discussed in section 3.2.3.1, Gluck and Bower suggested that base-rate neglect 
might be explained in terms of a simple cue competition effect, used to explain blocking, 
which is readily modelled with a component-cue network using the LMS or Rescorla and 
Wagner’s (1972) learning rule. Cue 1 is the best available predictor of the rare disease. It is 
unlikely to acquire strong associative connections with the common disease, because it is 
likely to occur in combination with other cues when the common category is present. 
When the rare category is present, it is the most likely cue to be present and, as such, will 
receive most of its associative weight increments in this context. 
While the component cue network can account for base-rate neglect, it experiences 
difficulties in accounting for the inverse base-rate effect. Markman (1989) demonstrated 
that Gluck and Bower’s (1988a) hypothesis that the component cue network might account 
for the inverse base-rate effect was not, in fact, correct. The absolute magnitude of the 
weight for the perfect predictor of the common category will grow at a faster rate than that 
for the perfect predictor of the rare category (Markman, 1989). 
Note that the same is true of the configural-cue network. In this case the additional 
irrelevant cue plus perfect predictor configural nodes will be activated at exactly the same 
times as the perfect predictor nodes themselves. While associative strength will be split 
between two perfectly valid nodes, this will not make any difference to the relationship 
between the perfect predictors for each category, when presented together. 
Kruschke’s theory with regards to these base-rate effects was to suggest that both 
were the result of the same underlying learning principles. His intuition was that base- 
rates cause frequent categories to be learnt before rare ones. This learning would involve 
the ‘commitment’ of features of the common categories to predicting those categories, 
such that rare categories would tend to be defined in terms of whatever features were 
distinctive to them, or whatever features were otherwise uncommitted (Kruschke, 1996a). 
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In relation to the inverse base-rate effect this would suggest that the irrelevant 
feature is likely to be assigned to the common category prior to experience of the rarer 
category. When the rare category occurs, the distinctive, otherwise uncommitted feature is 
the perfect predictor cue. Consequently, the common category tends to be associated with 
the combination of the irrelevant cue and the perfect predictor of the common category. 
The rare category tends to just be associated with its perfect predictor. 
During learning, this should result in associative strength being distributed between 
two cues for the common category, but being concentrated in just one for the rare category. 
At asymptotic levels of learning, the theory therefore predicts that if the common predictor 
and the rare predictor are presented together, the rare predictor will have greater 
associative strength and the inverse base-rate effect will be displayed. 
Kruschke subsequently argued that base-rate neglect is simply an attenuated 
manifestation of the inverse base-rate effect. In this case the normatively irrelevant feature 
is infrequent for the common category and as such is not likely to be 'committed' to its 
prediction as much as the more commonly associated features. When the rare category 
occurs, this feature, being relatively uncommitted to the common category may be 
associated with the rare category (ibid.). 
3.3.5.3.1. Attention to Distinctive InpuT (ADIT) 
In order to formalise this theory in terms of a model, Kruschke proposed a new 
connectionist model called ADIT (ibid.). The model formalised the idea of learning 
involving attention to distinctive input by incorporating an algorithm to control rapid 
attention shifts which occurred when feedback was delivered. The model is described as a 
version of the component cue network and incorporates the same method of representation, 
i.e. a single node to represent the presence of a feature. 
Each node also has an attention weight that controls the contribution of its 
associative strength to the decision process and also the rate of change in the associative 
weight. Attention weights begin each trial with a value that is, generally, a function of one 
over the number of cues present on a trial. Kruschke discusses alternative normalisation 
schemes but these are not essential to a description of the model and do not qualitatively 
affect its performance on the tasks referred to here. 
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Upon presentation of the feedback (following the measurement of the response 
probability) these attention weights alter, and remain normalised, in such a way as to 
minimise error, or network output discrepancy with the feedback vector. The operation of 
the algorithm is best described in terms of the inverse base-rate effect as this gives a clear 
understanding of why it works. 
Assuming that the common category is presented first (as it will be on the majority 
of cases), each of the two active components will have equal attention strength but be 
delivering zero association strength. Altering the attention weights will not reduce error 
and so attention weights remain equal for the two components up to the end of the trial. At 
this point associative weights are altered according to the overall discrepancy, as in the 
Rescorla-Wagner (1972) learning rule. In ADIT the magnitude of the change is gated by 
the attention strength, which, for this trial will be equal for each component, so each 
component will get the same weight increase with respect to the correct category. 
When the rare category is presented for the first time, there will be zero associative 
strength for its perfect predictor but the irrelevant cue will be predicting the wrong 
(common) category. In this case, in order to reduce overall error, the rapid attention shift 
algorithm must move attention away from the irrelevant cue. While the ‘new’ cue has a 
zero association weight, error is less when its attention weight is maximal than when any 
attention is paid to the irrelevant cue. Consequently, the irrelevant cue receives a minimal 
error signal whereas the distinctive feature for the rare category receives the bulk of the 
signal. 
This pattern is repeated on each subsequent occurrence of the rare category. This 
tends to ‘protect’ the configural basis of the associative strength for the common category 
and locates all of the associative strength for the rare category on its perfect predictor. 
When testing on the conflicting cue transfer pattern, the rare category tends to win out 
because the cue predicting the common category has learnt in such a way as to only be 
delivering half of the associative strength required to reduce error to zero. 
3.3.5.4. Other models incorporating rapid attention shifts 
Despite its ability to account for the base-rate effects described above, ADIT 
clearly has a number of shortcomings in relation to its generalisability to other tasks. Most 
obvious of these shortcomings relates to the component cue model of representation it 
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employs. As discussed in previous sections representing stimuli in terms of their elemental 
components will not allow the model to be used to represent situations involving, for 
example, component-compound discriminations. 
In addition, the original ADIT model does not include any perseveration of 
attention between learning trials. Attention weights in ADIT are reset to values determined 
wholly by the number of components present on a trial at the beginning of each trial. 
Coupled with the basic nature of the representations used, this means that ADIT would be 
unable to generalise its attention learning across trials. 
In response to these shortcomings Kruschke and his colleagues have developed two 
new models. In order to address the shortcomings of the component cue form of 
representation, Kruschke and Johansen (1999) proposed a rapid attention shift variant of 
ALCOVE, known as RASHNL, for Rapid Attention SHifts ’N’ Learning. This model also 
included a mechanism for allowing the preservation of learnt attention weights across 
trials. A similar mechanism is made use of in an enhanced version ADIT called EXIT, for 
Extended adIT (Kruschke, in press a, Kruschke, in press b). 
RASHNL is a very elaborate model, involving a number of processes absent from 
the basic ALCOVE model. It makes use of a variant of the attention learning algorithm 
used for ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). This algorithm is slightly different in that it ‘builds- 
in’ a certain amount of competition between dimensions in that information about all 
dimension weights is used in calculating the update for each individual weight. This 
algorithm is iterated a number of times before associative weights are updated, in order to 
facilitate the kind of rapid attention shifts used by ADIT. 
The attention weights themselves are unbounded but a capacity limitation is 
implemented in a similar way to that used in ADIT, by, broadly speaking, normalising the 
exponentiated, unbounded weights. Attention weights are preserved from trial to trial by 
allowing the rapid attention shift to affect the underlying unbounded weight, then using a 
separate learning function at the end of the trial to preserve a proportion of the change for 
the start of the next trial. 
The model was applied to data from experiments investigating human learning of 
probabilistic category structures. In order to represent the data kom these experiments, 
RASHNL also required additional capacities such as representations of individual 
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dimensional salience and an ‘annealing’ factor which reduced the learning rates throughout 
the model as a function of the number of learning trials presented. These will not be 
discussed here as they relate to experiments which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The RASHNL model, however, demonstrates successfully that rapid attention 
shifts may be applied to dimensional attention models as well as those which locate 
attention parameters on the response side of the stimulus representation. It seems likely 
that, given suitable settings of its 10 fkeely estimated parameters, RASHNL may be 
capable of similar tasks to its predecessor, ALCOVE. 
Unfortunately, RASHNL has nothing new to say regarding the more basic 
shortcomings of the exemplar form of representation upon which it relies. As with other 
exemplar models it can only be plausibly applied to experiments where all of the stimuli 
have exactly the same number of components or dimensions. 
Kruschke’s modifications to the basic ADIT (Kruschke, 1996a) model, in the form 
of EXIT (Kruschke, in press a) similarly, do nothing to extend the applicability of this 
model beyond learning tasks which do not need any configural representations. These 
modifications, as mentioned above, involve giving the model the capacity to preserve 
attention learning between trials. 
The EXIT model, the basic architecture of which is illustrated in figure 3.7, 
incorporates an attentional sub-system that affects the rate at which activation from basic 
component cue representations contributes to response strength. The attentional sub- 
system produces attention values in the unit range by firstly combining learnt gain 
parameters with direct (zero or one) activation values from the component cue 
representations. These latter ensure that an absent cue receives no attention. 
The learnt gain contribution comes from exemplar nodes which do not have 
adaptive attention weights on their input dimensions. These represent each component 
cue’s activation in terms of a location on a dimension. The location is represented as one, 
if the cue is present, and zero if the cue is absent. For the two cues shown in figure 3.7 this 
would necessitate four exemplar nodes, representing the ‘points’ (O,O), (O,l), (1,O) and 
(1,l). Each activates according to the proximity of input to the point in space which they 
represent. 
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Contribution from these exemplar nodes is gated by learnt weights. The 
contribution is exponentiated and multiplied by the direct contribution from the cue 
representations themselves. This means that the gain for an absent cue is zero, whereas the 
gain for a cue about which nothing has yet been learnt, is one. The gain values are then 
normalised using a similar function to that used for RASHNL. In this case, however, the 
exponentiated weighted contributions fiom the exemplar nodes are multiplied by the direct 
input from the component representations prior to the normalisation taking place. The 
normalised attention values are then used to gate the contribution of each cue, via its 
associative weight, to the decision function. 
The rapid attention shifts are implemented in a similar way to those used in ADIT 
(Kruschke, 1996a) described above. The difference here is, firstly, that the changes are to 
the underlying gain values rathex than to the normalised attention values. Secondly, 
weights from the exemplar nodes in the attention sub-system change at the end of each 
trial, in a way which reduces the discrepancy between the weighted output of the exemplar 
node and the shifted gain value. In this way attention learning may be preserved between 
trials. As with ADIT and RASHNL, described above, association weights are updated at 
the end of each trial using a variant of the Reswrla-Wagner learning rule. 
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Figure 3.7: Architecture of the EXIT model (adapted from Kruschke, in press a) with two 
cues and two outcomes shown. 
EXIT has been shown to be able to represent the same base-rate effects as ADIT 
(Kruschke, in press a) as well as the results from some further tests of these effects 
(Kruschke, in press b). In addition, Kruschke applied the model to representing data 
concerning blocking (Kruschke & Blair, 2000). These data suggested that blocking of 
learning about a novel irrelevant cue also attenuated subsequent learning about that cue 
relative to learning about new cues. EXIT was able to represent this effect partly because 
the attention weight for the novel irrelevant cue decreased during trials where it was 
irrelevant. When the cue was subsequently presented in compound with a novel cue, the 
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attention weight for the old cue was less than that for the new cue meaning that more 
associative strength accrued to the new cue (Kruschke, in press a). 
EXIT is quite an ambitious model and sets out to provide a unified approach to the 
representation of a variety of learning effects. This unified approach is one which attempts 
to identify associative learning and processes of selective attention as subservient to an 
overall goal of ‘error reduction’. 
As stated above, however, its dependence on component cue representations 
considerably limits the applicability of the model. In addition, EXIT acquires some new 
problems. The exemplar nodes in the attention sub-system also make use of the somewhat 
questionable practice of representing the presence and absence of a cue as different 
locations on the same dimension. Absent cues produce net attention weights of zero, but 
this is only because the weighted contributions from ‘null’ exemplars to the gain values of 
absent cues are multiplied by zero prior to their use in the determination of the normalised 
attention vector. 
As with other exemplar models, problems would be faced by EXIT when 
attempting to describe how exemplars are recruited to the attention sub-system when new 
cues and cue configurations were presented to the model. If extra cues were presented 
would this result in new exemplars? If so, what would their relationship be to the presences 
and absences of already represented cues and cue configurations? 
3.4. Summary 
The review of literature presented in this chapter focussed on three principal issues 
that ought to be taken into account when developing connectionist models of category 
learning. As may be apparent, the interrelatedness of these issues is such that combining 
the various approaches to each of them has resulted in an enormous variety of models. 
Tbis review is by no means complete. Factors such as the representation of base- 
rate information, effects of short-term memory processes on learning, and the 
representation of guessing strategies have all been identified as being the kinds of issues 
which may have to be taken into account when modelling category learning (e.g. Kruschke 
& Erickson, 1995, and Kruschke & Bradley, 1995). The way in which factors such as these 
interact with learning is likely to be highly dependent on the choices one makes with 
regards to learning rules, representation, and selective attention. As such they have not 
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been considered in this review but will be addressed in later chapters when they become 
more specifically relevant. 
What appears to emerge from such a survey, is that despite the overt similarity of 
some of the tasks to which models have been applied, attempts to develop unitary 
approaches have proved fraught with difficulty. Much of this difficulty appears to reside 
with choices made in relation to the way in which stimuli are represented. As discussed at 
the end of section 3.2, models of stimulus representation have a central role in determining 
the way in which essential aspects of learning, such as processes of selective attention, 
may be modelled. Different types of representation model generalisation in markedly 
different ways. Any process which seeks to limit the conb-ibution of certain aspects of a 
stimulus to that generalisation process, is bound to operate within the confines of what 
generalisation ‘means’ for the representation used. 
To some extent, exemplar approaches such as the GCM and ALCOVE have 
dominated theories of category learning, precisely because they appear to offer the most 
coherent account of selective attention available. Where the exemplar model of 
representation appears to ‘break down’, the alternatives provided tend to focus on 
somewhat inflexible component cue representations. 
The model of representation which would seem most capable of representing 
learning across the domains currently occupied by either exemplar approaches or 
component cue based models is the configural-cue model. As discussed, however, while 
the model seems to have all of the various representational possibilities which might be 
required by a task at its ‘disposal’, the lack of readily generalisable attention mechanisms 
considerably reduces its applicability. 
The following chapters will focus on this model of representation, with the 
intention of proposing ways in which attentive processes may be incorporated into models 
making use of configural-cue based representations. The next chapter focuses on ways in 
which the behaviour of configural-cue networks may be modelled using approaches similar 
to the stochastic learning models described in section 3.1. This will be followed by 
chapters which represent the insights developed more specifically in the form of 
connectionist networks. 
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ChaDter 4: Information transmission and learnin9 
4.1 Information theory 
Following the publication of Claude Shannon’s The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication in 1948, mathematical psychology seized upon the new formalisms 
offered to describe communication systems. These formalisms offered ways of analysing 
experimental results and, more controversially, a way of describing the processes which 
might underlie those results (Luce, 1960). 
Shannon’s hugely influential work established a mathematical theory for describing 
the behaviour of communication systems. A schematic diagram of general communication 
system is shown in figure 4.1. The kind of system envisaged by Shannon is one which 
transmits a message f?om one place, its point of origin or the information source, to 
another, the destination. 
Between these two places lay the transmitter; some means by which the message is 
converted into a signal suitable for transmission across a channel. The channel is simply 
the medium of transmission across which a signal travels to a receiver. The receiver is, for 
the purposes of the applications Shannon was considering, a device for performing the 
reverse operation to that carried out by the transmitter. In this way it ‘reconstructs’ the 





Figure 4.1 : A general communication system. 
The signal can be perturbed either in the channel or at either end of it (or at all 
points) by noise or distortion. Distortion is generally distinguished from noise in terms of 
the systematicity of its effects on the signal. Distortion may be described in terms of some 
operation which systematically alters the characteristics of the signal. If the operation 
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which describes the effects of distortion is known its effects can be removed by simply 
applying the inverse operation at the receiver or within the channel (Raisbeck, 1963, p.3). 
Noise, in contrast, involves statistically unpredictable perturbations, the effects of which 
cannot always be removed. 
Shannon’s theories represent two things. Firstly, a way of describing the efficiency 
or effectiveness of a communication system using statistical analyses of its inputs and 
outputs. Secondly, they provide way of defining the statistical characteristics of messages 
in relation to the requirements of systems capable of transmitting them. 
4.l.l.Information theoretic data analysis 
Shannon’s basic approach to providing a measure of the effectiveness of a 
communication system was to examine the problem in terms of how predictable the input 
of the system was, given knowledge of its output. More specifically, the effectiveness of 
the channel was measured in terms of how much ‘uncertainty’ on the part of an observer, 
regarding the input to a channel, could be removed by observing the output. 
Figure 4.2 shows a simple example of a communication system with two possible 
inputs and two possible outputs. The assumption is that when an input occurs, only one 
input will occur and it will be followed by only one output, so &p(i)= TpG) =l. The 
diagram shows three different representations of the channel illustrating the three different 
probability measures which may be used to derive the effectiveness of the channel. These 
measures are related to one another in that, given knowledge of the joint probabilities 
and, via Bayes theorem, 
(4.2). 
For the basic measure of average uncertainty, H, regarding, say, which input in 
figure 4.2 will occur, Shannon used the following measure, 
H(input) = -&(i)log, p(i) (4.3). 
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H(input) is referred to as the prior uncertainty or entropy of the input as it relates to 
a situation where an observer has no knowledge of the output from the system. The same 
function applies to the uncertainty regarding the output with no knowledge of input, or 
H(output). The observer may be assumed to have knowledge of previous inputs such that 
the probability of each may be known or, in practice, estimated fiom the relative frequency 
of the two inputs. 
Shannon used the logarithmic measure for a number of reasons. Two of these that 
are most relevant here are; firstly, it captures the intuition that uncertainty should increase 
with the number of alternative (input) states or messages and, secondly, that it be maximal 
when those states are equiprobable. For example, if one input is far more likely than the 
other, the prior uncertainty regarding which input will occur next will be less than that 
which might arise if both were equally likely. This uncertainty would be greater if there 
were three equally likely alternatives than two. 
The unit of measurement here is the binary digit or ‘bit’, given by the base of the 
logarithm. where the two inputs are equally likely (p(i,) = p(i2) = 0.5)) the prior average 
uncertainty regarding which input will occur is one bit. This is also expressed in terms of 
the rate at which the input source reduces uncertainty, on the part of an observer, every 
time a state or symbol occurs. The average rate of the source described above, with two 
equiprobable input symbols, indexed by i, and i,, is one bit per symbol. 
A simple case where the communication system is one that is ‘supposed’ to 
reproduce exactly the message transmitted may be used as an example. In this case, the 
inputs i, and i2 are zero and one respectively, with j, and j, being the corresponding output 
messages, zero and one respectively. The maximum rate at which the system may transmit 
is, clearly, the same as the rate of the input source. If, however, noise was having some 
effect on the channel such that occasionally, for example, when a one was sent a zero 
would be received or output, then clearly the rate of the channel would be less than that of 
the input source. The rate at which the occurrence of an output symbol reduced uncertainty 
about the input symbol would be less than the rate that would obtain from ‘directly’ 
observing the input. 
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Figure 4.2: An example communication channel with possible input messages i, and i,, and 
output messages j, and j,. Probabilities shown with arrows representing A) joint 
probabilities, p(input,output); B) conditional probabilities of a particular output given the 
input, p(output I input) and C) conditional probabilities of a particular input given the 
output, p(input 1 output). Measures of uncertainty, H, are described in the text. 
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The measure of this loss of information from the message is known as the 
conditional entropy or the equivocation of the channel. Equivocation is the uncertainty 
which remains about which input symbol was sent, given knowledge of the symbol 
received. This measure involves the use of the conditional probabilities p(input I output) as 
shown in panel C of figure 4.2. It may be evaluated according to the following function, 
H(inPuiloutpui)=C~-pCi)~(il j) log,p(il j)  (4.4). 
j i  
Following this the average rate of transmission between the input and the output, 
known as T(input; output), may be calculated in terms of the rate of the input source minus 
the loss of information in transmission, or equivocation, 
T(input;output) = H(input) - H(input I output) 
Broadly speaking, the transmission rate function given above appears to provide a 
(4.5). 
measure of the extent to which the input of a communication system can be predicted from 
knowledge of its output. The opposite scenario, whereby the average extent to which the 
output may be predicted from knowledge of the input is illustrated by figure 4.2 B. In this 
case the conditional probabilities of output given input are required. These are used to 
determine the average amount of uncertainty regarding the output of the system that 
remains, given knowledge of the input. This is known as the ambiguity of the channel 
(McGill & Quastler, 1955), 
H(output I input) = c c - p ( i ) p ( j  li)log, p ( j  1 i) 
Obviously, this average removed uncertainty may not be greater than the average 
(4.6). 
i j  
uncertainty regarding the output itself, so T(input; output) is calculated as follows, 
T(input;output) = H(output)- H(output 1 input) 
The application of these functions is subject to two assumptions regarding the 
(4.7). 
processes on which variation of the input and output sources depend. The first of these is 
that the variation in the sources depends on stationary processes. Briefly, a stationary 
process is one whose variation is not dependent on the time across which the variation is 
measured. In the above example the probabilities p(i) and p(i), and the conditional 
probabilities p(il j) should be the same regardless of how long the system is observed for. 
The second assumption is that the processes are ergodic. This means that if one 
makes a number of sets of observations of the various sources involved, there should be no 
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difference in the various probabilities observed. A process then can be said to be stationary 
and ergodic if the process is statistically invariant with respect to the duration of 
observation and with respect to the particular record of an observation (Karbowiak, 1969, 
p.72). 
Stationary ergodic processes are not normally observed in nature, but quasi- 
stationary processes, which are statistically invariant across a ‘time scale of interest’, may 
be (ibid.). Furthermore, many observable processes may be said to approximate ergodic 
processes and thus be said to be quasi-ergodic, particularly if the records are of long 
duration. The requirement for both of these assumptions to hold for the processes under 
examination means that, for practical purposes where relative frequencies are used instead 
of probabilities, the above measures represent approximations to some ‘true’ figure. The 
approximation becomes increasingly reliable as the requirements of ergodicity and 
stationarity are approached. 
These assumptions are similar to those which exist in other statistical formulations 
where, for example, sample size is a factor in assessing the reliability or generalisability of 
an index of correlation. The similarity of the theorems of communication theory to those of 
statistical tests such as analysis of variance prompted a number of researches to investigate 
the utility of the tools of communication theory in analysing experimental data from the 
behavioural sciences (e.g. McGill, 1954). Work was also carried out relating this method 
of analysis to variance analysis and correlational analysis (e.g. McGill, 1955) revealing 
formal parallels between the systems. 
The use of the tools of communication theory to analyse experimental data treats 
the experimental participant as, in effect, a communication channel. For a learning 
experiment, for example, one would be regarding the stimuli as input sources or messages 
and the responses produced as the output of the communication system. 
Assuming experimenter control over the stimuli, one could regard the process 
determining which stimuli are presented as quasi-stationary. This would be the case if the 
stimuli had controlled frequencies across the duration of the experiment. The minimum 
time-scale for which the process may be said to be stationary would be established if the 
presentations were organised into blocks of trials where the frequency within a block was 
the same as the frequency across any number of entire blocks. Obviously there would be 
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some deviations if the measure of relative frequency was taken from less than the number 
of trials in a block, or was from a number of trials not divisible without remainder by the 
number of trials in a block. 
The responses of the participant may also be described in this way if one can 
assume that there was no bias on the part of the participant towards one response over 
another or, rather, that one can assume that this bias would not change across the duration 
of the experiment. Quasi-ergodicity may be similarly assumed given the above criteria. 
This may be extended to cover the output of a number of participants. This would be easier 
if there was little difference in the response biases of the participants and, preferably, no 
response biases at all. 
A specific example might be a forced-choice identification experiment where, for 
example, one was training the participant to press button A, if exposed to stimulus I, and 
press button B if exposed to a similar stimulus 2, where stimuli were equally likely. One 
could expect (assuming no response bias) the relative fiequencies of stimuli and responses 
to remain unchanged throughout the course of the experiment. The ability of the 
participant to discriminate between the two stimuli, however, could be inferred from an 
analysis of the average fkequencies with which each response occurred given each 
stimulus. If the equivocation or conditional entropy, estimated by representing these 
frequencies as conditional probabilities, was less than the average entropy of the input 
then, by equation 4.6, some relationship between the stimuli and the responses may be 
proposed. 
Traditionally, these average frequencies are expressed in terms of the joint relative 
frequencies of stimulus-response events measured across blocks of trials and/ or between 
participants. T h i s  method yields a contingency table or confusion matrix with joint relative 
frequencies, shown below as joint probabilities, as follows; 
response 
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This approach, corresponding to the channel representation given in figure 4.2 A, 
was Erequently used to represent data in learning, recognition, identification and choice 
experiments but requires the transmission rate to be calculated in a slightly different way, 
T(input;output) = H(input) + H(output) - H(input,output) (4.8). 
Where H(input,output) is the average joint entropy of input-output events determined as 
follows, 
H(input,output) = -Cp(i,j)log, p( i , j )  (4.9). 
ij 
Note that the transmission rate is sensitive to ‘order’ with respect to the diagonals 
of the confusion matrix, irrespective of direction. If the participant always responded with 
j ,  to i,and j, to i, then the value of T(input; output) would be 1. The same value would 
result if the participant always responded with j, to i,and j, to i,. If, however, the 
participant simply always responded with j,, regardless of input, the value of T(input; 
output) would drop to zero due to the resultant drop in the value of H(output), to zero. 
4.1.2 Information theoretic analysis of supervised learning experiments 
The categorisation and associative learning tasks described in the previous chapter, 
which are the main focus of this thesis, are all cases of supervised learning. The participant 
is exposed to a stimulus and is given some form of feedback with regards to their 
responding. Generally, for each stimulus presented, there is an experimenter-defined 
correct response. 
The goal of the experiment is to examine the way in which the participant learns 
which response is ‘correct’ for each stimulus. Probabilistic category structures or 
probabilistic reinforcement schedules are variants of this scheme in which the feedback is 
only partially correlated with the participant’s response to a particular stimulus. In this case 
the correlation is generally greater than zero otherwise no learning would be expected and, 
in fact, one might expect irrelevance to be learned (see section 3.3.2.1). 
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p(labe1 1 stimulus) 
p(S1) = 0.5 
p(s2) = 0.5 
A 
P(s,) = 0.5 
p(sJ = 0.5 
B 
H(label1 stimulus)= 0 H(labe1) =1 
T(stimu1us; label)= 1 
p(labe1 1 stimulus) 
0.75 
0.75 
H(label1 stimulus)= 0.81 13 
T(stimu1us; label)= 0.1887 
H(labe1) =1 
Figure 4.3: Maximum average transmission rates between stimuli and label feedback 
(T(stimu1us; label)) for two learning tasks. Panel A shows a task where the label is 
perfectly predictable given the stimulus. Panel B shows a task where the label is only 
probabilistically related to the stimulus. 
The structures of these supervised learning experiments are particularly amenable 
to description using the tools of communication theory. In this case, one would represent 
the stimuli as inputs and the desired responses as outputs. In a category learning 
experiment, for example, the stimuli are the inputs and the category labels are the outputs. 
Figure 4.3 shows an example of this applied to two simple learning tasks with two stimuli, 
s, and s2, and two responses, A and B. The feedback for this experiment is assumed to be 
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the label and so ‘transmission’ may be calculated from the stimulus to the label feedback 
given. 
In the first experiment (figure 4.3 A), the label is perfectly predictable from the 
stimuli. The maximum transmission rate for any experiment involving the two 
equiprobable labels A and B will be equal to the entropy or uncertainty regarding this 
source, calculated by equation 4.3 as 1 bit. The ambiguity of the channel, or the conditional 
uncertainty regarding the output given knowledge of the input, calculated using equation 
4.6, in this case is zero. The maximum average transmission between stimuli and labels is, 
by equation 4.7, one bit per stimulus. 
Figure 4.3 B shows a situation in which the label is only probabilistically related to 
the stimulus shown (given by the conditional probabilities). Using the same equations 
yields a maximum average transmission rate of 0.1887 bits per stimulus. 
4.1.3. Multivariate signal processing analysis of Shepard et aL’s (1961) 
category structures 
In the appendix of their Psychological Monograph, Shepard et al. (1 961) suggested 
that the difficulty of each of their categorisation tasks could be described in terms of the 
number of type I classifications required to reduce uncertainty about the category label to 
zero. The type I category structure (see figure 2.1) requires knowledge of only one 
dimension to determine category membership precisely. The type I1 can be described as 
consisting of two type I structures, in that knowledge of two dimensions is required and 
finally type VI requires all three dimensions and therefore consists of three type I 
structures. The authors reasoned that the types 111 to V generally require between two and 
three dimensions and so their difficulty would be between that of types I1 and VI, in line 
with the results. The analysis is not one which describes learning, but is better expressed in 
terms of how many dimensions, on average, a person who knows the rule has to see before 
their uncertainty regarding the label is reduced to zero. 
The measures they used were derived from multivariate signal processing theory 
(McGill, 1954, 1955). It involves calculating the difference between the basic uncertainty 
regarding the category label, given no knowledge of the input object, and the uncertainty 
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that remains regarding the label when the values of one, two, and three dimensions are 
known. 
In the case of the Shepard et al. (1961) analysis, the choice of input for which 
uncertainty reductions were calculated was determined by an optimal, sequential 
progression through the dimensions. The first inputs would be the two values of one 
dimension; the second inputs would be the four ‘points’ which represent the comers of the 
space of the first dimension and the second dimension. Finally, the third inputs would be 
the eight comers of the three-dimensional space. 
The values required for this analysis may be described as conditional transmission 
rates. For example, the measure describing how much uncertainty regarding the label is 
removed by knowledge of r, given that one already knows the value of q is described by 
the measure T(r; label 1 s). This measure is evaluated as follows; 
T(r;lubeZ) q)  = T(q,r;lubel)- T(q;lubel) (4.10). 
To calculate T(q,r; label) one can use any of the methods given in section 4.1.1, in 
this case, however, the input consists of the various states (q,r) that is, the various 
combinations of values of variables q and r. One can work out the contribution of the final 
step of the sequence, T(s; label 1 q,r) using a similar method; 
T(s;lubel I q,r) = T(q,r,s;lubel)- T(q,v;lubel) (4.1 1). 
The basic uncertainty regarding the category label, H(label), is determined using 
the basic entropy equation (4.1). The probabilities of each label are 0.5 in the case of the 
Shepard et al. (1961) experiments so H(labe1) =I. 
The values of T(input;label) for each task and each input configuration are given in 
table 4.1. The category structures, in relation to the dimensions, are those given in figure 




input I I1 111 IV V VI 
q 1 0 0.18872 0.18872 0.18872 0 
r 0 0 0 0.18872 0 0 
S 0 0 0.18872 0.18872 0 0 
q,r 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
q,s 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
r,s 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
q,r>s 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 4.1: Values of T(input; label) for each input set and each of the category structures 
used by Shepard et al. (1961). 
As stated above, Shepard et al. (1961) assumed an optimal path through the 
dimensions to generate a cumulative value for uncertainty reduction across the three 
dimensions. This would involve the conditional transmission rates being calculated for 
each step in this sequence to produce three values indexed as (C,,C,,C,) by Shepard et al. 
For a sequence q to r to s, the C values would consist of the following measures; 
(T(q;label), T(r; label I q), T(s; label I q,r)). Table 4.2 shows the C values calculated for 
optimal paths through the dimensions. ‘Sub-optimal’ paths are those where more weight 
would be given to higher dimensional information. A sub-optimal path for the type I 
structure might be one where q was the last element. In which case, no uncertainty would 
be removed until q had been inspected; by this point all of the dimensions would have been 
inspected. 
Shepard et al. (1961) reasoned that the more the participant required high 
dimensionality information to reduce uncertainty, the more difficult the task would be. A 
difficulty rating could therefore be produced by differentially weighting each of the C 
values and summing the products. Assuming the weight for C, is one, the difficulty, D, 
might be determined by (ibid. appendix), 
(4.121, D=C,+CXC,+PC~ 
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where ci is the weight for two dimensions, and p is the weight for three-dimensional 
information. The authors established that in order for the values of D to be ordered in the 
same way as the observed task difficulty then p>1.378a-0.378 (ibid.). This includes values 
for the weights which are equal to their dimensionality (e.g. a=2, p=3). This set of weights 
is assumed for the values shown in the second to last row of the table. They yield difficulty 
ratings of I=l, II=2,III to V= 2.31 128, and VI=3. 
category structure 
type1 type11 type111 typeIV typeV typeVI 
C, 1 0 0.1887 0.1887 0.1887 0 
c2 0 1 0.3113 0.3113 0.3113 0 
c3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
C,d, 1 2 2.3113 2.3113 2.3113 3 
path@) qrs, qsr qsr, sqr qrs, qsr, qrs, qsr 
sqr, srq 
Table 4.2: C values and optimal paths for each of the Shepard et al. (1961) category 
structures. The second to last row gives the cumulative total when each C value is 
multiplied by its dimensionality, d. 
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4.2 Information theory and models of learning 
The analysis of experimental results and structures using the tools of 
communication theory involves using the same functions to describe the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables in an experiment as one would use to 
describe the outputs from and inputs to a communication system. An obvious extension of 
this usage is to infer that the processes underlying the observable behaviour of 
experimental participants are processes of communication. For this hypothesis the 
connection or bond between stimuli and responses is a communication system and may be 
described using the terminology and methods of communication theory. 
The representation of learning using information theoretic models is potentially 
problematic in terms of what aspects of the experiment the communication system is meant 
to represent. Traditionally, channel capacity measures have been applied to stimulus- 
response contingency tables in relation to such tasks as discrimination, where performance 
is typically measured at asymptote (see, for example Luce, 1959 and Luce, 1963 for 
reviews of this usage). In this case the transmission rate estimate derived from the 
contingency table is used to indicate the reliability with which participants may 
discriminate between stimuli. The implication here is that when errors are made, 
transmission is less than perfect. The reason for this less than perfect transmission is 
assumed to be noise between stimulus and response. This noise may be attributed to some 
limitation on the capacity of the participant to represent, uniquely, the particular stimulus 
being presented. 
In an experiment which involves learning, the measure of transmission rate 
between stimulus and response changes from trial to trial. In this case it is not really 
possible to say what the transmission rate of the channel is, as the various conditional 
probabilities will vary from trial to trial. The communication channels being examined in 
the context of learning are adaptive. 
To recap on the basics of associative learning theory, the presentation of a stimulus 
is followed by some decision process which, when made and implemented, is followed by 
some consequence for the organism. If the decision is reinforced in some way, then the 
assumption is that some connection between the stimulus and response is enhanced, such 
138 
that the probability of the same response following subsequent presentation of the same 
stimulus is increased in some way. 
communication terms, some intra-systemic representation or detector of the 
stimulus transmits a signal in the presence of the stimulus. This signal is received by a 
decision process that converts the signal, if appropriate, into an output from the system in 
the form of a behavioural response. Reinforcement of this response leads to a modification 
of the signal received by the decision process from the antecedent stimulus representation 
or detector, such that the signal, when subsequently transmitted, biases the decision 
process in favour of the reinforced response. This modification may be conceptualised as a 
modification to the channel between the transmitter or stimulus representation, and the 
receiver or decision process. 
This representation of the communication between a stimulus and a response is, 
essentially, the basis for connectionist models. Figure 4.4 illustrates one way of mapping 
some of the key features of the connection between a stimulus and response onto the 
ffamework of a communication system. The modifiable bias or distortion is represented as 
a Characteristic of the channel that contributes to the received signal. It is shown in this 
way as its effect is assumed to be dependent on the transmission of some signal from the 
stimulus representation. This signal may be regarded as, basically, neutral with respect to 
the decision process. This neutral signal may be described as reflecting the ‘activation’ of 
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Figure 4.4: Relationship between a stimulus and response represented as a communication 
system with modifiable bias or distortion component to channel. 
The basic assumption, in applying this form of analysis as a model of the learning 
process, is that a naYve participant may be described in terms of a channel with a zero 
initial transmission rate. Learning results in a ‘modification’ of this channel towards the 
maximum allowable by the particular structure. 
With regards to the ergodicity and stationarity of the various sources involved, 
certain assumptions are required. As discussed above, provided that the probabilities of 
stimuli and outcomes, and the conditional probabilities which relate them, do not change 
across the course of an experiment, the experimental structure itself may be regarded as 
being composed of quasi-ergodic and quasi-stationary sources. As such, there is no real 
problem with applying the above analysis to these kinds of experiment. 
For the analysis of a participant’s responding, however, the relationships between 
stimuli and responses may not conform to these requirements. The assumptions required to 
make learning amenable to this form of analysis are similar to those involved in using 
connectionist networks to represent learning. The approach may, therefore, be most 
accurately described as a way of representing transmission rates in connectionist networks. 
For these networks, on any given trial the probability of a particular response, given 
a particular stimulus, is a function of the state of the system at the time the stimulus is 
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presented. For that state, the conditional probabilities of each response, given each 
stimulus, are fixed. As such, the sources involved and their relationships can be described 
as ergodic and stationary and any entropies and transmission rates calculated for that 
particular state may be regarded as accurate measures. 
When feedback is given and weights are altered, the state of the system changes. 
Strictly speaking, when recalculating the transmission rates, it is not the case that the 
maximum transmission rate for that system has changed. Rather it may be better expressed 
in terms of the system being a different system with a different transmission rate. Learning 
in connectionist networks may, in these terms, be described as producing a sequence of 
different systems, each with higher maximum transmission rates than the last. Generally, 
the assumptions that relate connectionist networks to the participants, whose behaviour in 
the experimental context they are meant to represent, are the same. 
4.2.1. Supervised learning, feedback, and adaptive channels 
When transmission measures are used to describe asymptotic responding in 
discrimination experiments, for example, the channel observed or inferred is between 
stimuli and responses. As discussed above, it is inferred that the participant knows what 
the correct response is for a given stimulus such that any equivocation or ambiguity 
measured from the contingency table may be attributable to ‘noise’ in the channel. 
For learning, the situation is somewhat different. Increasing measures of the 
predictability of the response, given the stimulus, may provide an indication that learning 
has taken place, however a more appropriate measure of performance may be the 
ambiguity or conditional uncertainty of thefeedbuck, given knowledge of the response. In 
a multidimensional categorisation task, for example, a participant may classify stimuli 
according to the value of one dimension, which is non-diagnostic with respect to the 
category label. While this makes prediction of the response, given the stimulus, easy, 
resulting in a high estimate of transmission between stimulus and response, the response 
may be wholly uncorrelated with the feedback. In this case, as far as the experiment is 
concerned, no learning has occurred. 
As a result, the model suggested here is one in which the increase in the 
transmission rate of the channel, which may be inferred between stimuli and responses, is 
‘driven’ by the uncertainty which obtains between the response produced and the feedback 
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which results. In other words, the increasing rate of a channel between stimuli and 
responses occurs because the particular way in which this transmission is effected 
decreases the conditional uncertainty of the feedback or outcome, given the response. 
This assumption is, to some extent, required if one is to be able to represent 
learning in which the feedback signal is a simple ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ signal, rather than 
specific category label feedback. In this case the connection modelled cannot be between 
the stimulus representations and the feedback as there is no direct relationship between 
these two variables. As the performance of the system increases, the proportion of ‘right’ 
signals increases. This reduces the entropy of the feedback signal towards zero with the 
result that the transmission rate between stimuli and feedback decreases as well. 
In relation to connectionist models, the above observation indicates the somewhat 
‘overworked’ nature of a network’s output nodes. In models of supervised learning the 
activation of output nodes is presumed to generate response probabilities. The responses 
having been generated, a feedback signal of some description occurs. This signal is 
presumed to exert an effect on the connection between stimulus representations and the 
decision process. The effect is proportional to the discrepancy between the response 
strength vector and a vector representing the desired decision. 
In effect, the ‘correct’ decision is represented in such a way as to enable a teacher 
signal to affect the connection between the stimulus representations and the decision 
process. This requires, in relation to a communication system, the decision process or 
output nodes to act as receivers of response strength, generators of response probabilities, 
receivers for feedback signals, and ‘comparators’ determining the magnitude and direction 
of weight update signals. 
One of the main problems with this approach is that learning is directional. 
Participants are learning to get all of the answers correct. A similar transmission rate might 
be measured for a channel, regardless of the nature of the feedback, if the participant was 
getting all of the answers wrong. For an observer of the channel, the feedback would still 
be perfectly predictable from knowledge of the response. In this case the observer would 
need to ‘convert’ the response using the same operation on each response to get the correct 
answer. The directionality, in connectionist networks is implemented by allowing the 
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weights to the decision process or output nodes to adapt in the direction of a perfect 
representation of the correct decision vector. 
The assumption that learning is directional means that increases in transmission 
rate for the channel can be described in terms of increases in p(correct) and decreases in 
p(incorrect). Relative to the channels proposed here, this corresponds to two types of 
conditional probability. With regards to the channel between stimuli and responses the 
conditional probabilities representing this are p(responds A( member of A) and p(responds 
B I member of B) for p(correct), and p(responds A( member of B) and p(responds B I 
member of A) for p(incorrect). 
For the channel between response and feedback this depends on whether the 
feedback is in the form of a category label or in the form of a right-wrong signal. For the 
label feedback the probabilities of interest are p(feedback AI response A) and p(feedback B 
1 response B) corresponding to p(correct), with p(feedback A( response B) and p(feedback 
B I response A) corresponding to p(inc0rrect). For right-wrong feedback the probabilities 
are p(right I response A) and p (right I response B) for p(correct), and p(wrong I response 
A) and p (wrong I response B) for p(incorrect). 
In order to model the learning process using these probabilities, it can be said that 
the ongoing transmission rate of the channel between stimulus representations and 
responses may be described in terms of T(membership; response). That is to say that the 
transmission rate may be described in terms of how well the response may be predicted 
given knowledge of which category the input stimulus was a member of. T (input; label) 
gives the maximum rate it may reach. Note that these are different in that T(input; label) 
covers the inputs to the channel, whereas T(membership; response) divides these inputs 
into the groups reflecting their category membership. These relationships are illustrated in 
figure 4.5 for a category structure with two categories and all stimuli assumed to be 
members of one category or the other. 
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Figure 4.5: Channels and transmission relationships in a supervised learning model. 
Stimuli are divided into mutually exclusive sets, A and B. T(membership; response), 
T(response; feedback), and H(feedback I response) are changing properties of the channel 
in the experiment. T(input; label) is a measure fixed by the nature of the channel’s input 
and the experimental structure. 
In fact T(input; label) is an index of the extent to which the inputs to the channel 
may he divided into groups based on the label which applies to them. In the diagram this is 
represented where T(input; label) is shown as applying in both directions, towards the 
correct label and towards the stimuli grouped into their two categories. The adaptive 
channel shown is one where T(membership; response) changes as p(responds A( member 
of A) is altered by modification of the channel weights. Here, the member of A is the 
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whole stimulus. The channel in question, however, may just be getting part of that stimulus 
as input. The maximum transmission rate is therefore a function of how well that particular 
‘piece’ may be used to determine category membership, or T(input; label). 
4.2.2 Predicting category learning rates 
The analysis in section 4.1.3 suggested that task difficulty might be described in 
terms of the distribution of information required to resolve the uncertainty regarding the 
category label. The more dimensions involved in the final rule defining membership, the 
harder the task will be. 
The analysis of learning in relation to channel transmission rates, outlined in the 
previous section indicates that the values used to calculate the difficulty rating in Shepard 
et aZ(1961) may have a different application. The values in table 4.1 may be described as 
the transmission rates of channels with a particular set of inputs, e.g. values of q, qr, qrs 
etc., and outputs in the form of the category labels, e.g. T(input; label). 
In relation to learning, this transmission rate gives the maximum, average, certainty 
a person may reach about the category label, given knowledge only of the particular inputs 
which pertain to the channel. Associative learning models typically involve the 
modification of some connection between a cue and a reinforced response, from an initial 
‘naive’ level, where prediction, given no other sources of input is at chance level. This 
modification proceeds towards a maximum determined by, mainly, some measure of 
association between the cue and reinforced responding. This may be described (in terms of 
channel transmission rate) as a channel increasing its rate from zero towards its maximum. 
The rate also describes the efective rate of transmission for the signal that is 
resulting in this modification. This is particularly relevant for associative learning models, 
where teacher or error signals exert their effect according to the presence or absence of the 
cue. This is not dependent on any of the characteristics of the channel itself, apart from the 
current level of error; it is wholly a fimction of the correlation between a particular state of 
the target and the presence of an input. Its dependence on the current level of error is 
described in terms of the value of H(feedback I response) described in the previous section 
and shown in figure 4.5. This will decrease as the channel adapts in the desired direction. 
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The transmission rates would appear to provide an index of how rapidly, and to 
what extent, an associative network, given a particular set of inputs, may learn a 
categorisation task. The assumption is that the transmission rate of the channel is increased 
by increments to the conditional probability that the network produces an A as output 
(say), given a member of A as input. This probability will be incremented towards that 
which applies to the maximum transmission measure, at a rate that is a function of the 
maximum transmission measure. 
An additional parameter to consider for each network would be the kequency of 
the individual inputs for each network. The assumption here is that transmission rate only 
accumulates for input when that input is present. The less frequently each input appears, 
the more slowly, on average, the network will learn. 
Unfortunately, while the use of maximum transmission rates to predict learning 
rates appears almost straightforward up to this point, the approach is made more 
complicated by the parallel nature of the system being represented. There are a number of 
differences that need to be taken into account when relating what is fundamentally a 
sequential model of channel capacity, to a system which is using parallel channels. 
4.2.2.1 Redundancy, the decision function, and the summation of parallel 
contributions 
The multivariate signal processing approach outlined above provides an insight into 
the structure of the six tasks used by Shepard et al. (1961). It says nothing about the way in 
which the information about the various relationships may be delivered to a choice 
function, and used in determining which decision is made. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, decision functions in learning, particularly 
those used in connectionist models, make use of some measure of relative evidence in 
favour of the various alternatives. Connectionist networks model this evidence in terms of 
associative strength between representations and the various alternatives in the decision 
process. This strength develops as a function of the correlation between the occurrence of 
the representation and a particular outcome. 
As described above, one may describe this correlation as a measure of maximum 
transmission rate between the representations and the outcome. The transmission rate 
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measure is, in this sense, a measure of the associability of the representation of the input 
event and the outcome. 
The multivariate signal processing approach suggests that information from certain 
channels is redundant in that, for example, knowledge of QR (i.e. knowledge of the 
combined values on dimensions q and r), on the type I task will provide no information 
that knowledge of Q alone won't have already provided. For a connectionist model in 
which channels between Q and QR and the outcome will be developing at the same time, 
this poses problems with regards to the manner in which their contributions interact. 
During learning, for example, does the contribution of the QR channel provide 
anything extra for the decision? The decision functions used in connectionist approaches to 
learning suggest a particular model of the way transmissions from various simultaneously 
active channels may be combined to yield an overall reduction in uncertainty. In a 
connectionist model, contributions are summed to affect the decision process, such that 
redundancy may actually accelerate the rate at which uncertainty is reduced. 
In order to approximate this effect using a transmission rate representation of the 
channels in the network, the role of these connections is proposed to be analogous to the 
role of redundant repetitions of a message in a sequential transmission model. 
Redundancy, in this respect, relates to the 'noise resistance' of the language used to 
transmit the message. The more times a message is repeated, the less likely it is that the 
receiver will be in error about it. 
The idea is best understood in the sequential domain by the notion of a transmitter 
repeating a message over and over again. In a simple example, a set of symbols transmitted 
consists of ones and zeros. The job of the receiver is to determine which message has been 
sent. Assuming that the channel is affected by noise, one may calculate the probability of 
the receiver mistaking a one for a zero or a zero for a one. This is the probability of error, 
P(E). 
The probability of error for one symbol sent is p(E), with the probability of correct 
reception being 1 - p(E). The probability of error for two symbols sent consecutively is 
P(E)~, such that the probability of a receiver getting it wrong for n repetitions in a row is 
p(E)". The problem here for the receiver is deciding which interpretation is correct. How 
does it know when it is in error? 
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This depends on the decision function being used. A simple system may use an 
averaging system, whereby if there were more ones than zeros in the sequence the receiver 
may output a one. Using this decision scheme, its probability of error would be based on 
how likely erroneous averages are. 
This is a function of the probability of error per symbol and the number of 
repetitions across which the average is taken. Using these, one can construct a binomial 
distribution for the probabilities of each different ratio of correct to transposed digits. The 
probability that the number of errors, NE, equals r, given a total of n repetitions of the 
message, is given by the following, 
where. 
(4.14). 
A simple decision scheme may output a one if the sequence contains more ones 
than zeros. In this case calculating the probability of error is a simple matter of summing 
the probabilities that r is greater than n-r. Note that one may remove the possibility of a tie 
by using an odd sequence length. With the binomial distribution, if p(E) < 1 -P(E), the 
average probability of error given a sequence length of n decreases as n increases. This 
decrease in average probability is exponential. 
The choice functions used by parallel networks make use of redundancy in a way 
which has similar properties. In this case the weighted contributions of multiple nodes are 
summed and used to determine an overall choice probability. Provided the contributions of 
these nodes are in the same ‘direction’ they will combine to reduce error. 
An important difference between parallel networks and a sequential communication 
channel relates to the contribution made to the decision function by uncorrelated sources. 
For the sequential model described above, the probability of error for each symbol 
received is equal. The assumption is that the error probability is a function of the channel 
and that each symbol is transmitted via the same channel. For a parallel network, the 
symbols are transmitted by different channels. If these channels were examined in 
isolation, their error probabilities would be different. 
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This examination would involve determining the probability of error, using the 
decision function, where the channel in question was the only channel contributing to the 
decision. In the case of an uncorrelated source, one whose maximum transmission rate was 
zero, the probability of error would be 0.5. 
An important property of connectionist networks, in particular those which may 
have positive or negative weights, is that uncorrelated nodes, on average, have zero 
association weights. In this case these uncorrelated sources are not, on average, actually 
contributing to the decision process. In a single experiment, where the relationships 
between the stimuli and the outcomes do not change, the effect of individual channels on 
the probability of error in the decision process may be described as a function of the 
ongoing channel transmission rates. 
In a sequential system, making use of redundancy in this way obviously increases 
the time required to transmit a message. It also involves a memory cost, in that the decision 
system must be able to store each of the n members of the sequence in order to be able to 
make a decision about the message transmitted at the end of the sequence. In practical 
communication channels this method of combating the effects of noise is not usually the 
most efficient solution available. Preferable solutions in these cases usually involve the use 
of encoding strategies that make error detection more rapid. The codes used are generally 
developed to maximise the efficiency of transmission for a given message source, 
transmitter, channel, and receiver. 
It could be argued that in parallel systems such as connectionist networks, both of 
the costs of redundancy described above might be absent. The cost for parallel networks is 
limited to the overhead involved in maintaining a larger number of channels than that 
which may actually be absolutely necessary to transmit the message required. Some of this 
may be offset by the reduced requirement for high signal-to-noise ratios in individual 
channels. 
In addition, efficient code construction requires knowledge of the problem. This in 
itself represents a time cost to any system which has to construct the code and transmit it at 
the same time. Processes analogous to re-encoding to improve efficiency may occur in 
cognitive systems but the difficulty remains, however, that the nature of the problem must 
be learnt before the relative efficiencies of different encoding strategies may be evaluated. 
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There may also be ‘collateral’ advantages to making use of parallel redundancy in 
that it enables graceful degradation of performance under conditions of system damage or 
noise increases. Related to this property, it may also facilitate representations which enable 
generalisation to take place. 
4.2.2.1 Simplifying assumptions 
It is not the intention of this section to undertake a detailed examination of the 
relationship between information theory and connectionist learning models. Rather the 
approach may be usefully deployed to allow approximate predictions of the behaviour of 
such models in the context of specific learning tasks. In this way, these predictions may be 
used to inform the design of connectionist models. 
One aspect of the information-theoretic analysis, that may be helpful in this respect, 
is the idea that one may be able to predict rates at which components of a connectionist 
network may accumulate associative strength for a particular task. For the configural-cue 
model this is particularly apparent. 
The models presented below represent simplifications of the transmission rate 
characteristics of the channels involved. Without these simplifications, the actual models 
would probably be at least as complicated as actual connectionist networks. 
4.2.2.1.1 Spatial sub-channel representation 
For this approach, each spatial sub-channel is assumed to progress from a nayve 
state or zero transmission rate, towards the maximum transmission rate allowable by the 
category structure. As discussed above, the conditional probabilities which are assumed to 
alter for this channel are p(correct) and p(incorrect) (equal to 1-p(correct)). As such 
regardless of the dimensionality of the channel, it is represented in terms of a binary 
symmetrical channel. 
This simplification involves each channel being conceptualised as having two 
inputs and two outputs. The inputs may be described as members of A and members of B 
with the outputs being A and B. The maximum transmission rate, in this case, refers to the 
extent to which members of A may be distinguished from members of B on the basis of the 
cues or cue-configurations represented by the channel. 
As stated, learning involves the alteration of the p(correct) (and p(incorrect)) 
probabilities subject to the difference between the channel’s current transmission rate and 
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the maximum which it may achieve. For certain channels, this means that the asymptotic 
probabilities approached reflect the way in which the maximum transmission rate is 
realised in a binary symmetrical channel, rather than in a channel with, say, more than two 
input sources. 
This is particularly the case for the partially valid two-dimensional channels in the 
type 111 to V structures. These channels have a maximum average transmission rate of 0.5. 
This is realised in terms of it having two sources which are perfectly valid and two sources 
which have no validity whatsoever. 
The actual accumulation of transmission rate by these channels is likely to involve 
p(correct) for its valid sources approachmg unity, and p(correct) for its non-valid sources 
remaining at 0.5. Calculating the transmission rate in this case would involve averaging the 
transmission rate for all of the sources in the channel. 
With the binary symmetrical channel a 0.5 transmission rate is realised by 
p(correct) being approximately 0.88997. The simplification here is that all of the sources in 
a channel are assumed to have identical transmission rates that are equal to what would, in 
fact, be the average rate. If all four sources in the partially valid two-dimensional channels 
had a maximum transmission rate of 0.5, then their individual probability of being correct 
on a given trial would be 0.88997. The reason for introducing this averaging process is to 
allow the channel to be treated as a whole, rather than as a collection of individual sources. 
The effect of this simplification on the learning rate for these channels is likely to 
be to accelerate the rate at which they reach a maximum. For these channels the source 
probability is 0.25 but the maximum value of p(correct) is 0.88997. In ‘reality’ two of the 
sources have no validity and two are perfectly valid. The probability required for the valid 
sources, to realise a 0.5 rate is unity. As such, the partially valid two-dimensional channels 
are likely to learn at a slightly faster relative rate than those in a connectionist network, as 
they can reach the 0.5 capacity by incrementing sources to a 0.88997 p(correct) value. 
This is not really a factor for any of the other channels, as either they have unit 
validity or they already are binary symmetrical channels so the representation is not 
problematic. 
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4.2.2.1.2 Interaction of channels and the representation of directionality in learning 
The second problem concerns the interaction of individual channel capacities to 
yield an overall transmission rate. The method chosen was to represent an overall error 
probability as a function of e raised to a negative power for the sum of the ongoing 
transmission rates for the channels. There are two problems for this representation. 
Firstly it does not take into account the directionality of learning which occurs in 
connectionist learning schemes. This is only really a problem for the partially valid one- 
dimensional channels in the types 111 to V structures. For these channels their realisation in 
a network is likely to involve weights which provide a positive contribution to certainty on 
0.75 of stimuli, and a negative contribution to certainty on the remaining 0.25 stimuli. 
The representation of an input actually reducing certainty about an outcome is 
problematic for information theory. In this case the negative contribution to the certainty 
must be expressed in terms of the channel actually increasing the probability of error on 
the occasions when its weight is in the wrong direction for an output. In the models 
described below this negative aspect to the contribution has been ignored. 
The problem with directionality is one that relates to the interaction of the 
individual channels in the network to produce an overall error probability. It could be 
argued that, in networks where learning is based on an overall error signal, the negative 
contribution made by these channels on certain trials may have a positive effect on the 
learning rates of channels which are valid on these trials. Because individual trial learning 
is not represented in these models either, these effects will go unrepresented. It may be an 
appropriate approximation to regard all of the contributions made by these channels as 
positive. For certain trials, however, the ‘positivity’ is an effect ‘distributed’ across other 
channels. 
The second problem with regards to interaction relates to redundancy. While it was 
suggested in the previous section that redundancy would have a form of additive effect on 
overall transmission rate, the extent to which this is true depends on the task. Again, this is 
only really a problem for category structures I11 to V and relates to partially valid channels. 
The problem is with the interaction of the partially valid two-dimensional channels. 
For example, in the type V task the two partially valid two-dimensional channels 
are not capable, when their outputs are combined, of predicting the category label for all 
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stimuli. The two channels ‘overlap’ and both successfully predict the two central category 
members. Each channels’ remaining valid sources predict, alone, the membership of the 
peripheral members. The sources which are active in these channels when the exception 
members of the structure are present are non-valid. The result is a combined maximum 
transmission rate of 0.75. The same problem is present for certain of the relationships in 
the types 111 and IV structures. In the type 111 structure, all three two-dimensional channels 
have a combined maximum transmission rate of unity, as does a combination of QR and 
RS. Combinations of channels QS and RS, however, only have a maximum of 0.75. For 
type IV, all two-channel combinations have a maximum transmission rate of 0.75 but all 
three together yield a combined rate of one. 
To a great extent this problem is ‘invisible’ for these category structures. One 
cannot test the model using a combination of any of these two-dimensional sources without 
also activating the fully valid three-dimensional channel. 
Although differences are observed between the response probabilities for different 
stimuli, which are likely to correspond to their logical status as central, peripheral or 
exceptional members, this basic model is not designed to represent these differences. As 
stated above, in order to simplify the channel representation, the behaviour of all channels 
on all stimuli is represented in terms of its average performance, as such, all differences are 
‘averaged out’. 
It is possible to use this approach to address differences between stimuli. To do this 
one would simply calculate the sum of transmission rates for all channels for each 
stimulus. The average channel transmission rates are simply the averages of individual 
stimulus rates (or the sum of the transmission rates for a stimulus multiplied by the 
probability of that stimulus). When calculating the combined maximum rates for each 
stimulus the result is a maximum ‘redundancy’ measure for each stimulus. These measures 
are highest for central members, with peripheral members next and lowest for exception 
members. 
The summed transmission rate measure does, however, pose some problems for 
any attempt to generalise the approach to other learning problems. Perhaps most obvious 
would be a structure involving stimuli with two wholly redundant dimensions, neither of 
which is capable of perfectly predicting the membership. Two redundant channels with 
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maximum transmission rates of 0.5 could not, in this case, combine to yield a rate greater 
than 0.5. 
In order to address this possibility one could introduce an asymptotic limit on the 
learning function for the network, which consisted of the maximum possible transmission 
rate given the representations available to the network. For the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks 
this limit would be unity, and would be given by the maximum transmission rate T(q,r,s;l) 
in table 4.1. 
4.2.2.1 Representing ongoing performance and learning 
As discussed above, simply summing the transmission rates for all of the 
contributing channels does not provide an adequate way of representing the overall 
performance of the multichannel network. For the first average trial, at least, each ‘sub- 
network’ of the organisation will increment its transmission rate according to the rates 
given in the above tables. While approximating the combined transmission rate using 
simple summation was used effectively by Bartos and LeVoi (2001), a measure is used 
here which takes into account the role of redundancy described above. In order to index the 
increase in overall performance, a measure is required to determine the average probability 
of error. 
In order to represent the role of redundancy in this combined rate measure, the 
following simple measure was used to define the average probability of error, p(E), of the 
network on an average trial, 
(4.15). 
The first part of the equation, the 0.5, gives the basic probability of error without any 
contribution from the channels. This value is multiplied by e raised to the negative power 
of the summed channel contributions. Each channel’s contribution is given by the 
transmission rate 7(i;Z) which is the transmission rate for channel i to the receivers at 1. The 
whole is multiplied by a gain constant, g. 
As may be apparent, the nature of equation 4.15 is such that 1-p(E) will resemble 
the top half of a logistic, such as those described in the previous chapter in relation to 
choice functions. This particular form was used to represent the ‘multiplicative’ role of 
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redundancy (described in section 4.2.2.1) more explicitly, although a logistic is likely to 
produce equivalent results. 
The transmission rate measure for the channel is based on a binary symmetrical 
channel with two probabilities being altered by leaming. As discussed above, the variables 
being altered are the conditional probabilities p(outputs label A I input is a member of 
category A), known as p(correct), and p(outputs label B I input is a member of label A), 
known as p(incorrect). Representation of the B channels is not necessary here, as their 
development will be symmetrical and subject to identical constraints. These probabilities 
are assumed to begin at 0.5, with the ‘ongoing’ or current transmission rate of a channel 
between input set i and the labels 1, called z(i; I), given by the following, 
z(i;l) = I + ((p(cowect)log, p(correct)) + (p(incorrect)log, p(incorrect))) 
(4.16). 
The most obvious correspondence between the set of networks given above and an 
actual parallel network model is Gluck and Bower’s (1988b) configural-cue model, 
described in the previous chapter. The configural-cue model also employs a least mean 
squares learning algorithm, similar to Rescorla & Wagner’s (1972) rule, which produces 
error signals proportional to the total error on a given trial. This can be implemented, to 
some extent, by using the transmission rate update approach to produce average trial-by- 
trial performance curves. As discussed in section 4.2.2.1, however, it is not possible to 
represent the interactive nature of this learning rule due to the ‘averaging out’ involved in 
the channel representations. 
The increment in this model will, like the network model, be controlled by the total 
‘lack‘ of transmission rate. While transmission rates will bead towards the entropy of the 
labels, H(label), the maximum attainable will not just be this measure. The asymptotic total 
transmission rate will be the maximum that can be achieved by this particular organisation. 
This level, in the case of the three-dimensional tasks described here will be equal to 
T(q,r,s; label). This value is given in table 4.1 and is 1 in all cases. 
For these tasks the category label is predictable given knowledge of, at most, all 
three dimensions. If one was representing a task where this knowledge was not always 
enough to enable perfect prediction of the category label, then the maximum transmission 
rate attainable would be less than the entropy of the label. In effect this measure may be 
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used to say whether a task is linearly separable, given the ability to represent the inputs at a 
given dimensionality. All of these tasks are separable using, at most, three dimensions. 
The change in p(correct) is, as described above, governed by overall lack of rate, 
frequency of the representations in each channel, the maximum transmission rates, and a 
learning rate constant (k). 
T(i; I )  refers to the maximum rates shown in table 4.1. Its use in the update equation is to 
limit the rate of a channel to its maximum, given the task. On an average trial, a channel 
will not be able to increase its transmission rate beyond that of its maximum average rate. 
The term ni is the number of input sources for the channel, 2 for a one-dimensional, 4 for a 
two-dimensional, and 8 for the three-dimensional channels. The transmission rate ?(total; I )  
is the combined transmission rate. It is, in a sense, equivalent to an ongoing version of the 
transmission rate T(response;feedback) shown in figure 4.5. It is calculated from the error 
probability in equation 4.15, p(E), as follows, 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the learning curves, in terms of 1-p(E), produced for the six 
tasks using the above equations and a value of 0.05 fork and 4 for the gain parameter g. 
The graph shows the block-by-block accumulation of total transmission rate. The block is 
an average of 16 trials. 
The model correctly predicts that the type I is easier than the type 11, which in turn 
is easier than the type VI task. As can be seen there is almost no difference in performance 
on types 11, I11 and IV tasks, with type V being slightly more difficult. This ordering is 
somewhat consistent with the performance described by Gluck and Bower (1988b, p.188) 
in relation to their basic configural-cue network. Relative performance on the six category 
structures for the configural-cue network changes across the course of learning. Initially 
type I1 is more difficult than types 111 and IV but marginally easier than type V. As 
learning progresses performance on the type I1 task overtakes that on the type IV task, but 
remains worse than the type I1 task (ibid.). 
These graphs do not capture the change in performance that appears to give the 
type I1 a late advantage over the type IV for the configural-cue model. This is unsurprising, 
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as the model never actually deals with the specific objects. For the ‘real’ configural-cue 
network, the differences between objects become important, particularly late on in 
learning. As discussed in chapter 2, the objects in types 111 to V have different statuses in 
relation to the number of separate rules that apply to them. Rescorla & Wagner’s (1972) 
rule will operate on these differences, as performance nears asymptote, by producing 
negative teacher signals when overall output is geater than one. The more distributed the 
rules are and the more their application varies from object to object, the more this effect 
will come into play. 
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Figure 4.6: Increase in 1-p(E) by the transmission rate model of the configural-cue 
organisation across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials for each of the six category structures 
from Shepard et al. (1961). 
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As figure 4.7 shows, the type IV structure results in a very distributed pattern of 
transmission rates. Because the transmission rate model does not deal with specific objects, 
it does not reflect the fact that the two-dimensional rules are likely to be instantiated at 
different times, only all active together for the ‘prototype’ members of each category. 
Using this parallel transmission rate approach highlights important differences 
between Shepard et al.’s (1961) use of the approach to describe the complexity of a 
‘minimal’ rule, and its use in determining how that rule may have been developed in the 
first place. The parallel approach requires that all of the information is, to some extent, 
available to the decision and learning process at the same time. The optimal path through 
the dimensions assumed does not apply to a parallel approach, where the general idea is 
that all ‘paths’ will be occurring at the same time. 
While the optimal distribution of information may offer an index of difficulty, there 
is no mechanism specified to suggest how that optimal distribution is realised. The use of 
different parameters applied to different dimensionality channels, while in line with 
Shepard et al.’s (1961) fitting of the distribution to the difficulty, is not sufficient to 
explain the differences in difficulty. The frequency parameters employed here are 
analogous to these dimensionality parameters, attenuating learning according to the 
dimensionality, but they do not result in the required difference. Application of this type of 
parameter to the configural-cue model, on top of the ‘natural’ lower frequency of higher 
dimensionality representations, does not substantially improve the fit of the model to the 
data (Nosofsky et al., 1994). 
As previously discussed, the requirement seems to be for some form of selective 
attention process. This is envisaged as making use of higher order aspects of the 
information, and  or employing architectural constraints to enhance the learning and/ or 
contribution of lower dimensionality, high validity rules relative to high dimensional and/ 
or low validity rules. 
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4.3 Selective attention and channel transmission rates 
The previous chapter discussed selective attention as a process which controls the 
associability of cues. Several approaches were discussed and the differences between the 
ways in which the associability of cues could be controlled were contrasted. The simplest 
approach, in the form of Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) learning model, suggested that cue 
associability be attenuated according to how well the outcome is already predicted by otha 
available cues. While being extremely influential, the rule cannot explain alone, regardless 
of the representations used, the differences in difficulty for the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. 
Other approaches suggested a secondary process, represented by a set modifiable 
weights which might vary according to the relevance, or relative relevance, of particular 
aspects of the stimuli. These weights generally exert their influence according to two 
distinct methods. 
One method is to use these weights to control the contribution made by certain 
representations to the decision process. The weights, in this case, which generally also 
control associative learning rates, act as a gate on the output and learning functions of, 
either individual representations, or sets of representations. Modular approaches and 
models such as ADIT (Kruschke, 1996a) make use of this method. 
The second method is exemplified by dimensional attention models such as 
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). Here dimensional attention weights control the contribution 
of certain parts of the stimulus towards the activation of representations. As activation 
generally controls both the contribution made by a representation and its associative 
learning rate, this method achieves similar effects to the first method described above. 
The intuitive difference between these two approaches, in relation to transmission 
rates, may be expressed in terms of the parameters affected by the algorithms. In the case 
of those rules where the extra weight does not affect activation, it may be suggested that it 
is the capacity of the channel @(i; I )  for example) which is being directly multiplied. For 
ALCOVE it would appear that it might be the conditional probabilities that underlie 
transmission rate, which are being altered. This role is subtle in ALCOVE, however, in 
that because it is also dependent on the recruitment of exemplars to represent lower 
dimensionality information, the algorithm also alters the number of channels representing 
relevant dimensional information. 
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The following outlines three approaches to selective attention, which augment the 
basic transmission rate implementation of the configural-cue model. Two of these models 
locate the cue associability parameter on the target side of the representations, and the 
other assigns it to the dimensions underlying each representation. 
4.3.1. Transmission rate squared: independent channel associability 
weights 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the configural-cue network fails to predict the 
exact order of difficulty of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. The reason for this is that it 
appears to give too much weight to the multiple, fully valid two-dimensional cues in tasks 
I11 to V. For at least types 111 and IV, there are more fully valid cue configurations than 
there are for the type 11. Each learns according to its own frequency and validity and 
consequently learning is faster for the types 111 and IV than it is for the type 11. 
Nosofsky et al. (1994), suggested that performance of the basic configural-cue 
model might be improved if the validity of the space in which representations occurred 
was taken into account. As discussed in the last chapter, these authors attempted to 
represent this using the dimensionalized adaptive learning rate (DALR) model (see section 
3.3.4.1.1). Although the approach failed to predict the relative difficulties of the tasks, 
more appropriate measures and uses of average capacity may enable such an organisation 
to succeed in these tasks. 
The transmission rate approach includes ready-made average performance 
parameters for each module, and it is actually surprisingly simple to produce a qualitative 
fit to the Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994) data by making use of them. The 
assumption is that the ongoing transmission rate of each module or sub-network is 
multiplicatively gated by a value that reflects this ongoing rate. In simple terms, if the 
ongoing rate for each channel is squared prior to summing in the error calculation, then the 
basic model above can be made to predict the order of difficulty. This requires an 
alteration to equation 4.15 to reflect that the total rate is now a function of the sum of 
squared rates as follows, 
- g ~ < ( i q z  
p ( E )  = 0.5e ' (4.18). 
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Figure 4.8 shows the accumulation of summed squared transmission rates by the 
model, with k = 0.075 and g=4. As can be seen the type I1 is now learnt more quickly than 
the types 111 to V. The squaring of capacities obviously affects the contribution of the 
partially valid channels in the type 111 to V structures. This effect will not be so great on 
the fully diagnostic channels of the type I1 structure (or anywhere else they appear), and as 
such type I1 learning is enhanced relative to learning of types 111 to V. Early performance 
appears to be attenuated slightly, resulting in a sigmoidal shape for the curves. 
Comparing figures 4.9 and 4.7 also shows that all of the channels have to reach 
higher individual rates before error is reduced to zero. This again will affect types 111 and 
IV more than type I1 as, apart from the three-dimensional channel, all of the channels in 
the rule-plus-exception structures have lower learning rates due to their lower maximum 
transmission rates. 












Figure 4.8: Increase in I-p(E) by the configural-cue organisation with ‘output’ rate squared 
prior to summing across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials for each of the six category 
structures from Shepard et al. (1961). 
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It is interesting to note that this model does not imply that learning rate is squared 
or multiplied by average transmission rate. While the measure indirectly affects learning 
by enhancing the overall error signal in relation to the channel’s discrepancy from its 
maximum, the update rule is fundamentally the same. 
In terms of implementation using a connectionist framework, this model does not 
simply imply that the output from each representation, or even channel, is squared. As will 
be detailed in the next chapter, the requirement is for a separate weight for each channel 
that tracks the average performance of the channel as a whole. The principal reason for 
this is the characteristics of the semi-valid two-dimensional channels in task types 111 to V. 
As discussed above, these channels contain two representations that are perfectly 
valid, and two that are non-valid. Squaring the output from these channels will not affect 
the status of these individual sources in any way which is different to the way it affects the 
fully valid two-dimensional channel in the type I1 task. As with the plain configural-cue 
model, there are more fully valid sources in types 111 and IV than in the type I1 structure; as 
a result one would expect little difference in relative task difficulty for the model. 
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4.3.2 Relative channel validity and associability weights 
The Mackintosh (1975) conception of cue associability weights implied that these 
weights would apply to each cue, and evolve according to some comparison of the 
effectiveness of the cue, relative to that of other cues present on the same trial. 
The next model attempts to represent Mackintosh’s (1 975) concepts of weights 
which represent relative validity using modular associability weights. Because the channel 
capacities describe the average characteristics of the spatial array, all representations 
within a spatial channel have equal status to one another. Locating another set of weights 
on the spatial channels will enable their values to be determined by simply comparing the 
average characteristics of channels. 
Unlike the ‘transmission rates squared’ approach described above, this will require 
one to specifically model the evolution of the association weights. The resultant model is 
‘half connectionist’ in that while the individual association weights between the 
representations and the category label are modelled in terms of the average characteristics 
of their channel, the second set of weights are modelled specifically. 
These weights may undergo positive or negative changes. In this model they are 
represented as weights which can take on positive or negative values, but mediate 
associability according to a logistic transform of the weight value. Conceptual difficulties 
regarding negative associability are consequently avoided as ‘associability’ of a channel 
varies between zero and one. 
Total transmission rate, for a particular iteration, is derived from the error 
probability as given for the previous models. In this model the error probability is 
calculated in a similar way except, for the multiplication of each channel transmission rate 
by the associability weight, a, for the channel, 
- g C r ( i i ) o ,  
p(E)=0.5e ’ (4.19). 
The weights also affect the learning in that updates are multiplied by the 
associability weight of the channel as follows, 
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The associability of the channel is given by the parameter a+ this is derived from the 
associability weight cl, as follows; 
(4.21). 
Updates to the associability weights are determined by subtracting from the transmission 
rate of the channel, the transmission rate of all of the channels. The sum of these 
differences determines the direction and magnitude of the change. Change to associability 
weight cl, is calculated after each trial as follows, 
A a i  = (T(g,r,s;l)-z(total;l))k,Cz(i;l)-z(j;l) (4.22), 
j t i  
where k, is a fixed update rate. These weights are initialised at zero allowing an initial 
associability for all channels of 0.5 via equation 4.21. 
Figure 4.10 shows the accumulation of total transmission rate by the model across 
16 blocks of 16 trials using k=0.075, g=4, and k, =0.15. While similar to figure 4.8, 
showing the experimentally observed order of difficulty, there are slight differences. The 
grouping of types 111 to V is perhaps more marked with the type V structure actually 
overtaking the types I11 and IV structures. The reason for this is that there are larger 
numbers of channels with some validity for types 111 and IV, than for the type V. The 
associability weights are, therefore, likely to change less for these two structures. The more 
channels there are contributing, the less difference there will be between them. 
Figures 4.1 1 and 4.12 illustrate this pattern quite clearly. Comparing figure 4.1 1 
with 4.7 and 4.9 shows that the transmission rates reached are about midway between 
those seen in the conventional configural-cue organisation and the transmission rate 
squared version. The associabilities shown in figure 4.12 mediate an approximate 
'squaring' of output capacities. While they are not equal to the capacities they are ordered 
in a similar way. The associabilities for valid channels in the type V structure grow to a 
larger size than those in the types 111 and IV structures due to the relative absence of 
competition. 
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Figure 4.10: Increase in 1-p(E) by the configural-cue organisation with channel 
associability weights across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials for each of the six category 
structures from Shepard et al. (1961). 
This represents something of a conceptual shortcoming in the model in that the 
indication is that the more irrelevant dimensions there are in a task, the faster the relevant 
channels’ weights are likely to increase. This issue will be addressed in the next chapter 
when connectionist implementations of these models are developed. 
Another difference between this model and the previous one is the level of 
contribution or transmission reached by the redundant valid channels in the types I and I1 
structures (qr, qs, and qrs for the type I, and qrs for the type 11). The associability weights 
for these channels either increase very slowly from a zero value (0.5 value of aJ or drop 
such that the net effect on output will be less than for a transmission rate squared approach. 
In addition the role of the associability parameters in learning curtails the development of 
channels with relatively lower validity. With their higher numbers of representations per 
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Figure 4.1 1 : Individual channel transmission rates from the channel associability weights 
organisation across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials for each of the six category structures 
from Shepard et al. (1961). Key shown for type IV applies to all graphs. 
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Figure 4.12: Individual channel associabilities from the channeI associability weights 
organisation across 16 blocks of 16 'average' trials for each of the six category structures 
from Shepard et al. (1961). Key shown for type IV applies to all graphs. 
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4.3.3. Dimensional attention 
The final approach discussed here is to locate attention parameters on the 
dimensions themselves. As mentioned above this leads to some conceptual problems for 
the configural-cue type of representation because one is obliged to suggest some way in 
which the dimensions themselves interact with individual representations. Consequently 
this type of model is the most complex of the three. 
4.3.3.1 Role of dimensional weights in detector activation 
One problem with the basic configural-cue model is the fact that its various 
representations of the stimulus are all assumed to occur with equal ‘strength’ on any given 
trial, regardless of their dimensionality. This gives the model a curious and somewhat 
implausible property. This is illustrated well by an XOR problem presented in the context 
of a three-dimensional stimulus set as in, for example, Shepard et al’s (1961) type I1 
structure. This task should be easier to learn than the same problem presented with no 
irrelevant dimensions. This will be due to the influence of the extra redundant dimensions 
and the fully valid exemplar nodes that result. 
Proposing some form of weights applying to particular dimensions or substitutive 
component pairs, requires one to propose alternative activation functions for the model 
such that the potentially different strengths of weight on each dimension may exert an 
effect. 
The activation of a particular detector, in the configural-cue model, may also be 
described as the product of the activations of its various components. These activations are 
either one or zero, dependent on whether the component is present or absent. In this way, 
one might suggest weights on each dimension which have a multiplicative effect on the 
activation of components. 
The problem with this approach is in terms of specifying the nature of the weights, 
i.e. their starting value, the range across which they may vary, and the method by which 
they may be altered during learning. If the weights are to represent some form of limited 
capacity or be normalised, for example, then problems are likely to result with regards to 
the activation of higher dimensionality detectors. If, for example, attention weights were to 
sum to one at all times then the initial activation function for representations would be 
(l/n)d where n is the number of dimension in the stimulus and d is the number of 
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dimensions in the representation being activated. This would lead to extremely small 
activations for higher dimensionality detectors. 
The model adopted here is one that may be described as emerging from Shepard et 
al‘s (1961) concept of measuring task difficulty in terms of the distribution of information 
across the optimum sequence, described in section 4.1.3. The ‘solution’ adopted is to 
propose that a particular representation is instantiated or activated as a result of the 
‘sampling’ of its dimension or dimensional components. A sequential, stochastic process 
of sampling is suggested such that a multidimensional representation is only instantiated if 
its component dimensions are sampled consecutively. Figure 4.13 shows the sequential 
pattern of detector activation for six specific detectors, given a particular sequence of 
sampled dimensions. 
This assumes a form of ‘memory’ for each representation in that, for example, a 
three-dimensional representation will only activate if the currently sampled dimension and 
the two preceding it are all different. The memory ‘size’ for each representation is 
controlled by its dimensionality, such that a one-dimensional representation is only 
activated if the currently sampled dimension is its dimension, and a two-dimensional 
representation is instantiated if the current and last samples are its two components. The 
role of attention weights in this model is to control the probability that a particular 
dimension will be sampled. 
These probabilities are normalised such that the probability that a detector will be 
activated on a given trial, where all sampling probabilities are equal, will now be a 
function of d!(l/n)d. This enables a sizeable improvement on the activation levels for 
higher dimensional detectors over simple product function but retains a certain amount of 
the simplicity. The model developed from this approach calculates the probabilities of each 
channel being active on a given trial using the initial sampling probabilities for that trial. 
The sampling probabilities are updated before the next trial using a back-propagation of 
error algorithm. 
What this model of representation activation means with respect to the time course 
of processing and architectures capable of implementing it is open to question. These 
issues will be discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7, when connectionist 
implementations of the approach are described. 
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Figure 4.13: Sequential pattern of detector activation (for six detectors) for the model 
described in the text. Each ‘component’ represented by the detector (shown by labelled, 
filled or open rectangles) has a ‘memory’, in time steps, of its dimensionality (or number 
of components) minus one. For example, each component of the qrs=OlO node will remain 
active for two time steps after it has been activated by the relevant input signal. 
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4.3.3.2 Adjusting sampling probabilities using a back-propagation scheme 
This model assumes the activation scheme for representations or channels 
described above and illustrated in figure 4.1 3. In this approach, the sampling process 
within each trial is representable in terms of a Markov process. The probability of a 
particular dimension being sampled at time t is only a function of the sampling 
probabilities for each dimension and the dimension sampled at time t-1. 
The sampling process is dependent on the vector of initial, modifiable sampling 
probabilities, p=(p(q), p(r), p(s)) and the matrix of transition probabilities P={p(jl i)}. The 
probability p(jl i) represents the conditional probability p(L,=jl X,=i) which is the 
probability that the dimension sampled, X, at t+l will be j given that the dimension 
sampled at t is i. 
An additional factor affecting the transition probabilities is introduced for this 
model. It is assumed that the more uncertain the system is regarding which dimension to 
sample next (the more equal the sampling probabilities are), the less likely it is to sample 
to the same dimension twice in a row. This factor is introduced to enhance the probability 
of activation for configural channels. In a way, equal sampling probabilities are indicative 
of a ‘requirement’ for configural representations to be activated. In this model, sampling 
probabilities are normalised after being affected by back-propagated signals. If they remain 
equal after this update, the indication is that all of the dimensions of the task are equally 
valid. 
For the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks, this tends to mean that configural 
representations are required for the task and that individual dimensions are, at best, not 
completely valid. Obviously, there may be other learning situations where this is not the 
case. For example, the dimensions may all be fully valid and, consequently, redundant. 
The role of this parameter will be discussed in more detail below and, more hlly in the 
context of the connectionist models developed using this approach. 
The measure used to affect the probability of consecutive sampling of the same 
dimension is just the entropy of the sampling ‘decision’, denoted H(D), it is evaluated by 
the following function, 
(4.23) 
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where N is the number of dimensions, d, in p, three in this case. 
The probabilities of channel activation are determined by first d e t a i n i n g  the 
probabilities that each dimension is sampled in a trial. Because the probability of sampling 
the same dimension consecutively is partially determined by a value related to the entropy 
of the sampling decision, these probabilities are not the same as the initial sampling 
probabilities given in vector p. 
One can derive an estimate of the sampling probabilities by multiplying p by Pz or 
the transition matrix raised to a power Z. The resulting vector, p'= pPz gives estimates of 
the probabilities of each dimension, (p'(q), p'(r), p'(c)), after Z average samples. For these 
models Z=7 was used. 
The probability of a single dimensional channel, e.g. Q, being activated is thus just 
p'(q). The probability of a two-dimensional channel, c, with two dimensions i and j, being 
active is given by the following; 
P ( 4  = ( J w P ( h + l  li,))+($(.h0,+1 I d )  (4.24). 
This is simply the sum of the probabilities of sequences ij and ji. The conditional 
probabilities are the entries in the transition matrix P. Assuming three dimensions i, j, and 
k the entry in the matrix corresponding to pcwll iJ is calculated as follows; 
4.i) (4.25). 
P(-A+I I = p ( j )  + (p(i)(l - H( D))) + p(k )  
The method used in equation 4.25 can be expanded to calculate the probability of 
the three-dimensional channel, QRS, being active during a trial. 
A Q R ~ = ( P ' ( ~ ) P ( C + ,  I ~ , ) P ( s , + ,  I~))+(P'(~)P(s,+, l q , b ( ~ + ~  IS,)) 
+ (P+9P(qr+, I 5)P(%+, 14,)) +(P'(r)P(S,+, IC)Pk,+I 1.4) 
+(P'(4P(qr+1 IS,)P(I,+I IqJ)+(P"P(5+1 b,)P(q,+, IC)) 
(4.26) 
Which is to say, the sum of the probabilities of all three-step sequences where a different 
dimension is sampled on each sequence, i.e. p(qrs), p(qsr), p(rqs), p(rsq), p(sqr), and 
p(srq). 
To check that the value of Z=7 provided a reasonably accurate estimate of the 
average sampling probabilities, p'(d), a model of the sequential sampling process was set 
up using the transition matrices as calculated using equations 4.23,4.24 and 4.25. The 
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model randomly determined, on each step, the next dimension sampled by comparing a 
random value in the unit range with the conditional probabilities for each dimension, given 
the current dimension. 
Each model ran for 2000 iterations with a given p vector, determined by 
normalising three random numbers in the unit range. This was repeated for 1000 different 
p vectors with the relative frequency of each dimension determined for each run. These 
averages were compared to the values determined by pP7. The average absolute difference 
between the observed frequencies and the estimated (pP’) values was 0.0051 suggesting 
that Z=7 would provide adequate estimates for this model. The absolute difference did not 
appear to vary much with the value of p(d). The average absolute difference for each 
quarter of the range of values for p(d) was as follows: p<=0.25, error 0.0049, ~ 7 3 6 ;  
0.25<p<=0.5, error 0.0051, n= 1995; 0.5<p<=0.75, error 0.0056, n=247; 0.75<p<=1, error 
0.056, n=22. 
The representation of sampling in terms of a Markov process does involve making 
certain assumptions with regards to the nature of the sampling process. The implication is 
that the probability of a dimension being sampled is, approximately, equal to the 
probability of its sampling given an infinitely long sampling period. Obviously this cannot 
be the case for any system having to operate in time. Consequently, the probabilities 
calculated represent an approximation ignoring, to some extent, the role of variance given 
shorter duration sample sequences. The importance of this increased variation in shorter 
sequences will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
The ongoing transmission rate of each channel is calculated in the same way as for 
the previous models but in this case, this rate is multiplied by the channel activation 
probability, prior to summation in the error function. 
(4.27) 
Note that the channel is now indexed using c. The channel activation probability is also 
used in determining the update to the channel’s transmission rate. The function defining 
this increment is as follows, 
1 
nc 
&(correct), = (T(q,r,s;l) - r(total;l))(T(c;l) -r(c;l))p(c)--k (4.28). 
175 
The rule is similar to that used for the relative associability weights model except that p(c) 
is used in place of a modifiable weight as in equation 4.20. 
Modifying the dimensional sampling probabilities that, in turn, control the channel 
activation Probabilities is done using a back-propagation scheme. 
&(dl = ( q W d ) -  z(total;l))k,cz(c,llP(c) (4.29) 
dsc 
The increment to the sampling probability is, basically, the overall discrepancy multiplied 
by the output from each channel for which the dimension d is an element. All of this is 
multiplied by a rate constant b. These increments are added to the probabilities on that 
trial with the probabilities on the next trial being the normalised, incremented values from 
the previous trial. 
4.3.3.2.1 Results 
Figure 4.14 shows the increase in 1-p(E) by the model across 16 blocks of 16 trials 
using k=0.1, g=4, and & =l.  The sampling probabilities were initialised at 1/3. Again, the 
order of difficulty reported by Shepard et al. (1961) is displayed by the model. The model 
represents learning of the type I1 tasks as being noticeably easier than that for the types I11 
to V tasks. There is a slight sigmoidal shape to the graphs for all tasks, excepting the type I 
task. Increasing the weight learning rate k can reduce this trend but the result of this is to 
improve performance on all tasks. While this does not affect the overall order of difficulty 
represented in figure 4.14, it does narrow the gap between the type I1 and the types 111 to V 
tasks. 
The ‘selective attention’ used in this model is responsible for the correct ordering in 
this case. Figure 4.15 shows the results for the model when the attention learning rate, 16 is 
set to zero with all other parameters the same as for figure 4.14. In this case performance is 
fairly equivalent to the basic model presented in section 4.2.2. 
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Figure 4.14: Increase in 1-p(E) by the sequential sampling configural-cue organisation 
with modifiable dimensional sampling probabilities across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials 
for each of the six category structures from Shepard et al. (1961). 
Figures 4.16 to 4.18 show the channel activation probabilities, transmission rates 
and sampling probabilities for the model with modifiable sampling rates. A number of 
interesting features are indicated. 
The sampling probabilities shown in figure 4.1 8 display a marked tendency to 
restrict sampling to the most valid dimension(s) particularly in the type I and I1 structures. 
While the previous two models indicate transmission rate accumulating for redundant valid 
channels, this model shows a reduction in this tendency, illustrated in figure 4.17. Almost 
all of this redundant rate is accumulated during the first couple of blocks. When the 
frequencies with which channels are activated are taken into account, shown in figure 4.16, 
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Figure 4.15: Increase in 1 -p(E) by sequential sampling configural-cue organisation with 
learning rate k, set to zero across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials for each of the six 
category structures from Shepard et al. (1961). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, experimental data concerning dimensional 
relevance shifts and blocking of conditioning suggest that dimensions that are irrelevant to 
the task appear to be ‘blocked’ with respect to subsequent learning tasks. For the first two 
models in this chapter some control over responding will accumulate to these dimensions 
via their involvement in higher dimensionality, valid, but redundant, channels. This seems 
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Figure 4.16: Individual channel activation probabilities p(c) from the dimensional attention 
model across 16 blocks of 16 'average' trials for each of the six category structures from 
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Figure 4.17: Individual channel transmission rates from the dimensional attention model 
across 16 blocks of 16 ‘average’ trials for each of the six category structures from Shepard 
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Figure 4.18: Individual sampling probabilities p(d) from the dimensional attention model 
across 16 blocks of 16 'average' trials for each of the six category structures from Shepard 
etal.  (1961). 
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4.4. General discussion concerning the transmission rate 
approach 
The transmission rate models described above are somewhat related to the 
stochastic learning models described in the previous chapter. Like these models they are 
limited with regards to the scope of their application. These models characterise the stimuli 
in terms of their average properties across the course of the experiment. They are 
consequently unable to model situations in which these properties may change during the 
experiment. They are thus incapable of offering any representations of concurrent learning 
tasks, or those which involve transfer stimuli. The models seem best suited to experiments 
such as the Shepard et al. (1961) learning tasks where the structure of the experiment is 
fixed. 
Unlike the stochastic models described in the previous chapter, this approach does 
specifically relate to methods of representing the way in which stimuli may be encoded, 
and the relationships between various encodings and learning. The transmission rate 
models, as discussed above, appear to be somewhat closer to connectionist models in this 
respect. Connectionist models are effectively communication channels and as such, the 
form of analysis described above would appear to be a way of examining the rates at which 
they may learn tasks, dependent on the encoding methods they implement. 
The next chapters detail attempts to implement the designs suggested here using a 
connectionist approach, This chapter has certainly indicated that a network using the 
configural-cue representation may be readily adapted to allow modelling of the data 
reported by Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994). With respect to other tasks, 
as will be discussed, the dimensional attention model may be the model that would gain 
most from this approach. 
A second issue, which may be addressed for all of the above models, concerns the 
differences between specific exemplars. In the above models specific exemplars are not 
examined, and so differences in their logical status in tasks 111 to V cannot really be 
investigated. It seems likely that logical status may determine the redundancy of the 
network with respect to individual stimuli. For example, central category members are 
characterised by having more valid cues and cue configurations associated with them than 
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peripheral or exception members. Redundancy, in this case, may well lead to different 
pattans of ‘growth’ in different spatial sub-networks dependent on whether the stimuli 
they are valid for are central or peripheral. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this 
leads to particular problems in relation to using overall error signals in the determination of 
weight updates, as might be required by an implementation using Rescorla & Wagner’s 




The previous chapter discussed the potential applicability of three different 
schemes for modelling category learning using a configural-cue representation. Possible 
solutions to the problems with the configural-cue model (Gluck & Bower 1988b, Nosofsky 
et al. 1994) with respect to this task seem to involve the addition of another set of weights 
to the basic organisation. This chapter concentrates on the two modular approaches 
developed in chapter 4. 
As discussed in chapter 4, the transmission rate analysis, while useful for indicating 
the kinds of information that may be relevant to model performance, is limited by a 
number of factors. These relate to its lack of representation of the differences in the logical 
statuses of individual stimuli. As will be seen, these differences turn out to be important for 
connectionist implementations of the approaches outlined in the previous chapter. 
5.1. The Independent Modular Associability Weights (IMAW) 
model. 
The simplest model discussed in the previous chapter made use of the average 
transmission fates of the spatial sub-channels in a fairly straightforward way. If the output 
transmission rate kom each channel was squared prior to summation for overall output 
then a qualitative fit to the observed data could be achieved. It was suggested that one way 
to implement this would be by locating a weight between the spatial sub-channel and the 
output which, in some way, tracked the average, ongoing transmission rate of the sub- 
network. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates a part of this architecture. Similar to the DALR version of the 
configural-cue model, tested by Nosofsky et al. (1994), the 26 nodes required for the 
representation of the objects are divided into seven ‘spatial’ modules. This model is 
perhaps better related to ‘mixture of experts’ architectures (Jacobs, Jordan, Nowlan, & 
Hinton, 1991, Jacobs, 1997, Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) than to the DALR model, in that 
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both learning rate within, and output fiom, the module is controlled by modular weights. 
Figure 5.1 represents these weights as being located within nodes (the c or channel nodes), 
one for each output destination (or label), per module. 
Output from the sources in the module, in the direction of the label, may be 
regarded as summed within the c nodes, although in practice only one of the module’s 
sources is active at any given time. The c nodes may also be regarded as ‘doubling’ as 
local representations of the target or label node activation. As with the mixture of experts 
architectures, leaming at the output weights of individual source nodes is local to the 
module. Each module is learning the category assignments independently of other 
modules. The role and nature of this local learning scheme will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
The main difference between the mixture of experts (ME) framework and this 
model is that the weights responsible for gating the output of each module are also 
independent of one another. Contribution from each module in ME networks is generally 
normalised, with the weights adjusted according to the relative efficacy of the module at 
predicting the output. The ME scheme has more in common with the second model in this 
chapter and it will be discussed in more detail in that context. 
The purpose behind this model is to implement, in the simplest fashion, the 
‘transmission rate squared’ approach outlined in the previous chapter. The model, with just 







Figure 5.1: Modular configural-cue network with module or channel nodes located 
between source nodes and label nodes. Only three of the seven modules are illustrated for 
the sake of clarity. All of the qrs source nodes are connected to their channel nodes. 
5.1.1. Functions defining the model 
5.1.1.1 Feedforward of activation 
wsc 4%- 'CA +OCA @- p(A) 
I 
WSC +OX-- ~ C B   bo,^ CB +dB) G 0 
Figure 5.2: Diagram showing the feedforward pathway of activation, and notation used in 
the equations below from the activation of a source node s to choice probability P([) 
(shown specifically as p(A) and p(B). 
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Figure 5.2 shows an example of a channel between a source node and a destination, 
represented by a probability of choosing one or the other category label. Weights e,, and 
e,, are located within channel or c nodes as shown in figure 5.1. Working backwards from 
the destination to the input source; the choice activation is converted to a representation of 
the choice probability for each label, 1, using the normalised exponentiated output from the 
channel nodes. The function, described in section 3.1.2.2, and also known as a ‘ s o k a x ’  
activation function is as follows; 
CO., 
(5.1). 
The output from the c nodes to their I nodes, o,,, is the sum of the module’s source node 
outputs, multiplied by the channel weight between the module, c, and the label node, 1, or 
(5.2). 
The output from the source node to the channel node c, o,, is the product of the activation 
of the source node, s, and the weight on the connection between s and c nodes, wsc; 
0, = a,w,c (5.3). 
As described above, only one source node per module will be active at any given time as a 
source node has activation, a,, of one, if that particular cue or cue configuration is present 
on that trial, and zero if absent. 
5.1.1.2 Weight update functions 
The various weights are updated at the end of each trial. As described above, the 
weights between source nodes and their channel nodes are altered according to the 
discrepancy of the total source node output for a module and the label node activation. 
There is no ‘global’ component to the error signal, each weight begins at zero and is 
updated according to the following function; 
(5.4). 
The label node, 1, refers to the label node to which the particular c node is connected. Each 
s node, as shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2, is connected to two c nodes; with each c node 
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connected to a different label node. The activation of this node, a ,  is one if the label was 
present on the trial and minus one if it was absent. The multiplication of the label 
activation by the sign of e,, occurs because these weights can, in principle, be positive or 
negative. The term h, is a learning rate parameter that remains constant throughout the 
simulation. The value of this parameter controls the proportion of the discrepancy between 
an active node’s output and the label activation removed during each trial. The effect of its 
variation on the overall performance of the model is mediated by the size of the other 
learning rate constant described below. 
It is worth noting that, although this was not shown in the previous chapter, the gap 
between the type I1 and types 111 to V structures could be enhanced by multiplying the 
update signal for a module by that module’s maximum transmission rate. It was assumed 
that this maximum transmission rate was something that would have to be learnt in a 
connectionist implementation. In this model this learning is effectively carried out by the 8 
weights. As such the decision was made to multiply weight updates by the value of the 8 
weight (as in equation 5.4). Alternative models were examined in relation to this and other 
design decisions and these will be discussed below. 
The 8 weights are somewhat different in that they must be initialised at some 
absolute magnitude which is greater than zero. As equation 5.4 uses the sign of 8 and its 
absolute value, a zero initial value will preclude the possibility of any learning at all. 
As discussed above, their function is to track the average transmission rate of the 
module. The way this is done here may be described in terms of a connection buck 
between the label node and the module. The learning process is one where the label nodes 
are attempting to learn to predict the input to the modules’ c nodes, with the 8 weight being 
the connection strength which results from this process. In this case the weights are 
updated according to the discrepancy between the guess made by the label node, via the 8 
weight, and the ‘bottom-up’ input to the c node. The function describing the change in 
these weights is as follows; 
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The parameter h, is a learning rate parameter that remains constant throughout the 
simulation. This parameter, like L, controls the rate at which the weight changes in the 
direction of the target, in this case the target is the weighted output of the module’s source 
nodes, on a given trial. The effect of varying h, on the model’s performance is related to 
the value of the other learning rate parameter. The nature of this interaction shapes, to 
some extent, the model’s performance in general and will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
The use of the hyperbolic tangent of the weighted label activation tends to enhance 
weight values of fully valid channels, where the weights between source and channel 
nodes head towards absolute values of one. In this case, the hyperbolic tangent will tend to 
guarantee that the output of the module’s source nodes is higher than the ‘output’ of the 
label node to module connection. 
An alternative but equivalent weight update function is given in Bartos and LeVoi 
(2001); its form in relation to the notation given here is, 
Equation 5.5 is probably more satisfactory as it allows for the possibility of no learning 
occurring in the absence of feedback (when a, may be zero). In addition it captures the idea 
of the transmission rate being squared in a more intuitive way. 
The transmission equations given in the previous chapter are symmetrical, in that 
the maximum rate of a channel between combined module output and category label is the 
same as the rate of a channel between the label and the combined source node output. 
Implemented using equation 5.5, the ‘squaring’ of transmission rate may be conceptualised 
in terms of the feedforward transmission rate of the module (learning the label) being 
multiplied by the transmission rate of a feedback channel between label and module. The 
transmission rate of this feedback channel changes according to how well the label may be 
used to predict the category membership of the sources within the module. 
5.1.2. The experimental simulation 
The model was tested on each category structure twenty times with a different 
randomised order of input presentation for each experiment. The blocks were organised in 
the same way as the Shepard et al. (1961) experiment for the trial-and-error learning of the 
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individual category structure (experiment 1) and the Nosofsky et al. (1994) replication (see 
section 2.2). No attempt was made here to investigate the transfer of training effects, so the 
results reported below are just averages for the twenty simulations of one run through 
sixteen blocks of training data. 
The parameters used for the simulations were k = 0 . 3 5  and &=0.2. The initial value 
of all 0 weights was set to 0.5. These settings were not optimised to reduce difference 
between model and human performance. Varying the parameter settings generally did not 
effect the overall ordering of the task difficulties. The effect was generally to alter the 
convergence rate across all tasks and, consequently, to affect the extent to which curves 
were ‘bunched-up’ or separated. Also the values of the learning rate parameters will affect 
the stability of the model or the ability of the model to converge at all. The role of these 
particular parameter settings will be discussed below. 
5.1.3. Simulation results 
Figure 5.3 shows the average probability of correct responding by the model for the 
six category structures. The results compare favourably with the results of Shepard et al. 
(1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994) (see figure 2.3), in terms of the number of errors likely 
to be made during the learning of each problem. There is a clear advantage for the type I1 
structure over types 111 and IV, indicating that the model more closely simulates human 
data than the basic configural-cue model (Gluck & Bower, 1988b) and the variants tested 
by Nosofsky et al. (1994). 
Comparison of this figure with figure 2.3, however, reveals a number of differences 
in terms of the fine detail of the learning curves. These differences and their implications 












Figure 5.3: Average probability of correct output per block for the independent modular 
associability weights model for each of the six category structures of Shepard et al. (1961). 
Averages are based on 20 runs through the 16 blocks, on each structure with randomised 
order of input patterns. 
As figure 5.4 shows, the model also successfully demonstrates the differences in 
performance on the different patterns for task types I11 to V. Central members of categories 
were learnt with lower average probabilities of error than peripheral members. The 
exception members in the type V structure were learnt more slowly than central and 
peripheral members. There were, as expected, no significant differences between pattern 
performance within structures I, 11, and VI. 
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Figure 5.4: Performance of the model on individual patterns for category structures 111 to 
V. Performance is indexed in terms of the average probability of correct responding across 
the entire 16 blocks of the simulation. See figure 2.2 for illustrations of the relationships 
between these three types of member within each category structure. 
5.1.4. Discussion of the IMAW model 
While the above model displays a qualitative fit to the relative difficulties reported 
by Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994), the way in which it produces this fit 
seems likely to limit its ability to address data from other learning experiments. Some of 
these problems generalise from the modular approach, as discussed in the previous chapter; 
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others pertain to something of a lack of ‘robustness’ of the qualitative fit under conditions 
where the model’s parameters are varied. 
5.1.4.1. Local versus global teacher signals 
In common with other modular approaches (e.g. Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) this 
model employs a ‘local’ learning rule for the incrementing of weights within modules. 
This rule does not take into account the discrepancy of the summed output fiom the target 
value when calculating weight updates. 
Different weight-update functions were considered and tested in the development 
of this model. These involved different uses of ‘global’ teacher signals; i.e. those 
dependent on measures of discrepancy between summed contribution to a label or 1 node 
and the feedback activation of that node. These variants included: 
1. Global teacher signal updates for the source to channel node weights, with the 8 weight 
update functions as in the above model. 
2. Global teacher signal updates for the source to channel node weights, with the 8 weight 
update function additionally gated by the absolute magnitude of the global teacher 
signal on that trial. 
3. Local teacher signal updates for source to channel node weights, with the 8 weight 
update function additionally gated by the absolute magnitude of the global teacher 
signal on that trial. 
4. Local teacher signal updates for source to channel node weights additionally gated by 
absolute global error signal value, with the 8 weight update function additionally gated 
by the absolute magnitude of the global teacher signal on that trial. 
5. Local teacher signal updates for source to channel node weights additionally gated by 
absolute global error signal value, with just the local 8 weight update function 
described by equation 5.5. 
Note that the transmission rate version of this model, described in the previous 
chapter, employed a form of global teacher signal in terms of the average remaining 
ambiguity of the channel (maximum possible transmission rate, minus the combined 
transmission rate). Using global teacher signals proved problematic for this connectionist 
model. While the results from the above models will not be discussed in detail, the ability 
193 
of these models to represent the qualitative trends of the learning curves in figure 2.3 was 
somewhat worse than the model described in detail above. The orders were, generally, 
preserved although there was a marked tendency with some variants for performance on 
the type VI structure to overtake or equal performance on the types 111 to V structures. On 
other variants, this problem was made worse, or replaced by a tendency for the types 11, I11 
and IV learning curves to be very close together. 
Where implemented on just the s to c association weights, the general effect of 
global teacher signals was to reduce the performance on the types 111 to V structures, 
relative to performance on the type VI. The reason for this is that the different logical 
status of the stimuli in these structures leads to a differing dependence of the network on 
the fully valid three-dimensional module. Because the teacher signals to this module would 
vary in size, dependent on the particular stimulus presented, the 8 weights for the three- 
dimensional module would generally decrease when exposed to central members of the 
category (due to the lower weights in this module for these stimuli). They would generally 
increase when exposed to peripheral or exceptional members. The net result is an 
attenuated development of this module’s contribution to the decision process for all 
stimuli. 
Because the 8 weights for the partially valid two-dimensional modules tend 
towards values of 0.5 (reflecting the average output from these modules), performance on 
stimuli where less than two valid two-dimensional sources are present, e.g. peripheral and 
exceptional members would be attenuated. These variants would thus be fairly slow at 
learning in the later phases of training. This problem would not be suffered for the type VI 
structure, where the three-dimensional module would increase its output at the same rate 
for all inputs. 
As can be seen from figure 5.5, for the local learning model presented here, the rate 
at which 0 weights change for modules, and the levels they reach by the end of training, 
depends only on the diagnosticity of the module itself. As such, for example, the 8 weights 
in the three-dimensional module grow at the same rate and reach the same maxima on all 
tasks. 
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Figure 5.5: Development of 6 weights in the model per block on the six category 
structures, averaged across the twenty simulations per structure, 
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Figure 5.6: Examples of development of source node to channel node (category B) weights 
across the sixteen blocks of a typical run through the type 1 category structure. 
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Figure 5.7: Examples of development of source node to channel node (category B) 
weights across the sixteen blocks of a typical rn through the type V category structure. 
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Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show examples of the development of association weights for 
some of the modules in one run through the types I and V category structures. As can be 
seen, all of the sources in the three-dimensional module grow at the same rate towards the 
same maximum, regardless of the logical status of the stimulus they represent. 
One might suggest that this problem might be ameliorated by the inclusion of a 
global rate parameter in the 8 weight update algorithm. In this case the 0 weights would 
not decrease as much in the three-dimensional module in the presence of central members 
simply because the global signal will be smaller, owing to the contributions of lower 
dimensionality modules. 
This, unfortunately, results in a different difficulty. The problem observed in this 
case is that the difference between the type II and the types III and IV structures decreases. 
Much of the reason for this is attributable to an increased contribution made by the 
partially valid one-dimensional modules in the types Ill and IV structures. 
As can be seen from figures 5.5 and 5.7, the weights associated with these channels 
in the local learning model tend to remain low. As the ‘positive’ teacher signals associated 
with stimuli for which the module is valid decrease with learning, the negative signals 
associated with their being invalid increase. Despite the lower relative frequency of the 
negative signals (0.25) their increase in size results in the weights stabilising, on average, 
at the values observed in figure 5.7. The same pattern is true for 8 weights, which will 
decrease more when the channel is wrong than they increase when it is right. 
Introducing a global teacher component to the 8 weight learning rule will disrupt 
this pattern, as the size of teacher signals will generally decrease as learning progresses. 
This results in the balance between positive and negative signals for these channels being 
disrupted. The net result is that both associative and 8 weights increase above the levels 
observed for the local learning model. As with standard networks deploying the Rescorla- 
Wagner rule, what tends to occur is increased weight gains for valid sources when their 
activation is accompanied by an active source that indicates the opposite decision. As such 
there is a tendency for the 8 weights of the two-dimensional, partially valid modules 
(which may contain sources perfectly valid on occasions when the one-dimensional 
channels are ‘wrong’) to develop faster. 
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What tends to be observed with variants where only the 8 weights have global 
learning parameters, is that on types 111 and IV early learning rates are much higher than 
that observed for the type 11. Eventually, actual maximum transmission rates are reached 
by the lower dimensionality modules and this advantage disappears. The performance on 
the type I1 overtakes performance on types 111 and IV. While late superiority for type I1 is 
observed in the model described here, it is much more marked in these variants, with the 
superiority of type I1 generally being less than that shown in figure 5.3 following its 
emergence. This issue will be discussed further below in relation to the IMAW model. 
In variants which combine local leaming with global parameters in the associative 
weight update, the problem associated with purely global learning remains, with learning 
in types I11 to V attenuated relative to type VI in later blocks. Putting global parameters on 
both learning rules (as in variant 4) combines both problems, learning of types 111 and IV is 
more rapid than that for type I1 for up to three blocks, but then gets worse than learning for 
type VI in later blocks. In addition, asymptotic performance on all tasks is fairly poor. 
This would appear to be a significant problem for this model. It implies that 
individual modules will learn any problem according to their individual relationship with 
the problem structure. Without modifications this would appear to preclude the possibility 
of the model being able to represent blocking of conditioning (as discussed in chapter 3). 
5.1.4.2 Late superiority of type I1 structure 
An additional problem observed for this model is the late superiority of 
performance on the type I1 structure, relative to performance on structures I11 and IV. As 
discussed above, this problem is exacerbated by the effects of introducing a global teacher 
signal weighting for the 8 weight update function. 
The principal reason for its occurrence in this model, and its more severe 
manifestation in the variants discussed above, is related. As described in section 5.1.1.2, 
the choice to include the absolute value of 8 in its own learning function and the learning 
function for the association weights, makes it necessary to initialise the 8 weights at a 
value greater than zero. Reducing this initial value tends to result in increasingly sigmoidal 
learning curves, with an overall increase in the number of blocks of training required 
before asymptotic performance is reached. 
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As also discussed in section 5.1.1.2, while the transmission rate model described in 
the previous chapter did not include a parameter in its learning functions which captured 
the channel’s transmission rate, omitting it in a connectionist implementation resulted in a 
worse fit to the data. The resultant variant employed a local learning rule for association 
weights, with the response strength passed to the decision nodes weighted by the 8 
weights. These weights could be initialised at zero and develop using a similar function to 
equation 5.5, but without their own value included in the function. 
The result was a correct ordering but, as stated above, the difference between 
performance on type I1 and types 111 and IV was smaller than that shown for this model in 
figure 5.3. In addition the difference between the type V structure and the types I11 and IV 
increased. In fact the difference between these curves was equal to or sometimes greater 
than the difference between types 111 and IV, and type 11. 
These factors led to the decision to multiply the weight updates, as well as the 
output, by the value of the module’s 8 weight. As discussed above this meant that the value 
of this weight had to be initialised at a value of greater than zero. This factor is principally 
responsible for the problem of the late superiority of the type I1 structure over that of types 
111 and 1%‘. 
The reason for this is that, during the initial trials with the types 111 and IV 
structures, the values of the 8 weights on the partially valid two-dimensional modules are 
actually at the level they can be expected to reach at the end of training. This means that 
early learning in these modules will be at an identical rate to learning in the fully valid 
two-dimensional module in the type I1 structure. 
Because there are more fully valid two-dimensional sources in the types 111 and IV 
structures than in the type 11, early learning may be expected to follow the same pattern as 
that observed for the standard configural-cue model (Gluck & Bower, 1988b). Note, in 
figure 5.5 early learning for all structures tends to be characterised by a drop in the value 
of 8 weights from the initial value of 0.5. This is to be expected; the weights begin to 
increase again when the values of association weights in a module exceed the hyperbolic 
tangent of the 8 weight for that module. 
Figure 5.5 indicates that this seems to happen by about the third block. At this 
point, the superior validity of the fully valid two-dimensional module in the type I1 
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structure enables its 8 weight to increase at a higher rate than the 8 weights for the modules 
in structures I11 and IV. 
As suggested above, this problem is related to the problems associated with the use 
of global teacher measures on the 8 weight learning algorithm. Both problems are a result 
of the 8 weights not accurately representing the effective transmission rate of the module 
they pertain to. The more ‘equal’ these weights are, the more learning in the model will 
resemble that of the standard configural-cue model. 
5.1.4.3. Overview and possible developments to the model 
While the IMAW model produces what may be described as superior qualitative 
fits to the Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994) data than the standard 
configural-cue model, it would appear to have a number of problems. These problems, to 
some extent, compromise its performance on this task but also would appear to preclude its 
generalisability to other learning tasks. 
The discussion above would appear to indicate that the ‘tricky’ aspect regarding 
getting the model to show the desired order of task difficulty, is one of keeping the types 
I11 to V learning curves between the curves for the types I1 and VI tasks. Certain 
modifications would appear to close the gap between type VI and types 111 to V, while 
others seem to enhance type I11 and IV performance relative to type 11. 
In the context of the corresponding transmission rate model, presented in the 
previous chapter, this would appear to be a problem of making sure the combined 
transmission rates of the sets of partially valid modules in the type 111 and IV structures 
sum to less than one. All of the structures have a fully valid three-dimensional module. 
This is a task, in the case of the type IV structure, of trying to guarantee that the sum of 
contributions fiom three partially valid one-dimensional modules and three partially valid 
two-dimensional modules adds up to less than the contribution of a single, fully valid two- 
dimensional module. 
The way in which this model appears to achieve this may be criticised as being 
?mewhat contrived, as it basically involves raising the transmission rates of modules to 
‘9 greater than one. This is obviously most likely to affect performance on the types 
1 7ctures, as the transmission rates of all but one of their modules are less than 
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one. Squaring, for example, will not affect the type I1 structure as much because the 
maximum transmission rates of its modules are all unity. 
The model may also be criticised on the grounds that its ability to generalise to 
other tasks would appear to be quite limited. It will be able to demonstrate, for example, 
compound-component and component-compound transfer, by virtue of its configural-cue 
representations. It would, however, have difficulty with a compound-component 
discrimination problem. The presence of the component would have, on average, no 
validity with respect to the prediction of the outcome. The model would have to represent 
the absence of one component and the presence of the other as distinct two-dimensional 
sources in order to be able to do this task. Whether this is a psychologically valid way to 
represent stimuli is somewhat questionable, as it does suggest that the absence of anything 
may be accompanied by distinct sources which activate when that thing is absent. 
Blocking of conditioning appears to be another phenomenon that this model would 
have problems representing. The lack of global error parameters precludes recourse to a 
‘lack of learning’ explanation of the phenomena as modelled by the Rescorla-Wagner 
learning rule (Rescorla & Wagner,1972). The model was not developed as a means of 
addressing these observations though, and it may be possible to alter it such that some 
representation may be offered. The initial values of the 6 weights in the model, for 
example, may be determined for this type of concurrent task as a function of the global 
error present. If all 8 weights began at some greater-than-zero level, then when a module is 
instantiated in some way by input blocking would obviously be difficult to represent. 
If, however, the initial 8 weights were dependent on the error, or magnitude of the 
teacher signal, following the presentation of the new configuration, then learning in the 
configural module, and the module containing the new redundant relevant source, would 
be severely attenuated. If the other problems of the model can be overcome this could be 
an avenue for further research. 
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5.2. The Relative Modular Associability Weights (RMAW) 
model 
The second approach discussed in the previous chapter was to weight a channel or 
module’s contribution to the overall category judgement by some measure of its relative 
transmission rate. This measure is, in a general way, comparable to Mackintosh‘s (1975) 
concept of cue associability. The second model in this chapter represents an attempt to 
implement this idea in a modular connectionist network. 
The basic idea behind Mackintosh’s model is that there is an adaptive learning rate 
parameter associated with each cue. This parameter adapts according to how well the cue 
is predicting the outcome in relation to other cues present on that trial. If the cue has 
greater association strength than the combined strength of all of the other cues present on 
that trial, then its learning rate parameter increases. If its strength is equal or lower, then its 
associability decreases. 
As discussed, however, this concept related to individual dimensions or cues. The 
model outlined by Mackintosh made no commitment to handling the configural or 
exemplar representations that seem essential to the modelling of tasks such as the Shepard 
et al. (1961) category learning tasks. This model represents the parameters as a 
characteristic of the module or spatial channel. The model, therefore, has a similar 
structure to that illustrated for the previous model in figure 5.1. The channel or c nodes, in 
this case, ‘house’ the associability weights, the evolution and nature of these weights being 
the principal difference between this model and the IMAW model. 
As with the previous model, learning ‘within’ modules is local to that module. The 
problems discussed in the context of the previous model, with regards to global error 
signals, applied equally to this model when variants were tested. 
The problems of the previous model with regards to the accumulation of 
transmission rate in redundant relevant channels would, it was hoped, be eliminated by the 
use of the relative associability weights as a variable in the associative weight update 
functions. Because the relevant channels would accumulate association strength at a rate 
proportional to the validity of their cues and the frequency of those cues, high dimensional 
relevant channels would generally have less associative strength than low dimensional 
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ones. The result would be that the associability of these high dimensionality channels 
would generally be negative in relation to the lower dimensionality ones. 
In addition, the fact that there would be some active reduction of the contribution of 
non-valid channels (unlike the passive reduction for the previous model) may enable the 
superiority of the type I1 structure to be revealed earlier in learning. 
5.2.1. Functions defining the model 
5.2.1.1 Feedforward activation 
Figure 5.8: Diagram showing the feedforward pathway of activation and notation used in 
the equations below from the activation of a source node s to choice probability p(l) 
(shown specifically as p(A) and p(B). 
Figure 5.8 shows an example of the feedfonvard pathway from an s node to the 
choice probabilities as in figure 5.2. Working backwards fiom the choice probabilities as 
before, the probability of choosing label I is represented using a similar function to that 
used in equation 5.1 for the previous model. 
The parameter g, is a fixed gain on the choice function, sometimes equated with the 
‘decisiveness’ of the network (e.g. Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). The introduction of this 
parameter to this model is principally to enhance asymptotic performance. As with the 
IMAW model, association weights between s nodes and c nodes cannot exceed an absolute 
value of one. Unlike the IMAW model, the weights in the c nodes, by which module 
outputs are multiplied, cannot exceed one. As such, the contribution of any channel to the 
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decision process cannot exceed an absolute value of one. The gain parameter on the choice 
function therefore enhances asymptotic performance. This function was fulfilled in the 
IMAW model, dynamically, by 8 weights that could exceed an absolute value of one. 
Module contribution is determined by the following function, 
(5.8). 
The calculation of the output from a source node s to its channel node c, or os,, is 
determined in the same way as for the IMAW model (equation 5.3). The difference 
between this and the previous model is that the summed, weighted, source node output for 
a module is multiplied by a value a, which is derived from the adaptive weight 0 according 
to the following logistic function; 
(5.9). 
Because the module associabilities are affected independently of one another by 
positive and negative signals, according to their relative contribution to the category 
decision, there is a requirement to prevent associability from falling below zero. ‘Negative 
associability’ would appear to have no meaning in this context and using this function 
obviates the need to ‘clip’ associabilities at either zero or one. The associability, a, in the 
current model is the ‘expression’, in transmission, of the weight 8. The parameter g, is a 
gain or sensitivity parameter which determines how rapidly a changes in relation to 
changes in 8. 
5.2.1.2 Weight update functions 
The association weight between a source node s and its channel node c is updated 
at the end of each trial according to the following function, 
(5.10). Aw9c = (a, - ~sc)Qsac,L 
As with the IMAW model, the activation of the label node, a,, is one if the label is present 
on that trial and minus one if it is absent. The parameter h, is a learning rate parameter 
held constant for the duration of the simulation. 
The update of associability parameters is effected by the alteration of the 8 weight 
that controls them. The update of an associability weight between a channel node C and 
label node 1, e,, takes place after each trial as follows; 
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A% =(dl-P(l))[C(kcl -kc,)%, (5.1 1). 1 
In this case a', is the binary representation of label I's activation and, as such, is zero if the 
label is absent and one if it is present. This fimction makes use of the overall error of the 
system with respect to its prediction of the category label. Because this prediction is 
expressed in terms of a choice probability, the binary representation may be regarded as 
the probability that the label occurred. The discrepancy is, in this case, that between the 
probability that the network responds with, for example, A and the probability that the 
label was, in fact, A. The learning rate constant in this function is, as with equation 5.5, 
represented by b. 
The second part of equation 5.11 is the sum of the differences between the 
contribution made by this channel, Cl, towards a correct prediction of the label and the 
contribution made by other channels, cl. These differences are each multiplied by the 
associability of the 'other' channels prior to summing. This is because it seems appropriate 
to limit the contributions of channels to the relative effectiveness calculation when those 
channels are already known to be irrelevant. The measure of contribution to the correct 
prediction of the label, 1, by a channel, c, known as kd is evaluated as follows; 
(5.12), 
This function will produce negative values if the channel is guessing the wrong way and 
positive ones if it is guessing the right way. Their magnitude will be the same as the 
summed source output for the module. 
5.2.2. The experimental simulation 
The manner of simulation was identical to that carried out for the previous model. 
Each category structure was run through for sixteen blocks, twenty times with randomised 
order of input presentation for each simulation. 
The parameters used for the simulations were g,=2, &=2, &=0.1 and b=0.5. The 
initial value of all 0 weights was set to -0.25 (yielding an initial CL value of 0.3775). While 
these values were not optimised to enhance fit to experimental data, their values could 
make a difference to the order of difficulty. Higher values of h, tended to enhance the 
learning rate for the type VI structure relative to that for the types 111 to V. In this case the 
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fully valid three-dimensional channel would tend to become dominant in processing much 
more quickly in the types I11 to V structures, reducing the positive effects of the semi-valid 
channels early in training. 
The initialisation of the 8 weights at a higher value, such as zero, tended to reduce 
the superiority of the type I1 structure over the types I11 to V, particularly early in training. 
This was a result, as in the previous model, of enhanced capacity for the multiple partially 
valid channels in the types 111 to V structures, which makes learning in this model 'look' 
more like learning in the standard configural-cue model. 
5.2.3. Simulation results and discussion 
While figures 5.9 and 5.10 show that the model is capable of producing a 
qualitative fit to the human data, closer analysis reveals that, like the IIvlAW model, there 
are problems with the method by which it achieves this. 
As can be seen from figure 5.9, the separation of the type VI learning curve from 
that of the types 111 to V is somewhat narrow. Examination of figure 5.1 1 illustrates the 
principal reason for this in that the type I11 to V category structures tend to be mostly 
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Figure 5.9: Average probability of correct output per block for the relative associability 
approach for each of the six category structures of Shepard et al. (1961). Averages are 
based on 20 m s  through the 16 blocks, on each structure with randomised order of input 
patterns. 
As with the IMAW model, for these tasks the differing logical status of the 
individual members tends to result in a distribution of response strength across several 
modules. For different stimuli, different numbers of modules are capable of offering 
reliable predictions of the category label. Because the 8 weight update function changes 
weights based on the relative contribution of modules, weighted by a global teacher signal 
value, this leads to an asymmetrical pattern of learning in the modules. 
Presentation of central members of these categories is likely to lead to higher response 
probabilities and, consequently, a smaller global teacher parameter affecting the 0 weight 
updates. Because each module is learning according to a local scheme, the level of 
difference between the output from the fully valid three-dimensional module and that from 
the semi-valid two-dimensional modules is likely to be fairly low as well. 
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Figure 5.10: Performance of the model on individual patterns for category structures 111 to 
V. Performance is indexed in terms of the average probability of correct responding across 
the entire 16 blocks of the simulation. See figure 2.2 for illustrations of the relationships 
between these three types of member within each category structure. 
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Figure 5.1 I :  Development of a parameters in the model per block on the six category 
structures, averaged across the twenty simulations per structure. The key shown in the type 
VI structure applies to all graphs 
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When peripheral stimuli are presented the global teacher signal is likely to be 
higher, making the size of 8 weight updates larger. In addition, at least one of the two- 
dimensional semi-valid modules will actually be contributing nothing to the response 
strength, meaning that the negative signal that it will receive is likely to be quite large (its 
contribution being much less than that of other modules). 
The net result is that update signals during peripheral stimulus presentations are 
larger than those that occur during central stimulus presentations. For the type V structure, 
they are largest of all when the exception category members are presented. These signals 
will generally favour the three-dimensional module which will be providing valid output 
on all of these trials. Trials where the three-dimensional module is less likely to be 
providing as high a contribution as lower dimensionality modules are attended by lower 
global teacher signals. As such, in general, the 8 weights for the three-dimensional module 
increase at a higher rate than they decrease, whereas for lower dimensionality modules the 
opposite pattern obtains. 
Note that for the type 111 structure, figure 5.1 1 shows the 8 weight for the qs 
module decreasing faster and earlier than that for the qr and rs module. Examination of this 
category structure, in figure 2.2, shows that the qs module has two fully valid sources but, 
in the case of this structure, this module is only ever valid when a central stimulus is 
presented. Because of this the qs module will not have trials where it is generally the most 
valid module, as such its 8 weights generally decrease. 
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Figure 5.12: Examples of development of source node to channel node (category B) 
weights across the sixteen blocks of a typical run through the type I category structure. 
212 
Partially valid and non-valid one-dimensional channels 
4-70 1.5 
1 





+- Partially valid two-dimensional channel 
e q m  Four weights from the fully valid three-dimensional channel 
l S  1 -q*1 
13 14 15 16 
-1.5 
Figure 5.13: Examples of development of source node to channel node (category B) 
weights across the sixteen blocks of a typical run through the type V category structure. 
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The early gains in the 8 weights for the partially valid two-dimensional modules 
shown in figure 5.1 1 are attributable to the higher frequency of the sources in these 
modules. As the three-dimensional module’s 8 weights increase, the values of its 
association weights ‘catch’ up with those of the sources in these partially valid modules. 
This is shown in figure 5.13 for the type V structure. It occurs, in this case, at about block 
4, which is about the point at which the 8 weights for these partially valid channels begin 
to decrease (figure 5.1 1). 
Unfortunately, removing the global teacher signal parameter from the 8 weight 
learning function tends to narrow the gap between type VI and types 111 to V curves still 
further. The reason for this is that once the association weights in the three-dimensional 
module have caught up with those in the partially valid two-dimensional channels, the 8 
weights for these channels decrease at a much faster rate. In this case, the fact that error is 
being reduced by the contribution of the other channels cannot act to slow this decrease. 
Any contribution being made by these partially valid channels early in learning is 
subsequently removed by the decrease in the associability weights, such that the only 
significant contribution, later in learning, comes from the fully valid three-dimensional 
module. 
Another problem with the model is associated with the development of associative 
strength for sources in redundant, relevant modules. This is shown clearly in figure 5.12 
which illustrates the development of associative weights in the type I category structure. 
Comparing this figure with figure 5.11 reveals that because the overall error regarding this 
task is reduced so quickly, the 8 weight for the two-dimensional modules do not have time 
to reduce to a low enough level to seriously attenuate associative learning in their modules. 
The result is that these associative weights continue to increase. 
This learning occurs, albeit to a lesser extent, for associative weights in the three- 
dimensional module. Although not shown here, it is also observed for the three- 
dimensional module in the type I1 task. As figure 5.1 1 shows, it takes a while for the 8 
weight for the three-dimensional module to decrease in this task. During this time learning 
of associations within this module will continue. 
This approach would appear to inherit some of the problems of the IMAW model 
given previously. Like this model it may have difficulty with compound-component 
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discriminations without some explicit representation of the absence of a component. In this 
case the problem is slightly different. Due to the local learning rule in the modules and the 
fact that associability weights cannot exceed one, the compound’s associative strength 
cannot exceed that of the components. 
Like the previous model, this model would have some difficulties representing 
blocking of conditioning. Similar to the IMAW model, it is not easy to specify what the 
starting value for an associability weight should be. When the compound is presented in 
the blocking paradigm, for example, if the new associability weight for the two- 
dimensional module is greater than zero, associative learning will occur in the new 
module. Furthermore, because the global error should be close to zero on account of the 
previous training with the component, there will be little or no change to the value of the 
associability weight, despite its lower validity on each trial. 
As suggested for the IMAW model, one could specify some rule which set the 
initial value of associability weights as a function of the discrepancy that obtained on the 
trial on which they appeared. As with the suggestion in the context of the IMAW model, 
however, this would require one to specify a set of rules that relate associability weights to 
error throughout the course of training. While using error information in this way may 
facilitate increased generalisability of the approach, it remains an area for future research. 
5.3. General discussion 
The two models presented in this chapter demonstrate that modularly organised 
configural-cue architectures are capable of modelling the data reported by Shepard et al. 
(1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994). As suggested in the previous chapter, the difficulties 
experienced by Nosofsky et al. (ibid.), when testing their modular DALR variant of the 
configural-cue model, can be overcome by the use of alternative measures of average 
module performance. 
There are two, related, key aspects to both models presented above. The first is that 
the sources of the configural-cue representation are organised into ‘spatial’ modules. The 
second is that the contribution of each module to the decision process is gated by an 
adaptive weight which, in some way, reflects the average validity of the spatial module 
with respect to the category structure being learnt. This weight also controls the maximum 
rate at which representations within the module acquire associative strength. 
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This spatial modular structure may be related to rule-based accounts of the 
categorisation process such as that advanced by Shepard et al. (1961) and Feldman (2000) 
to account for the relative difficulty of category structures. 
Each module may be conceptualised as a ‘candidate’ rule. Its dimensionality is 
related to the number of clauses required to define the rule that it may represent. The 
dimensionality of the module, with respect to these tasks at least, determines the frequency 
with which each representation within that module will be instantiated. This in turn 
determines the rate at which the module will ‘learn’. This much alone provides the reason 
why type I is easier to learn than type I1 which is, in turn easier than type VI. Low 
dimensionality rules are learnt more quickly than high dimensionality rules because their 
conditions are tested and evaluated more frequently. 
The two models presented in this chapter represent two quite different ways of 
accounting for the relative difficulties of the Shepard et al. (1961) category learning tasks. 
The two distinct algorithms for updating modular weights reflect the two different types of 
information used by the models. The independent modular associability weights model 
(IMAW) bases its account on, firstly, the redundancy of the modules’ contributions with 
respect to the task. Secondly, the model relies on an assumption that a module’s output to 
the decision process is gated by some value reflecting the average validity of the module’s 
contribution to the decision process. This assumption is generally architectural, in that it 
can be modelled in terms of an independent modular weight which tracks the average 
performance of the module on each occurrence of a label. 
The relative modular associability weights model (RMAW) is somewhat different 
in that it offers an account based on the relative merits of each module’s reinforcement 
schedule in relation to each task. Both models are fundamentally dependent on the idea 
that sources or representations are organised in a way which is based on the ‘space’ within 
which they occur. 
The redundancy, upon which the IMAW model is reliant, is inherent in the modular 
configural-cue representation. Each dimensional value, or configuration of values, is 
represented 2*d times, where o is the dimensionality of the whole object and d is the 
dimensionality of the value or configuration in question. Simpler rules get learnt faster, 
according to IMAW, not only because their lowest dimensionality representation gets 
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tested and evaluated more frequently than higher dimensionality rules. They are also faster 
because they can be represented or duplicated by more of the modules in the architecture. 
The average validity of each module, for IMAW, is measured in terms of a weight 
which reflects how well the module’s output predicts the category label. Because this 
weight tracks the output from the module across all trials, its maximum value will 
generally be less than one if the module is not fully valid for the task. Because the 
hyperbolic tangent of the weight (multiplied by plus or minus one, depending on the label) 
is compared with the output of the module, the maximum value of the modular weight is 
greater than one if the module is fully diagnostic. 
The effect of this scheme is such that partially valid modules are substantially 
penalised, relative to fully valid modules, both in terms of the contributions they may make 
to the decision process, and in terms of the learning rates of their sources. The key to 
‘making’ this modular scheme reflect the observed order of task difficulty lies in 
controlling the contributions of partially valid modules. The combined contributions of up 
to three, partially valid two-dimensional channels, and up to three partially valid one- 
dimensional modules, must not exceed the ongoing contributions of a single, fully valid 
two-dimensional module. This scheme would appear to meet that criterion such that 
module redundancy may be used as an index of task difficulty. 
The RMAW model makes use of a different ‘type’ of information to represent the 
observed order of task difficulty. In this case associability weights are controlled by the 
differences between the reinforcement schedules of each module. Modules begin with 
equal, intermediate-value, associability weights. An associability weight will increase if 
the module it pertains to has a clearly superior reinforcement schedule to the other 
modules. 
This superiority may be manifested between fully valid modules in terms of the 
relative frequencies of their sources. A one-dimensional fully valid module has a superior 
reinforcement schedule to a fully valid two-dimensional module. It is this relationship 
which results in the correct I, 11, VI ordering of difficulty. 
The reason why it penalises the types Ill to V tasks relative to the type I1 task is 
that, early in learning, there is no channel which is clearly best able to represent the 
category learning task across all trials. This tends to result in a persistence of intmediate- 
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value associability weights for each of the partially relevant modules and, as a result, 
associative learning in these modules is attenuated, regardless of the individual validity of 
sources. 
This usage of the modular architecture highlights an important aspect of its 
relationship with dimensional attention models. When the modularity of a connectionist 
network is spatial, as it is with the two models presented above, each module may, 
effectively, represent a particular dimensional attention pattern. 
This is most evident with the M A W  model, where there is an element of 
competition between each module in terms of the extent each contributes to the decision 
process, and the rate at which its sources learn. In this case the model is effectively 
selecting which of its modules is learning the category structure the fastest. For the types I, 
11, and VI structures the modules selected (or the associability weights of each module) 
correspond to the adoption of a dimensional attention strategy similar to that shown by the 
GCM (Nosofsky, 1984) for these three tasks (see table 3.6). 
While attention is not specifically dimensional in this model, the effect is the same. 
Information about dimensions which are not essential to the task is not used in the 
performance of the task. Rather than select the dimensions themselves, as with ALCOVE, 
the relative modular associability model selects from the range of ‘spaces’ which would 
result from particular patterns of dimensional attention. 
As discussed in sections 5.1.4 and 5.2.3, however, the modifications made to the 
configural-cue architecture, for the two models, may have resulted in these models losing 
important aspects of the functionality of the basic configural-cue model. Without further 
modifications, for example, neither model seems like it would be capable of representing 
blocking. This particular loss of functionality is primarily due to the use of associative 
learning rules that do not take into account the combined associative strength of all active 
representations. The attention learning methods used by the model do not appear to offer 
alternative explanations for the data predicted by the basic configural-cue model. 
In the course of allowing the configural-cue model to make comparable predictions 
to models such as ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992), it would appear that the resultant models 
have acquired some of ALCOVE’S shortcomings. In particular this relates to the models’ 
ability to describe certain learning effects, such as compound-component discriminations. 
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Another criticism of the models is that their abilty to represent the Shepard et al. 
(1961) data appears to be highly dependent on the initial values given to their modular 
associability weights. If these initial values are too high, then the task difficulties tend to 
approach those observed in the basic configural-cue model (Gluck & Bower, 1988b, 
Nosofsky et al., 1994). If the values are initialised too low then, owing to the dependence 
of associative learning on the magnitude of these weights, early learning is severely 
attenuated. The intermediate initial values of these weights seem to be required to allow 
the effects of average module validity to be manifested at as early a stage in learning as 
possible. There is, however, no principled reason for their initial values, other than the fact 
that they produce the desired results for the task. 
Whether these values would allow the models to simulate human performance on 
other tasks may require further testing. It seems likely, however, that more sophisticated 
rules relating initial modular weight values to error or uncertainty, as suggested above, 
may be required to allow these models to simulate basic associative learning capacities. 
In summary, while these models produce a qualitative fit to the data, this does not 
appear to be all that robust. There does not appear to be any principled reason why the 
parameters required to achieve even this qualitative fit should be set as they are in the tests 
above. In addition the models appear to have lost much of the functionality of the basic 
configural-cue model. The next chapter details models which incorporate dimensional 
attention into the configural-cue form of representation. As will be discussed, this 
approach seems to be more robust with regards to its ability to produce the required 
qualitative fit. In addition, because these models are not modular they can incorporate 
global error parameters in their learning rules. This enables preservation of much of the 
functionality of the basic configural-cue model. 
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Chapter 6: Modellinp SheDard. Hovland. and Jenkins 
J1961) usin? confiFura1-cue networks with dimensional 
attention 
The final model presented in chapter 4 employed a method for representing 
differential dimensional contributions to the activation of representations. This approach 
made use of a sequentially represented process of dimensional sampling with 
representations or detectors activated only by consecutive sampling of their component 
dimensions. 
In this approach, the sampling process is representable in terms of a Markov 
process. The simple model in chapter 4 used a system where the probability of a particular 
dimension being sampled at time t+l is only a function of the sampling probabilities for 
each dimension and the dimension sampled at timet. 
In this approach, the sampling process is dependent on the vector of initial, 
modifiable sampling probabilities, p=(p(q), p(r), p(s)) and the matrix of transition 
probabilities P={p(il i)}. The probability p(il i) represents the following conditional 
probability p(X,+,=jl X,=i), which is the probability that the dimension sampled, X, at t+l 
will be j given that the dimension sampled at t is i. In addition, the probability of a 
dimension being sampled on consecutive time steps was affected by a global parameter 
relating to the overall uncertainty of the sampling decision process. 
In this chapter, three models will be presented. One of these is a direct attempt to 
model the transmission rate model with dimensional attention, presented in chapter 4. In 
this model, the parameters altering at the end of each trial are the initial sampling 
probabilities in p. A second model represents the transition probabilities more directly and 
attempts to use a back-propagation of error algorithm to alter the matrix P between trials. 
A third model, which is based on the modifiable transition matrix approach, attempts to 
address some of the conceptual shortcomings of the other two models. 
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6.1. Alteration of sampling probabilities by back-propagation of 
error: The Adaptive Sampling Probabilities (ASP) model 
The basic architecture of the model is shown in figure 6.1, illustrating the 
relationships between the various components. As with the transmission rate model in 
section 4.3.3, and unlike the two models presented in chapter 5, the source nodes are not 
explicitly grouped in a modular way. They are shown as groups in figure 6.1 to illustrate 
their common dimensional input. 
arrays of nodes representing 
cues and cue configurations 
+ directions of sampling sets of modifiable 
connections sequences w 
transmission of 
dimensional information ------+ 
Figure 6.1 : Adaptive sampling probabilities (ASP) model showing dimensions, channels 
(arrays of nodes), label nodes, and the relations between them. Note that each array 
contains a number of ‘source’ nodes: 2,4, and 8, for 1,2, and 3-dimensional arrays 
respectively. Each of these nodes is connected with the decision node. 
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6.1.1 Feedfomard functions 
Unlike the models presented in chapter 5, this model only uses one output weight 
per source node. This is illustrated in figure 6.1 by a separate ‘decision’ node labelled 1. 
Output from the source nodes is summed and passed through a logistic to determine the 
choice probabilities. The probability that the model selects A, or p(A) is given by the 
following equation, 
(6.1). 
Here g is a gain or confidence parameter, which modulates the slope of the logistic, p(B) is 
given by 1-p(A). The output from a given node array or channel, c, to the decision node 1, 
or o,,, is a function of the probability that the nodes in that channel are active and the 
maximum contribution those nodes could make, if they were active. 
where k,, is the maximum contribution to the decision node given by, 
(6.3). 
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As for previous models, a, has a value of 1 if the cue or cue configuration which the 
source node s detects is present and zero if it is absent. The output from the source node is, 
as given in equation 6.2, dependent on the probability that the channel is active on that 
trial. In the case of a one-dimensional source, this is dependent on the probability that the 
dimension is sampled on a particular trial. For sources with more than one dimension, this 
depends on the probability that the component dimensions of the source are sampled 
consecutively. 
6.1.2. Sampling and activation probabilities. 
In this model, a channel ‘c’ is simply a set of source nodes that receive their input 
from the same dimension or set of dimensions. The probability, p(c), represents the 
probability that a channel is activated, and thus sending a signal, on a given trial. This is 
dependent on the dimensions involved in the channel and the probability of them being 
sampled during a trial. The model of node activation is the same as that used in the 
transmission based model given in section 4.3.3, with nodes activated according to the 
scheme illustrated in figure 4.13. 
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A slight exception to the scheme used in the transmission rate model involves the 
use of the sampling decision entropy parameter, H(D), in calculating the transition 
probabilities. For the ASP model a parameter, h, was incorporated, which controlled the 
effect of the decision entropy on the sampling process. Assuming three dimensions i, j, and 
k, the entry in the matrix corresponding to p(jw,l iJ is calculated as follows; 
This replaces equation 4.25 for the determination of transition probabilities for the model. 
The parameter h controls the effect of decision entropy (determined using equation 4.23) 
on recurrent sampling probabilities. The lower its value, the lower the effect that the 
entropy has on the process. 
This ‘across-trial’ average chance of activation does not directly address the 
method by which sampling is ‘translated’ into node activation. For the purposes of this 
model it is assumed that the probability of the sampling event required, across the trial, 
may be mapped directly onto an activation level at the point of decision and feedback. 
The probabilities of node activation are determined using identical equations to 
those used in chapter 4, section 4.3.3.2, for determining the transition matrix and the 
channel activation probabilities. In this case a node is active according to the probability 
that its channel is active, or p(c). 
6.1.3. Updating weights and sampling probabilities 
Updating the associative weights w,, is achieved at the end of each trial using a 
variant of Rescorla and Wagner’s (1 972) learning rule. 
Aw~,=(6-p(l))a,p(c) j l ,  (6.5). 
The change in the weight is, here, based on the difference between the teacher signal 6, 
which equals one if the label was A and zero if the label was B, and the output of the 
network passed through the logistic function as in equation 6.1. This measure is multiplied 
by the activation of the node and the probability that the node’s channel, c was activated on 
that particular trial. The learning rate parameter for these weights is given by &., The 
weight change is added to the weight for the next trial. 
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The model uses the difference between the teacher signal and theprobubilify of 
selecting a particular label, rather than the raw output, to determine the weight update. This 
choice was motivated by theoretical and practical considerations. 
The theoretical considerations are those discussed in the context of Kruschke’s 
(1992) use of ‘humble teachers’ in section 3.3.3.2.1. With the nominal feedback used in 
category learning experiments, the goal of associative learning may be best described as 
one of minimising the uncertainty of the decision process regarding category membership. 
The magnitude of this uncertainty is not really indexed by the raw measure of associative 
strength delivered to a single alternative in the decision process. 
The best measure available will be derived from the interaction of strength for each 
alternative, in the form of the response probabilities themselves. The difference between 
the probability of a response and a measure of whether that response was correct or not 
(given by the label feedback) would thus seem an appropriate candidate to describe the 
magnitude and direction of learning which might be required. 
On a more practical level, asymptotic performance of the model may be 
compromised by the use of the raw output measure when the error is going to be used to 
determine a back-propagated signal. This is particularly the case when the weights affected 
by the back-propagated signal are normalised subsequent to their update. Even slight 
negative signals owing to an ‘excess’ of output will be passed back maximally to the most 
relevant dimension due to the larger associative weights which are dependent on relevant 
dimensions. 
The implications of the use of this variant will be discussed more in the next 
chapter, when its generalisation to a situation with more than two alternatives is required. 
Updating the dimensional sampling probabilities is based on the back-propagation 
of error via the channels dependent on each dimension. The increment for a dimension d is 
as follows, 
where h, is an update rate constant. Increments are added to the probabilities and then 
normalised to sum to unity. If p(d) plus its increment is less than 0.0001 then p(d)+Ap(d) is 
clipped at 0.0001 prior to normalisation. 
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6.1.4. Results from the experimental simulation and discussion 
As with the previous models, each category structure was run through for sixteen 
blocks of sixteen trials, twenty times each with a different randomised order of 
presentation. 
6.1.4.1. Overall performance results 
Figure 6.2 shows the mean probability of selecting the correct category per block of 
training across the twenty runs. The parameters used for this particular set of results were 
h=0.65, &=1, g=2.5, and %=l. 
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Figure 6.2: Mean p(correct) per block averaged across the twenty runs through each task 
for the adaptive sampling probabilities (ASP) model. 
225 
As with the previous models, this model displays the correct ordering of difficulty 
for the tasks. The main concerns here are as follows: 
1. As with the previous models, there are still problems with the late emergence of clear 
superiority for the type I1 structure over the types 111 to V. The nature of these 
problems is the same as those suffered by these other models and concerns the early 
dominance of one-dimensional contribution to output. This is not likely to be alleviated 
by this particular approach as even were it to sample the ‘correct’ valid dimensions 
early on, this will still allow the contribution of nodes representing the non-valid one- 
dimensional inputs. 
2 .  As with the IMAW approach (but not the RMAW model), there seems to be a trend on 
the type I11 to V structures for difficulty to be, approximately, a function of the 
number of valid sources. The order of these three structures is IV< 111 < V. Although 
the differences between the performances are small, they do appear to be consistent. In 
addition the average difference between the type IV and type V structure would appear 
to be approximately as great as that between the types 111 and IV tasks and the type I1 
task. 
3. The performance on the type VI task, for the first two blocks, is fairly poor. Average 
performance on the second block of training is only just above chance level. As with 
the type I1 problems, this is likely to be the result of interference from non-valid 
sources during the early trials. Because the activation of three-dimensional 
representations is less than that of these ‘interfering’ representations, this interference 
is likely to persist for longer than it does on the type I1 structure. 
4. Fairly poor asymptotic performance on all tasks other than the type I structure. 
On the positive side, the difference between performance on the type VI and type V 
task is greater than that displayed by the modular models. The activation functions for the 
three-dimensional representations required for the type VI structure, are, in this model, 
dependent on the probability of the component dimensions being sequentially sampled. As 
with the transmission rate version of this model reported in chapter 4, this makes the 
activation for nodes a function of their dimensionality and, consequently, ‘penalises’ the 
three-dimensional representations most heavily. 
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Figure 6.3 also shows that the model, correctly, has more trouble with learning 
peripheral category members than central members. For the type V task, the model finds 
exception members the most difficult. The weight distributions which underlie this pattern 
will be discussed below. 
6.1.4.2. Sampling probabilities and channel activations 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the evolution of the sampling probability vector, p, as the 
model learnt the tasks. As can be seen, the effects of learning are particularly evident in the 
types I and I1 tasks, where the model quickly develops high sampling probabilities for the 
valid q dimension in the type I task, and the configurally valid q and s dimensions in the 
type I1 task. 
For these two tasks the influence of redundant relevant channels is eliminated fairly 
quickly. As will be described below, because the model makes use of a global teacher 
signal for the update of its associative weights, learning in redundant relevant channels is 
fairly well attenuated. In this case, the use of a variant of the Rescorla-Wagner learning 
rule does not appear to compromise performance at all. This suggest that the model may 
be capable of representing blocking of conditioning, whilst at the same time be capable of 
exhibiting the dimensional attention which appears to be required for the Shepard et a1 
(1961) tasks. 
There is almost no deviation from the initial pattern of equal sampling probabilities 
for the type 111 task, and nothing at all for the type IV task. In the case of the type 111 task, 
there is a very slight tendency for the sampling probability of its non-valid dimension r to 
be greater than that for the partially valid dimensions q and s. This will be discussed in 
more detail below and also in the context of the next model, where this tendency is much 
more marked. This tendency, it will be noted, is similar to the RMAW model discussed in 
section 5.3.3. As can be seen from figure 6.4, the sampling probability for the partially 
valid q dimension in the type V task is slightly higher than the probability of the remaining 
dimensions. 
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Figure 6.3: Performance of the model on individual patterns for category structures 111, IV, 
and V. Performance is indexed in terms of the average probability of correct responding 
across the entire 16 blocks of the simulation. Figure 2.2 shows the relationships between 
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Figure 6.4: Average dimensional sampling probabilities, (vector p), per block. 
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The manifestation of these probabilities in terms of the actual channel activations is 
shown in figure 6.5. It is important to note that the maximum activation for configural 
channels, such as the valid QS channel in the type I1 task, or the QRS channel, is 
controlled by the parameter h (used in equation 6.4). Increasing the level of this parameter 
increases the effect of sampling uncertainty on the probability of consecutive sampling of 
the same dimension. 
The QRS channel is particularly affected by this value. If the value of h were one, 
the probability of QRS activation, given p(q) = p(r) = p(s) would be 0.5. As can be seen 
from figure 6.5, for h=0.65 this value is approximately 0.36. Altering this parameter tends 
to increase performance on tasks reliant on configural channels. 
Figure 6.5 illustrates that there is very little difference in the activation probabilities 
for the channels in the types I11 to V tasks. This, in itself, suggests a reason for why there is 
such a difference between performance on the types I11 and IV, and the type V task. As 
discussed in the context of the IMAW model, there are simply more valid sources for the 
types 111 and IV task than for the type V task. The lack of difference between the channel 
activation probabilities for these tasks means that the overall rate of learning will be, 
principally, a function of the number of valid sources for each stimulus. 
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Figure 6.5: Average probability of each channel being active, p(c) on a trial per block for 
each of the six tasks. The key given for the type I task applies to all graphs. 
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6.1.4.3. Associative weights 
Figures 6.6 to 6.9 show the development of associative weights for some of the 
channels on some of the category structures. These weights are the weights at the end of 
each block for one run through the relevant category structure. Note that the order of 
difficulty on these five runs was the same as that shown in figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.6 shows the development of weights in the type I structure. Weights are 
shown for the valid Q channel, the non-valid R channel, the valid but redundant QR 
channel, and four weights from the QRS channel. As mentioned above, the model shows 
considerable attenuation of learning in the redundant relevant higher dimensionality 
channels. 
Weights for the type I1 structure are not shown here but learning in the redundant 
relevant QRS channel for this structure was similarly attenuated. A typical magnitude of a 
QRS weight in this task was about 0.3 compared to asymptotic magnitudes of about 2.5 for 
the QS channel. 
Figure 6.7 shows the associative weights developed for five of the channels on the 
type 111 task. These graphs show an interesting property of the interaction between the 
global teacher signal and the configural representations used. The partially valid QR 
channel has two valid sources, qF00 and qr=lO, and fairly large weights develop on these 
connections. The two non-valid sources, in this case, also have weights that are almost as 
great as those developed on the one-dimensional, partially valid Q sources shown in the 
top panel of figure 6.7. 
This pattern is also shown in the type V task for the QR channel, shown in the 
centre panel of figure 6.9. A closer analysis of the weights and the tasks reveals that for 
each of these partially valid channels, when one of the dimensions is independently 
partially valid and the other is non-valid, weights will develop on the non-valid two- 
dimensional sources. These weights will be in the opposite direction to the ‘rule’ promoted 
by their single partially valid dimensions. 
As can be seen from figure 6.7, the qr=Ol weight is positive whereas the q=O 
weight is negative, the qr-1 1 weight is negative whereas the q=l weight is positive. A 
similar pattern is shown for the weights on the non-valid qFO1 and qF11 sources in the 
type V task shown in figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.6: Associative weights for the Q, R, and QR channels and four weights from the 
QRS channel (to category B) at the end of each block of learning for one run through the 
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Figure 6.7: Associative weights for the Q, R, QR and QS channels and four weights from 
the QRS channel (to category B) at the end of each block of learning for one run through 
the type 111 category structure. 
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Figure 6.8: Associative weights for the Q, R, and QR channels and four weights from the 
QRS channel (to category B) at the end of each block of learning for one run through the 
type IV category structure. 
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Figure 6.9: Associative weights for the Q, R, and QR channels and four weights from the 
QRS channel (to category B) at the end of each block of learning for one run through the 
type V category structure. 
Though not shown here, the same pattern is also shown for non-valid sources in the 
RS channel for the type 111 task. In this case, weights are in the opposite direction to that 
suggested by the value of s. Similarly, in the type V task, non-valid QS source weights 
follow a similar pattern to the non valid QR weights, again having opposite signs to those 
suggested by the value of q they contain. 
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Weights do not develop on non-valid two-dimensional sources when both of the 
dimensions are independently, partially valid. This is shown for the QS channel for the 
type 111 task in the third panel of figure 6.7, and all of the two-dimensional channels in the 
type IV task, one of which is shown in the middle panel of figure 6.8. 
Examination of the types 111 and V category structures (shown in figure 2.2) shows 
that the conditions under which these non-valid sources occur, given the use of a global 
teacher signal based learning algorithm, are likely to promote these weights. 
The non-valid source is non-valid because on half of the occasions it is present, the 
stimulus belongs to category A and on the other half, it belongs to category B. In the 
context of its one, partially valid dimension, half of the times the source occurs the 
partially valid dimension is ‘correct’ about the category label, and the other half of the time 
it is ‘wrong’. The non-valid source thus develops weights in the opposite direction to those 
for its one, partially valid dimension, because error signals will be greater on those 
occasions when the one partially valid dimension is wrong than when it is right. 
Examination of the relevant category structures reveals that the weights developed 
by these non-valid sources are correct in the context of a peripheral exemplar, and 
incorrect in the context of central exemplars for the type 111 structure. For type V they are 
correct in the context of exception members and incorrect in the context of peripheral 
members. 
Whether this result accurately reflects human performance on the task is, possibly, 
a question for future research. The effect is somewhat similar to the base-rate effects 
observed by Gluck and Bower (1988a) described in chapter 3. If one were to test transfer 
performance on compounds and components of the stimuli following learning of the type 
111 task, say, the model might predict that the participant would be less likely to ascribe 
qr=Ol to category B than q=O. This would be despite the fact that qFO1 is non-valid in 
isolation, r=l is non-valid and q=O is, on 0.75 of trials, a member of category B. 
In addition, it is interesting to note that the size of associative weights for the three- 
dimensional channel, QRS, for tasks 111, IV and V correspond to their ‘logical status’. In 
all cases, weights for central members are smaller than weights for peripheral members. In 
the case of the type V structure, the weights shown in figure 6.9 follow the same pattern, 
with weights for exception members being the largest of all. 
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Weights are not shown for the type VI structure but, as might be expected, large 
weights develop on QRS sources, with all weights in non-valid lower dimensionality 
channels extremely low. 
6.1.4.4. General comments 
The approach developed here is somewhat encouraging in that it does appear to be, 
to some extent, capable of simulating the difficulty levels reported by Shepard et al. 
(1961). It also provides a significant advance on previous configural-cue variants in that it 
offers a genuinely dimensional attention process, rather than one that requires some form 
of modular organisation (as with the previous models). 
There are, as discussed above, problems with the model. It is, however, a relatively 
simple model with only four free parameters. Little attempt was made here to optimise 
these parameters, but it is worth discussing, briefly, their role in the model. 
Some reduction in the gap between types I11 and IV tasks, and the type V task may 
be achieved by increasing the gain on the decision process. Higher gain values are likely to 
improve performance on all tasks. The main reduction in the gap between types 111 and 
type V is likely to be noticed at the asymptotic end of the learning curve. Increasing 
learning rate parameters is likely, up to a point, to improve performance on all tasks. As 
with all learning rate increases, however, it may also make the performance of the model 
more unstable, particularly with regards to early blocks of training. This is likely to 
adversely affect early performance on the type I1 and type VI tasks. 
It is also important to note that the associative weight learning rule used in this 
model will mean that there is some interaction between the associative learning rate and 
the decision gain. Because the increment to associative weights is a function of the 
discrepancy between the choice probability and the target, the gain on the decision 
function will have a role in controlling the size of the increment actually delivered. 
As mentioned above, the sampling decision entropy parameter, h, has a role in 
controlling the probability of configural activation. It exerts a direct control on the 
diagonal, transitional probabilities p(i1i). Not using the entropy measure at all, or setting the 
value of h to zero, severely attenuates learning on tasks dependent on configural 
representations. 
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Using the entropy parameter tends to promote configural learning. Without it, the 
late superiority of the type 11 task is likely to be more pronounced as initial sampling 
probabilities would favour the tasks with the largest number of valid sources. The lower 
activation of the configural channels would decrease the rate at which back-propagation of 
error might ‘discover’ relevant and non-relevant dimensions. Increasing the parameter 
tends to enhance configural processing. This does not tend to make much difference to the 
order of difficulty, but tends to decrease the gap between types 111 and IV tasks, and the 
type I1 task. 
The reason for this is that the decision entropy, H(D), at asymptote, is less for the 
type I1 structure than for structures 111 to V. This is because the base of the logarithm used 
to determine H(D) is three, such that entropy is maximal when all three probabilities are 
equal. 
This means that for the types 111 and IV tasks, higher values of h tend to enhance 
the activations of all of their configural channels. For the type I1 task there is an initial 
problem with the enhancement of learning in the QRS channel during early blocks. This 
tends to slow down the operation of the back-propagation process as the three-dimensional 
channel provides positive signals to all dimensions. This reduces the rate at which the 
sampling probability for the irrelevant dimension is reduced. This, in turn, decreases the 
rate at which the two-dimensional channel increases its activation over the basic level 
reached for equal initial sampling probabilities. The result is a reduction in the advantage 
of the type I1 over the types 111 and IV tasks. 
This effect is representative of a major obstacle to the potential generalisability of 
the model to other learning tasks. If one had a task with many dimensions of which only 
two were relevant, as a compound only, the discovery of this relevance would drastically 
reduce the sampling probabilities for all but two of the dimensions. The entropy of the 
decision would, being to a much higher base, be comparatively low. This would increase 
the probability of consecutive sampling of the component dimensions of the relevant 
configuration and thus may considerably reduce configural activation. 
Ideally, once a dimension has been learnt to be irrelevant, its influence over the 
utilisation of dimensions which are relevant should be attenuated. Although the influence 
of irrelevant dimensions is indirect in this model, it is, potentially, problematic. 
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The problem of ‘disembodied’ probabilities is another difficulty for this model. The 
initial sampling probability vector, p, refers to the probabilities of sampling, without any 
explanation as to the system which gives rise to the probabilities in the first place. 
Probabilities, when normalised in this way, refer to relationships between events; q 
is more likely than r, for example. The model implies that some learning process makes q 
more likely to occur than r but does not necessarily suggest how t h i s  may be brought 
about. The model may be developed by replacing the probabilities with some form of 
weight that is altered by the back-propagation process. In this way one might suggest that 
the normalised weights refer to the initial sampling probabilities for the dimensions 
involved. If the weights began with non-zero values, then it would be possible to 
incorporate new dimensions into the model and attempt to model experiments where the 
number of stimulus dimensions, or components, was variable. 
The following model addresses, directly, both of these issues. It attempts to 
represent the dimensional attention aspect of the learning process in terms of a set of 
relationships between dimensions, rather than in terms of characteristics of the dimensions 
themselves. The difference is that the adaptive components with respect to the sampling 
process are the transition probabilities, rather than the initial probabilities. 
6.2. Alteration of transition matrix by back-propagation of 
error: the Adaptive Transition Matrix (ATM) model 
The second model attempting to implement a form of dimensional attention uses 
back-propagated error to specifically affect the transition probability matrix P. For this 
model, source node activation is still dependent on the sampling probabilities for 
individual dimensions and sequences of consecutively sampled dimensions. In this case the 
initial probabilities, p, remain fixed at one over the number of dimensions (i.e. 1/3). The 
values that change fiom trial-to-trial are the transition probabilities P. 
6.2.1. Determination of transition probabilities 
For this model, the sampling process may be represented in terms of a fully 
interconnected network of three nodes, one for each dimension. This arrangement is shown 
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in figure 6.10. The probability of a node being sampled at time t+l, or p(d),, is given by 
the following; 
Ad),,, = - ‘d(1)  (6.7). 
x ‘ d C O  d 
The activation of a dimension node, D, a, is dependent on the input from all of the nodes, 
d, in the sampling network, 
= x Z d a d D  (6.8). 
d 
The term z, is the transmission ‘rate’ of the dimensional node d. This term takes on a value 
of one, if the dimension is the dimension which is currently sampled, and zero otherwise. 
The effective connection strength between dimension d and dimension D is given by ado. 
This connection strength depends on the value of an adaptive unbounded positive or 
negative weight 8. The effective connection strength between dimensions i and j (where i 
may be the same dimension as j) is maintained in the unit range as follows; 
1 a.. =- 
‘I 1 +e-@, 
(6.9). 
Because only one dimensional node may be sampled and thus transmit at any one 
time, the conditional probabilities in the transition matrix P are thus determined just using 
the effective connection strengths. The conditional probability p(i,,J iJ is evaluated by the 
following; 
where k are all of the dimensions including i and j. 
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connection weight between i and j 
Figure 6.10: Representation of the sampling system as a system of three dimensional nodes 
interconnected via adaptive weights. 
6.2.2. Feed-forward activation functions 
This model employs the same activation functions as the ASP model. The choice 
probability is determined using the summed channel output, as in equation 6.1. The 
channel output is determined by the maximum weighted contribution and channel 
activation probabilities as in equations 6.2 and 6.3. 
The channel activation probabilities are calculated using similar methods to those 
given for the previous model. An important difference, in this case, is that there is no 
‘global’ uncertainty term H(D). The probability of consecutive sampling of the same 
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dimension twice is controlled by the transition probability p(il+l il) determined, along with 
the other transition probabilities, using equation 6.10. 
This model makes use of the specific probabilities of particular sequences of 
samples in determining the effects of back-propagated error signals on the transition 
weights. As such it is worth defining the channel activation probabilities in terms of these 
measures, in order to introduce the notation required in the next section. 
The probability of a channel being active during the trial is given, as for the ASP 
model and for the dimensional attention model in chapter 4, by the sum of the probabilities 
of the different sequences of samples which may activate it. As described above, a channel 
is activated by consecutive sampling of its component dimensions. For example, equation 
4.26 gives the activation probability of the QRS channel as being the sum of the sequence 
probabilities; p(qrs), p(qsr), p(rqs), p(rsq), p(sqr), and p(srq). 
In this case a channel, c, has a set of U dimensions uc= (dl, 4 . .  .d,,) and it is 
activated by any one of a set of sequences of samples of those dimensions. A sequence 
'member' of c is described by v,= {dt, dl+l.. d,+,,.,,}. Each element of the sequence is a 
different element of u,. Where U for a particular channel c is one, i.e. it is a one- 
dimensional channel, the probability of the channel being active, p(c), is just given by 
p'(d). This is the estimated probability of the dimension being sampled following Z steps 
of the sampling process, determined as with the previous model and the model in section 
4.3.3.2. For a multidimensional channel, the probability of channel activation during a 
trial, p(c), is given by the following; 
(6.11). 
rn=l 
The probability of the sequence occurring during the trial being given by; 
,=I 
6.2.3. Updating transition and associative weights 
At the end of each trial, associative weights and the weights which determine the 
transition probabilities in the sampling process are updated. Associative weights are altered 
according to the same rule as for the previous model, given in equation 6.5. The functions 
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governing the alteration of transition weights are somewhat more complicated than those 
used in the previous model. 
The basic heuristic used was to increase a transition weight between its origin and 
destination, if either that transition is involved in activating valid representations, or the 
destination is generally more involved in more valid relationships that the origin. The 
measure of the general contribution of a particular dimension to the decision is based on 
the back-propagation of error from channels dependent on that dimension, via transitions 
which end with that dimension. The signal back-propagated to a dimension, d, orb, is 
determined by the following function, 
(6.13). 
d q  
This is basically the error back-propagated through channels of which d is a component, 
multiplied by the fraction of that channel’s activity which may be attributable to sequences 
ending in d. 
The signals for individual weights differ, depending on what kind of weight they 
are. The update signal for the weight between a dimension and itself is different to the 
update between two different dimensions. The change signal for a connection between a 
dimension and itself is a function of the amount of signal back-propagated from the 
channel that is dependent only on the dimension itself, and the difference between that 
signal and the signal from multidimensional, dependent channels, 
(6.14). 
The first part of the equation is the signal from the channel for dimension i. The second 
part of the equation is the difference between this signal and the signal that is transmitted 
back via dependent channels with more than one dimension, via sequences which end with 
the dimension i itself. This second part is multiplied by the probability that consecutive 
sampling of i occurs during the trial. It is basically a measure of what is gained by 
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consecutive sampling of the same dimension, minus a measure of what will be lost by that 
sequence, all multiplied by the probability that the consecutive sampling occurs at all. 
The update signal for a connection between two different dimensions, i and j, is a 
function of the differences in back-propagated signals between the destination and origin, 
and the amount of back-propagated signal which depends on the transition itself. 
L J 
The first part of the equation is the difference between back-propagated signals to the 
destination and origin dimensions. This is weighted by the current value of the effective 
weight between the two, aii, to reflect that once it has been learnt that a destination 
dimension is irrelevant, the difference between the signals to the two dimensions is of 
reduced importance. The second part of the equation consists of the sum of signals back- 
propagated via channels which are dependent on the transition. 
The value of the weight on the next trial is then computed by the following, 
This means that the overall change to the weight Bij is determined by subtracting the 
increment signals to all other transition weights leading away from dimension i, from the 
increment signal for Bij. The parameter is a learning rate constant. 
As can be seen, the learning functions for these transition weights involve a high 
degree of competition. For the connections between a dimension and itself, the update 
signal shown in equation 6.14 involves the signals to the dimension in isolation being 
compared with the signals to transitions to other dimensions. Where the dimension is more 
valid in conjunction with other dimensions than it is by itself, this recurrent connection is 
likely to receive a negative signal. 
Equation 6.16 introduces further competition in that updates to the transition 
weights are dependent on whether that transition is uniquely relevant or not. As with the 
RMAW model, and similar to the scheme proposed by Mackintosh (1975), only the weight 
with the highest update signal will receive a positive change. 
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6.2.4. Results from the experimental simulation and discussion 
The experimental simulation was carried out in the same way as for the previous 
models. The model was run through the sixteen training blocks of each experiment twenty 
times, with a different randomised order of stimulus presentation for each run. 
6.2.4.1. Overall performance of the model 
The parameters used for the results which follow were &,,=l, ~ 2 . 5 ,  and &=4. In 
addition the transition weights for connections between a dimension and itself €Iii were 
initialised at -0 .5 ,  with all other transition weights initialised at zero. This was done in the 
hope that the problems with the early performance on the type VI, suffered by the previous 
model, would be, to some extent, rectified. 
The ASP model has a form of ‘built-in’ early enhancement for configural 
activation, in that the equal initial sampling probabilities results in a maximal value of 
H(D) for early trials. This model lacks such a provision and so, without this pre-setting of 
‘recurrent’ transition weights to lower values, severely attenuated early learning in the 
types I1 and VI structures could be expected. 
Figure 6.1 1 shows the average probability of the correct response being produced 
by the model, per block, averaged across the twenty runs through each category structure. 
Again, the model exhibits the order of difficulty observed by Shepard et a1 (1961) and 
Nosofsky et a1 (1994). Performance on the type I1 task is, for this model, considerably 
better than that shown for structures 111 to V. First-block performance on this task, while 
not superior to that on tasks I11 and IV, is certainly not clearly worse. 
Performance on structures 111 to V is interesting in terms of the fact that while the 
overall probabilities of correct responding across the sixteen blocks are fairly close for the 
three tasks, the learning curves are somewhat different in nature. The average probabilities 
of correct response per block across all sixteen blocks are 0.906,0.891, and 0.875 for types 
111, IV, and V respectively. 
The curves in figure 6.1 1 indicate that the errors tend to be distributed across the 
learning curves in different ways. Type IV seems to suffer from poor performance early on 
in learning, but then its performance increases to the highest asymptotic levels of the three. 
Type V has superior early performance but its performance towards the end of the 
experiment is noticeably worse than that on types 111 and IV. The performance on the type 
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111 structure begins in a similar fashion to that for the type V task, but higher levels of 
performance are achieved towards the end of the sixteen blocks. 
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Figure 6.1 1: Mean p(correct) per block averaged across the twenty runs through each task 
for the ATM model. 
The reasons for this particular pattern will be discussed below. Analysis of the 
transition weights and channel activation probabilities reveals that the model tends to 
behave in distinctly different ways for each of these three tasks. 
Performance on the type VI task is still somewhat poor in comparison with the 
human data for the early trials. Despite the fact that its performance towards the end of the 
task is only marginally worse than that on the type V structure, its overall performance is 
clearly worse than that shown for the rest of the category structures. 
Figure 6.12 shows how well the model learns patterns with different logical status 
in the types 111 to V tasks. As with all of the previous models, central members are easier 
to learn than peripheral ones which are, in the case of the type V task, easier than exception 
members. 
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6.2.4.2. Channel activation probabilities and transition weights 
Figure 6.13 shows the average probabilities of channel activation, averaged across 
each block, and across the twenty NI~S through each category structure. As the figure 
shows, for the type I task the activation for the valid Q channel rapidly increases towards 
unity with that of all other channels heading towards zero. 
The graph for the type I1 structure shows similarly rapid ‘learning’ of the relevant 
dimensions of the task. Unlike the previous model, activation of the valid QS channel on 
this structure approaches one. 
Both of these patterns can be understood in terms of the transition weights that 
develop between dimensions. Figure 6.14 shows the average, normalised, output from each 
dimension. This is the conditional probability of the destination dimension being sampled 
at time t+l, given that the origin dimension has been sampled at time t. 
As the output is the weight Os, passed through a logistic, as given in equation 6.9, 
the indication is that, for the type I structure, very high weights develop between all 
dimensions and q, with the weight from q to itself also being very high. All other weights 
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Figure 6.12: Performance of the model on individual patterns for category structures 111, 
IV, and V. Performance is indexed in terms of the average probability of correct 
responding across the entire 16 blocks of the simulation. Figure 2.2 shows the relationships 
between these three types of category member in each category structure. 
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Figure 6.13: Average probabilities of channel activations, p(c), per block. Key shown for 
the type I task applies to all graphs. 
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For the type I1 task, the high probability of activation in the QS channel can be 
understood in terms of extremely high weights between the q and s dimensions. Unlike the 
previous model, this model can control the probability that it will sample the same 
dimension twice in a row in terms of its weight to itself. In this case the weights for q to q 
and s to s are strongly negative. This results in a pattern of sampling that oscillates between 
q and s, resulting in the high probability of activation shown in figure 6.13. 
For the type VI task all weights between dimensions were positive, with all weights 
between a dimension and itself being strongly negative. As these weights become 
increasingly negative, the probability of the QRS channel being active, shown in figure 
6.13, increases towards 0.5. As described in section 6.1.4.4, this is the probability of the 
QRS channel being activated when the probability of consecutive sampling of the same 
dimension is zero. 
The channel activations and transition probabilities for structures I11 to V show 
different characteristics from one another, as suggested by the curves in figure 6.1 1. For 
the type 111 structure the pattern observed is one of high activation probabilities for the 
non-valid R channel and the partially valid QR and RS channels. With respect to the 
single-dimensional channels, asymptotic activation probabilities are approximately 0.25, 
0.5, and 0.25 for Q, R, and S respectively. The normalised effective transition weights, 
shown in figure 6.14 for this structure, suggest that the r dimension will be sampled on 
approximately every other step of the process. As described for the ASP model, and also 
for the RMAW model, in a situation where learning is somewhat competitive, the QS 
channel is likely to develop at a lower rate than RS and QR channels in this structure. 
It is important to note that the model does retain some level of activation in the QS 
channel and, from figure 6.14, there is still a small chance that q-s and s-q transitions will 
occur. When comparing the performance on the type I11 with performance on the type V, 
this would appear to be important. 
251 
Type I Type I1 
q q  q-r q-s r q  1-1 1-5 s-q s-r 5.5 
origin-destination 
qq q-r q-s rq 1-1 r-s s-q s-r s-s 
origin-destination 
1 7  
0.8 -I Type IV Type I11 
0.8 
d 
& '  
C Z  
% 0 4 1  
0 '  
qq q-r q-s r q  I-r 1-5 s-q s-r s-s 
origin-destination 
Type V 
qq q-r q-s r q  1-1 1-5 s-q 5-1 s-s 
origin-destination 
qq q-r q-s r q  r-r 1-5 s-q s-r s-s 
origin-destination 
Type IV 




q q  q-r q-s r q  r-r 1-5 s-q 5-1 s-s 
origin-destination 
Figure 6.14: Average effective transition weights (cq,), averaged across the last four blocks 
of training, normalised across each origin dimension, e.g. q-q + q-r + q-s = 1.  This is 
effectively the conditional probability of the destination being sampled at time t+l, given 
that the origin has been sampled at time t. Key shown for type VI applies to all charts. 
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On the type V structure, the model tends to sample the single valid q dimension in 
preference to the non-valid r and s dimensions. As figure 6.14 shows this tends to result in 
a similar pattern of sampling where, in this case, q is likely to be sampled on every other 
step of the process. Unlike the type I11 structure, however, the members of the categories 
on the type V structure cannot all be correctly classified in terms of the valid sources in the 
two partially valid two-dimensional channels. 
Because the reduction in the activation of the non-valid RS channel is more or less 
complete in this task, the probability of the QRS channel being activated is attenuated. 
This channel is most useful, in this task, for exception members and the attenuation of its 
activation severely degrades performance on these members. 
Activation of the QRS channel is dependent on the consecutive sampling of the 
three dimensions. The pattern of transition weights developed in the type V task allow this 
to occur at a maximum rate given by the sequence s-q-r-q-s-q-r-q-s, where bold type 
indicate the activation of the QRS channel. This  would allow the channel to be activated 
approximately half of the time assuming that q was sampled on every other step of the 
process. Unfortunately, following sampling of q the chance that the next dimension 
sampled will be the one that preceded q is equal to the chance of sampling the remaining 
dimension. This reduced the probability of QRS activation to about 0.25, as shown in 
figure 6.13. 
The situation is slightly different for the type 111 structure. While the transitions are 
predominantly between r and q and r and s, there remains a significant chance that a 
transition between q and s will occur. This enhances the probability of QRS activation by 
increasing the chance that consecutive samples will result in consecutive activations of the 
QRS channel via, say, the sequence q-r-s-q. While the s-q transition is less likely than 
other transitions, when it does occur, it tends to result in consecutive activations of the 
QRS channel. Note that if the above sequence does occur, the most probable next sample is 
dimension r, such that the QRS channel would be activated on three consecutive steps of 
the sampling process. 
The pattern of activation and transition probabilities for the type IV structure shows 
an entirely different tendency. In this task, all of the single dimensions are equally 
(partially) valid, and all of the two-dimensional channels contain the same number of valid 
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sources. For the central category members, all of the partially valid channels are fully 
valid. For the peripheral members two of the single dimensional channels are valid, and the 
two dimensional channel, of which the two valid dimensions are components, is also valid. 
Figure 6.13 shows that the model retains equal channel activation probabilities for 
each of the three single-dimensional channels. The configural channels begin with a 
somewhat lower activation probability, but then increase. This increase is most marked for 
the three-dimensional channel, which increases towards a probability of about 0.85 by the 
end of the experiment. 
The normalised effective transition weights shown in figure 6.14 indicate that, on 
average, the model has developed equal transition probabilities for each transition to a 
different dimension with the probability of consecutive sampling of the same dimension 
low, but not as low as that for the type VI. In fact, apart from these consecutive sampling 
probabilities, the average matrix appears to be similar to that for the type VI. 
As will be noticed from figure 6.13, the probability of activation for the QRS 
channel in the type VI task is much lower than that for the type IV task. The reason for this 
is that on the type IV task the model develops transition weights that support cyclical 
patterns of sampling. Closer inspection of the normalised effective transition weights 
reveals that individual networks either develop a ‘clockwise’ (q-r-s direction) or 
‘anticlockwise’ (s-r-q direction) pattern of weights. There were 10 of each type. Figure 
6.15 shows the averaged normalised effective transition weights for these two groups. 
The reason why cyclical sampling patterns develop for the model on the type IV 
structure is somewhat difficult to elucidate. The learning algorithms for the transition 
weights suggests that once cyclical sampling occurs, it is likely to persist, particularly in 
structures where all dimensions are equally valid. Because the signal back-propagated to a 
transition weight is a function of the frequency of that transition, once ‘travelling’ in one 
direction is more common that the other, the dominant direction is likely to receive more 
error signals. 
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Figure 6.15: Average normalised effective transition weights (aij), averaged across the last 
four blocks of training for the type IV task, separated into those runs which resulted in 
‘clockwise’ and ‘anticlockwise’ transition weight matrices (10 of each type). 
Furthermore, changes to a transition weight, due to differences between the back- 
propagated signal to the origin and destination of the transition, are gated by the size of the 
transition weight between them (as in equation 6.15). This means that once a transition 
weight has been reduced, signals due to this source are unlikely to alter it a great deal. 
The enhanced contribution of the three-dimensional channel which results from the 
cyclical sampling pattern is also likely to enhance the process. The only time that negative 
signals to transition weights between dimensions will occur in this task, is when peripheral 
category members are presented and the back-propagated signal to a destination dimension 
will be less than that transmitted to the origin. The signal back-propagated via the three- 
dimensional channel to this transition weight will always be positive. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of this contribution will be greater for peripheral stimuli as the three- 
dimensional associative weights for these members are greater. When central stimuli are 
presented all transitions and dimensions are equally valid, therefore enhancement of 
transitions will be greatest for those transitions which occur most frequently. 
Of all of the category structures the transition weights for the early blocks of 
training on the type IV are the most unstable. The learning rate parameter was set to quite a 
high value for these results (4). This, coupled with the competitive algorithm, the equal 
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validity of all dimensions and transitions, and the fact that not all of the dimensions and 
transitions are valid on all trials, is likely to account for this instability. If  cyclic patterns of 
sampling ‘emerge’ from this initial instability at some point they may, due to the reasons 
described above, be ‘self-promoting’ or act as stable attractors for the weights. 
6.2.4.3 Associative weights 
The associative weights that developed for the model are not shown here as they 
are substantially similar to those that developed for the ASP model. The weights for 
redundant relevant channels in the types I and I1 task were slightly smaller, this being 
accounted for by the more rapid and complete development of sampling patterns which 
preclude their activation. 
Development of weights on the ostensibly non-valid two-dimensional sources for 
the types 111 and V tasks followed a similar pattern to that shown for the ASP model. In 
this case the development was slightly less in the type 111 task and slightly greater in the 
type V task. Despite the high level of activation in the three-dimensional channel, the size 
of QRS associative weights in the type IV task was no greater than that for the types 111 
and V tasks. This may be accounted for by the fact that by the time the three-dimensional 
channel becomes dominant, substantial weights on the lower dimensionality channels have 
already developed. 
6.2.4.4. General comments 
The ATM model represents another way of implementing a form of dimensional 
attention using the configural-cue form of representation. Like the ASP model it achieves a 
qualitative fit to the data reported by Nosofsky et al. (1994) shown in figure 2.3, which is 
superior to that of the configural-cue variants reported by these authors (ibid.). 
The model represents something of a conceptual improvement over the ASP 
approach. As discussed in section 6.1.4.4, it seems likely that without further alterations it 
may be difficult to apply the ASP model to situations in which stimulus dimensionality 
varied. 
The ATM approach represents the selective attention process as dependent upon 
learnt relationships between dimensions, in the context of the task. New dimensions may 
be introduced with the assumption that the transition weights connecting them to each 
other have an initial value of zero. How this representation of new components or 
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dimensions might affect subsequent learning is, to some extent dependent on the way in 
which one models the operation of the ‘attention’ learning process. 
The next model attempts to clarify this issue by representing the process in a much 
more specific way. As will be seen, the way in which this may be achieved is by assuming 
that the process operates in a similar way to that used in the rapid attention shift models, 
described in section 3.3.5. 
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6.3. Rapid attention shifts: the Rapidly Adaptive Transition 
Matrix (RATM) model 
The final model presented in this chapter is an attempt to address some of the issues 
raised by the previous two. One issue concerns the direct representation of source node 
activation in terms of the probability of channel activation. With the ATM and ASP 
models there is no model offered as to how this probability is ‘converted’ into node 
activation. It may be suggested that this is an undesirable characteristic for a connectionist 
model. 
The use of channel activation probabilities also extends to interpretations of the 
various learning rules used. The sampling process in the previous two models is 
represented as a sequential process. Probability or transition weight update signals were 
calculated in terms of the probabilities of informative transitions, or samples, being made 
in relation to the feedback delivered for a particular stimulus. The above models thus 
attempted to approximate a process which would require time, using average measures of 
the likelihood of each transition occurring. 
Representing learning for the sampling process more explicitly would necessitate a 
number of iterations of the sampling process to occur, after the feedback had been 
presented, to allow the valid relationships to be learnt. This means that the sampling 
process for a model incorporating an explicit representation of sampling would not be 
representable in terms of a ‘within-trial’ Markov process. With the explicit representation, 
the probability of each dimension or transition may be changing on each step of the trial. 
Modelling the alteration of sampling probabilities using this sequential process is 
reminiscent of the rapid attention shift models, such as ADIT and EXIT (Kruschke, 1996a, 
and in press a). As discussed in section 3.3.5, these models alter ‘attention’ weights for 
individual representations, or dimensions (in the case of RASHNL (Kruschke & Johansen, 
1999)), in such a way as to minimise the discrepancy between the network’s output vector 
and the feedback vector. After these weights have been altered across a number of 
iterations, the associative weights are changed. 
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The ATM model, which makes use of sampling probabilities to control the 
activation of representations, requires that activation be evaluated according to the 
characteristics of the matrix of transition weights. These weights are modified by learning. 
Representing the channel activation as something which is dependent on the 
sampling process also requires that there be a number of iterations of the sampling process 
prior to the decision being made. This is necessary to allow the channel activations to 
‘develop’ to reflect the characteristics of the transition matrix. 
To implement learning of the matrix of transition weights using a more explicit 
representation of the sampling process, as stated above, requires some measurement of the 
effectiveness of particular transitions. This will not necessarily affect the operation of the 
back-propagation component of the learning process used in the previous model, although 
in this case the channel activation probabilities must be replaced with some other measure 
of channel activation. 
The simplest way to index the effectiveness of individual transitions would be to 
measure error before and after they have taken place. If a particular transition results in a 
decrease in the overall error, then that transition weight may receive a positive update 
signal. Conversely, if a transition leads to an increase in error, it would receive a negative 
signal. 
The resultant model is, therefore, somewhat more complicated than the previous 
two. This extra complexity is made necessary by taking into account the development of 
channel activations across a trial. It is, perhaps, more ‘connectionist’ than the previous two 
models, as all of the node activations are the result of explicitly represented transmission 
relationships, rather than just probabilities. 
The only probabilities which remain in the model are those which determine which 
dimension will be sampled on a given step of the trial. The model is deterministic, 
however, in that a random number in the unit range was generated at each step of the 
sampling process, its value being compared to the probabilities generated by the previous 
step to decide which dimension would be sampled on the current step. 
Figure 6.16 illustrates the architecture of the model. As can be seen, the model has 
recurrent aspects that were not present in the previous two models. The transition weight 
update rule, which will be described below, relies on both back-propagation of error and 
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direct feedback from the decision process. In addition, as will be detailed below, the 'state' 
ofthe decision process directly affects the characteristics of the matrix of transition 
weights. 
channel or set of 
input dimension 
representations 
@ ,. ."ru~v.:,-~ transition weight 
J 
Figure 6.1 6: Rapidly adaptive transition matrix (RATM) model showing effective 
connections between decision process and transition weights. There is full connectivity 
between all source nodes in channels and the decision process, represented by block 
arrow 
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6.3.1. Representation of the trial and the determination of sampling 
probabilities 
For this model, each trial consists of a number of steps. For the results presented 
each trial, indexed t, consists of 75 steps, indexed t. The trial is split into a pre-response 
phase and a post-response phase. The pre-response phase lasts for 49 steps, with the 
decision made on the fiftieth step and feedback presented from this point onwards until the 
end of the trial. 
The dimensional sampling probabilities are determined using the same method as 
in the previous model, using equations 6.8 and 6.9. Unlike the ATM model, the 
probabilities generated here are used on each step to determine the actual dimension 
sampled, and thus the value of T~ for each dimension. 
The effective connection strength in this model is determined, from the unbounded 
weight 8, in a somewhat different fashion. In this case the extent to which the learned 
connection strength is implemented at a particular step is modulated by a variable relating 
to the number of steps which have occurred since the trial began. It is also adjusted by a 
parameter relating to the ongoing uncertainty (pre-response), or error (post-response), 
regarding the decision. The role of this uncertainty or error-based parameter is different, 
depending on whether the connection is between a dimension and itself, or between two 
different dimensions. For a recurrent connection, the effective connection strength at step t, 
a,,,,,, is given by the following; 
I 
%(,) - (6.17). 
1 + exp- (( % t A )  - 1217, I) 
1 + exp- ( ( ~ v ~ , l ~ , l ) + 1 2 ~ ~ l )  
For a connection between two different dimensions, i to j, the following applies; 
1 
%it1 - (6.18). 
The variable q, is either the uncertainty regarding the decision, in the pre-response phase, 
or the teacher signal or error in the post-response phase. The details of how this value is 
determined will be discussed below, but it is proportional either to the discrepancy 
between output and feedback, or the uncertainty regarding the decision to be made. Its 
261 
different use in the two equations supports a system whereby sampling becomes 
increasingly distributed across the stimulus dimensions as uncertainty or error increases. 
For the recurrent connection, the size of the level of uncertainty or error reduces the 
effective connection strength, decreasing the probability of consecutive sampling of the 
same dimension. For the connection between different dimensions, the value increases the 
effective connection strength. 
Modulation of the effective strength according to the number of steps elapsed since 
the trial began is effected by the value of T,. This value is determined by the following, 
where g, is a gain on the function determining T, and p is a bias such that T,,= 0.5. The 
values of these parameters were set at g, = 0.25, and p = 25. This means that early in the 
trial, T is close to zero such that almost none of the learned transition weight is involved in 
the sampling process. As the trial progresses the values of the transition weights become 
increasingly important in sampling. By the time the decision is made the value of T is close 
to unity. 
The use of equations 6.17 and 6.18 to determine the effective connection strengths 
was motivated by, mostly, practical concerns. It is important to note that while this model 
involves the representation of information accumulating for a decision process over time, it 
was not specifically designed to model performance measures such as reaction times or 
differences in performance subject to time constraints. Testing of the model with respect to 
this type of task is beyond the scope of this thesis and remains an area for future research. 
The practical concerns which motivated the forms of equations 6.1 7 and 6.18 were 
two-fold. Firstly, one of the problems which appears to be experienced by the previous 
dimensional attention models is slow early learning, particularly for the type VI task. One 
of the reasons for this is that the early development of associative weights on lower 
dimensionality sources tends to attenuate the activation of higher dimensionality 
representations. 
While the early associations with low dimensionality sources are, in the long run, 
spurious, it takes time for the model to learn that this is the case. If one particular 
dimension is highly correlated with the first few feedback presentations, the transition 
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weights which develop will tend to reflect this, increasing the rate of sampling for that 
particular dimension at the expense of other dimensions. As a consequence the activation 
of configural representations, dependent on these ‘ignored’ dimensions, is reduced. 
The inclusion of the error or uncertainty ‘bias’ to the effective connection strength 
attempts to alleviate this problem by generally increasing the rate of configural activation 
when uncertainty or error is high. Uncertainty and error will generally be at its highest 
during early trials such that this parameter may enhance configural activation most at this 
time. 
Another problem experienced by the ATM model concerned the learning of 
exceptions in the type V structure. Exceptions to a rule must be learnt using representations 
with a higher dimensionality than the rule itself. When an exception is present, uncertainty 
will generally be at a higher level than it would be for a central category member. It was 
hoped that the extra uncertainty present on these trials might enhance the rate at which 
higher dimensionality representations were activated and thus enhance, to some extent, the 
rate at which exceptions might be learnt. 
The second motivation behind the forms of equations 6.17 and 6.18 was to allow, 
early in the trial, some opportunity for all sources in the stimulus to achieve some level of 
activation prior to the decision being made. Diminishing the influence of the 0 weights on 
the effective connection strength, according to the value of T, was a practical means of 
doing so. 
6.3.2. Feedforward functions and channel activations 
Like the two previous models, this model bases the probability of a particular label 
being selected on the logistic transform of the sum of the channel outputs. The measure is 
used throughout the trial and so is indexed by which step, t, the model is at as follows, 
(6.20). 
The gain in this case is indexed g, to differentiate it from other gains used in the model. As 
with the previous models p(B) = 1-p(A). The actual output decision, or rather the 
probability of the decision, is taken at t = 50. 
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This model uses channel ‘activation’ rather than the probability of the channel 
being active. The output from a channel, c, to the decision node, 1, at time t, or o,](~) is as 
follows, 
(6.21). 
Where a, refers to the presence or absence of the cue or cue configuration detected by the 
source node, as described for previous models. The activation of the channel, a,, is based 
on the ‘history’, across the trial, of sampling of the channel’s dimension or dimensions. 
The indexing of a, and the weight wsl with t reflects that neither of these values change 
during the trial. The activation of a channel at step t is calculated according to the 
following, 
Where ha is the rate of change in the activation, and A, is evaluated as follows, 
The elements of the first set in the top half of the function are the dimensions of c, (U,). As 
with the ATM model, the channel is conceptualised as the set of its U dimensions. The 
second set is the sequence of sampled dimensions, s, from step t back to t-(LJ-l) or the last 
U dimensions sampled. Note that the activation of a channel is set to zero at the beginning 
of each trial. 
6.3.3. Alteration of associative and transition weights 
The 6 weights in this model are more complicated than in the last model and 
change differently according to what stage of the trial they are in. Rules regarding their 
alteration also vary according to whether they are recurrent weights or weights for 
transitions between different dimensions. 
These weights are composed of two components. One component, Cl,,,, remains the 
same throughout the trial and is updated at the end of the trial. The other component, $ij(tl, 
alters during the post-response part of the trial subject to whether the transition it refers to 
results in increases or decreases in error. The ongoing value of Bij at time t is composed of 
its two components as follows; 
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@U(,) =%(I) +@U@) (6.241, 
where t is a step in t. The change to the Cp values occurs dependent on where in the trial the 
model is. 
Where %j(tjco is the activation of the transition at time t, that is aijct) =1 ifs,= j and s,. =i, and 
equals zero otherwise. The rate of change is given by h,. 
The uncertainty or error, q, is again determined differently depending on whether 
the model is in the pre-response phase (uncertainty) or post-response phase (error), 
6'+, -p(A), if 1 2 t < 50 
q =  6,-p(A),  i f 5 0 < t I 7 5  (6.26). 1 0 otherwise 
The delta values for the pre-response phase depend on the label decision which is most 
dominant at the time. So 8, = 1 if p(ApO.5, and equals zero if p(A), is less than 0.5, such 
that B is the dominant decision. If p(A), = 0.5, then 8, is assigned a value of 0.5 such that 
error is zero. For the post-response phase of the trial, the delta values take on values 
determined by feedback such that 6, =1 if the stimulus is a member of category A and 6, = 
0 if the stimulus is a member of category B. At the end of each step, for the beginning of 
the next, the Cp weights are updated, 
@U(,+,, = h(1) + *@U(,) (6.27). 
A point to note is that the uncertainty parameter, q, used in the pre-response phase 
is dependent on how discrepant the current output, at step t, is with the decision which was 
dominant on the last step. This will tend to result in increases to uncertainty if a transition 
leads to a change in the dominant decision. Even if there is no absolute change in certainty 
from one step to the next, a change in the sign of the summed channel output will result in 
a higher value for the uncertainty parameter. Given the role of the uncertainty parameter in 
equations 6.17 and 6.18, changes in the dominant decision are likely to decrease the 
subsequent probability of consecutive sampling of the same dimension. 
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The sizes of the changes in uncertainty (or error) are also controlled, somewhat, by 
the rate at which channel activation may change. Because the increments to channel 
activation are comparatively small in equation 6.22 (a value of 0.075 for ha was used), the 
increment rates have to be quite high for this model (4 used). 
At the end of each trial, the transition weights are updated by altering the 0, 
component of the transition weight. This update uses back-propagated error at the end of 
the trial, as well as the set of updates made to the (Iu component during the post-response 
part of the trial. The updates are different depending on whether the transition weight is 
between two different dimensions or between a dimension and itself. For recurrent 
connections the value of Oii at trial t+l, is calculated by the following, 
(6.28). 
,Et  
This is simply the sum of changes to the (I component of the weight in the post response 
phase of the trial t multiplied by a rate constant &. 
For the connection between dimensions the update is more complicated, 
In this case, the change is a function of the changes to the (I component of the weight in the 
post-response phase for the transition i to j, but also for the transition in the opposite 
direction. The reason for this will be discussed in more detail below. Also added to the 
change is the difference between signals back-propagated to the origin and destination for 
the transition, as used in the ATM model. This back-propagated signal is calculated based 
only on the output on the final, 75" step of the trial t. The signal for a dimension d is 
calculated by a similar method to that used to determine the alteration of sampling 
probabilities, using equation 6.6, 
The use of the sum of the increments to the transition in the opposite direction to 
that of the weight being updated was a response to some 'difficulties' experienced by the 
model when just the increments for the transition in question were used. These difficulties 
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were interesting because they involved the development of cyclical transition weights, as 
noted for the type IV structure in the ATM model. 
With the RATM model, cyclical sampling tended to occur within about three to 
four blocks for the type VI structure. Owing to the somewhat noisy nature of the sampling 
process, it is somewhat inevitable that for some trials a particular direction of transition 
will dominate. When this happens, particularly for the type VI structure, each transition in 
the dominant direction is likely to decrease error, by enhancing the activation of the fully 
valid three-dimensional channel. This will further enhance the directionality of the process 
as the trial progresses. 
At the end of the trial, this pattern will be substantially reinforced such that it 
begins with a higher probability on the next trial. This is not necessarily the case for 
structures 111 and V where, on some trials, some directional transitions are highly likely to 
considerably increase error. The result is that while the learning on the type VI task begins 
characteristically slowly, once the cyclical pattern has been learnt, its performance quickly 
overtakes that on tasks 111 and V and, occasionally, type IV as well. 
This is because, for the type VI task, the activation of the three-dimensional 
channel with cyclical sampling tends to approach unity quite rapidly. The learning of its 
association weights, being dependent on channel activation, thus tends to be more rapid 
than learning on the association weights for the types I11 to V tasks, which rely on a 
distributed pattern of activation across a number of channels. 
Introducing the increments to the transition in the opposite direction as in equation 
6.29 solved this problem. Whether this solution is particularly satisfactory will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
Association weights are updated using a similar rule as that given for the previous 
two models. Each weight is updated at the end of a particular trial based on its channel 
activation and the error occurring at the end of the trial, 
wsr(t+i) = ws/(t) +(1),75%(1)4(,=,,)il,) where3 E C  (6.31)9 
where h, is the learning rate for these weights. 
267 
6.3.4. Simulation results and discussion 
As with all of the previous models the model was tested twenty times on each of 
the six Shepard et al. (1961) category structures. Each run used new randomised orders of 
input pattern presentation. The model parameters used for the results presented below are 
given in table 6.1. Note all weights, including transition weights were initialised with a 
value of zero. 
parameter value function 
gT 
P 
gl 3 gain on decision function (eq. 6.20) 
ha 0.075 rate at which channel activation changes (eq. 6.22) 
L 1 associative weight learning rate (eq. 6.31) 




rate at which time elapsed in trial affects transition matrix (eq. 6.19) 
number of steps before 0.5 of transition matrix is used (eq. 6.19) 
2.5 between-trial transition weight learning rate (eq. 6.28 & 6.29) 
Table 6.1 : Parameter values used for the results presented 
The average p(correct) per block on the six tasks is shown in figure 6.17 and 
displays a similar pattern to that shown by the previous two models. The model exhibits 
the experimentally observed relative order of difficulty with the type I1 structure learnt 









Figure 6.17: Mean p(c0rrect) taken at e50  of each trial per block, averaged across the 
twenty runs through each task for the RATM model. 
As with the ASP model, and less clearly with the ATM model, there is a noticeable 
difference between performance on the type V structure and performance on the types I11 
and IV structures. Like these models, figure 6.18 illustrates that much of this difference 
may be attributed to the low rate at which exception members of the type V structure are 
learnt. 
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Figure 6.18: Performance of the model on individual patterns for category structures 111, 
IV, and V. Performance is indexed in terms of the average probability of correct 
responding across the entire I6 blocks of the simulation. Figure 2.2 shows the relationships 
between these three types of categoIy member in each category structure. 
Dealing with exceptions is quite a general problem for models which use 
dimensional attention. As was described in chapter 3, attempts to model experiments in 
which learning of exceptions is examined tend to make use of modular network 
architectures which, in effect, change the way in which a stimulus is represented depending 
on whether it conforms to a dominant rule or an exception. Because dimensional attention 
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models generally only have one set of dimensional attention parameters relating to the 
entire task, they may lack the ‘degrees of freedom’ necessary to accurately represent 
exception learning. 
The effects of this model’s way of implementing dimensional attention, in terms of 
individual channel activations, is shown in figure 6.19. These are the averages at each 
block of the individual channel activations at the point at which the choice probability is 
determined, e.g. t=50. 
The pattern displayed is fairly similar to that shown by the previous two models. 
The attention learning appears to have operated as expected for the types I and I1 tasks, 
rapidly attenuating the activation of non-valid and valid but redundant channels as in the 
previous two models. An exception is that the activation of the three-dimensional QRS 
channel in the type IV task tends towards a lower asymptotic value. The model produced 
no ‘cyclical’ patterns of transition weights, due to the nature of equation 6.29. 
As with the previous models, the interactive nature of the associative weight 
learning rule resulted in a lower average rate of activation for the QS channel, than the QR 
and RS channels in the type 111 task. This is due to the fact that the valid sources in the QS 
channel only ever occur in the context of central category members and, consequently, are 
accompanied by lower average error signals. 
The associative weights that developed for this model on the various tasks, while 
not shown here, were broadly similar to those given for the ASP model in section 6.1.4.3. 
Once the associative learning rule is made dependent on the error relative to combined 
channel contributions, the interactive patterns shown for the ASP model, and displayed for 
the ATM model, may be expected. This includes the development of weights for 
apparantly non-valid sources in the types 111 and V structures, as discussed in section 
6.1.4.3. 
Certain differences between this model and the ATM model can be seen in terms of 
the asymptotic transition weights developed during learning. These are shown in figure 
6.20 in terms of the values of 0, passed through a logistic and normalised across each 
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Figure 6.19: Average channel activations at point of decision, a,,,,,, per block. Key shown 
for the type I task applies to all graphs. 
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Comparing figure 6.20 with figure 6.14 reveals that the most noticeable difference 
is that recurrent connections on the irrelevant dimensions of the types I and I1 structures 
are not as low for this model as for the ‘average’ trial representation in figure 6.14. 
This is primarily due to the absence of an interactive or competitive aspect to the 
learning rule for transition weights. The ATM model, using equation 6.16, took into 
account changes to the other transition weights from a particular dimension when 
evaluating the final increment. As learning progressed, less ‘useful’ transitions, regardless 
of their infrequency, would receive progressively larger, negative error signals. 
In this model, transitions only tend to get incremented if they actually occur. The 
only competitive aspect of the learning function is the comparison of back-propagated 
signals used in the update of transitions between different dimensions, given in equation 
6.29. Transitions between valid and non-valid dimensions are thus substantially reduced, 
despite the infrequency of transitions to non-valid dimensions. Recurrent transitions are 
wholly dependent on whether they occur or not. After a period of learning on the type I 
and I1 category structures the probability of recurrent transitions on non-valid dimensions 
will be very low as sampling tends to be restricted, mostly, to valid dimensions, 
particularly by the time the response is decided upon. 
For the types I11 and V tasks, this lack of competition results in a more distributed 
pattern of sampling than that observed for the ATM model. Comparison of figures 6.13 
and 6.19 illustrates that the present model maintains a higher level of activation in its less 
valid channels than does the previous model. This should, in theory, enhance the 
performance of the model on type V exception members by increasing the probability of 
three-dimensional channel activation. 
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Figure 6.20: Average effective transition weights (a& based on the values of 0, averaged 
across the last four blocks of training, normalised across each origin dimension, e.g. q-q + 
q-r + q-s = 1 .  This is effectively the conditional probability of the destination being 
sampled at time t+l given that the origin has been sampled at time t. Key shown for type 
VI applies to all charts. 
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Comparison of figures 6.12 and 6.18 indicates that while the central and peripheral 
members of the type V structure are learnt with almost the same ease for both models, 
there is a slight improvement for exception members in this model. The lack of 
competition in the current model also allows marginally superior performance on the 
central members of the type 111 structure, compared to that on the previous model shown in 
figure 6.12. Peripheral members, for both models, appear to be learnt at approximately the 
same rate. Comparing figures 6.13 and 6.19 illustrates that the QS channel, valid only for 
central category members on this task, is more active in the current model than in the last. 
6.4. General discussion of sequential sampling dimensional 
attention models and the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks 
The three models described in this chapter offer a means of implementing some 
form of ‘dimensional selective attention’ using a configural-cue form of representation. 
The first two models provide two distinct methods of implementing this feature which 
were both, to some extent, successful given the task provided. The third model represented 
an attempt to implement in a more specifically connectionist fashion the second model’s 
adaptive transition matrix approach. 
While there are clearly a number of conceptual issues regarding the models, this 
section will concentrate on how well the models seem to apply to the representation of 
learning of the six structures used by Shepard et al. (1961). Conceptual issues regarding 
the generalisability of the sequential sampling model of representation, the representation 
of the time course of a trial, dealing with more than two categories, and exception learning 
will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
6.4.1. Persistent problems with the dimensional attention models 
6.4.1.1 Poor early performance on the type I1 structure 
One problem, which is suffered by all models in this chapter and all of the models 
in the last chapter, concerns performance on early blocks. All models appear to attenuate 
performance on the type I1 task for the first block to a lower level than that shown for types 
111 and IV. For the experimental data of Nosofsky et al. (1994) (see figure 2.3), the fact 
that the type I1 task is easier than the types 111 and IV is manifested in the very fist  block 
of training. 
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Kruschke and Bradley (1995) have suggested that human performance on early 
learning trials is something simple networks may have a problem representing. Their 
suggestion is that additional processes such as short-term memory or strategic guessing 
may be at work early in learning. 
For the models presented in this chapter attempts were made to enhance the rate of 
learning for both type I1 and type VI tasks, by enhancing the relative rate at which 
configural detectors were activated by the sampling process. As might have been predicted 
the success of these methods was mixed. While the rates of learning for types I1 and VI 
structures were enhanced, so too were the rates for types 111, IV, and V, such that the 
(wrong) first block order was maintained. These structures are just as dependent on 
configural representations as the types I1 and VI. 
As described above, for the configural-cue form of representation this problem 
emerges from the accumulation of weights on high frequency one-dimensional sources. 
These weights, for the type I1 structure, interfere with the attention learning aspects of the 
model causing attention to shift away from dimensions which are contributing error. This 
reduces the size of the error signal delivered to these ‘erroneous’ weights. Where 
dimensions ignored as a result of this process are part of a useful configuration, subsequent 
activation of that configuration is attenuated. 
The version of ALCOVE implemented by Nosofsky et al. (1 994) does not suffer 
from these problems. When unfamiliar stimuli are presented to the model it generates its 
response probabilities according to how similar the stimulus is to stimuli which have been 
presented before. The activation of these ‘familiar’ exemplar representations is likely to be 
much less than the activation of the ‘new’ exemplar. As such, while generalisation is likely 
to result in the model having a higher probability of being incorrect than correct (the 
nearest neighbours of exemplars in the type I1 are, in two thirds of cases, in the other 
category), the probability is likely to be close to 0.5. 
Following exposure to all eight stimuli, after the eighth trial, none of the 
representations will have positive weights for the wrong category. Those activated by 
generalisation will generally contribute less to the response strength than the actual 
exemplar representation and, as such, the model will stop producing p(correct) values of 
less than 0.5 after this point. There is no chance that the model may predict the right 
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category by chance alone beyond the eighth trial. In addition, once all of the exemplars 
have weights ‘pointing’ in the correct direction, attention learning will be rapid. The 
attention learning in ALCOVE favours strongly the learning of tasks where one or more 
dimensions are wholly irrelevant to the task. As discussed in section 3.3.3.2.2 learning 
when one or more dimensions are irrelevant is accelerated by a process of recruitment. 
In order to improve the fit of the ATM model to the first block experimental 
performance one may have to propose additional mechanisms. One of these might be some 
form of short-term memory. What might be desirable for the ATM model may be for it to 
evaluate, early in learning, whether dimensions are relevant or not. To do this the model 
would have to have access to the ‘predictions’ which might be made if the input were 
different to that currently experienced. 
ALCOVE actually has this access in that the predictions made by all exemplars 
activated by generalisation are available to the learning process. As described in section 
3.3.3.2.2, attention learning in ALCOVE is largely dependent on this generalisation-based 
activation. This form of access to ‘absent’ stimulus representations is not available to the 
configural-cue model. Here the only parts of absent stimuli that may be represented on a 
given presentation are those shared with the current stimulus. 
Kruschke and Bradley actually implemented a model of short-term memory 
processes as an enhancement for a basic component cue network (Kruschke & Bradley, 
1995). This type of network was unable to account for early training performance on a 
variety of tasks. Allowing it the ability to use information about previously presented, but 
currently absent, stimuli enabled improved fits to experimental data. Interestingly, 
ALCOVE does not seem to require any such mechanism to allow it to achieve a decent fit 
to early learning in the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. As discussed above, this is probably 
because the model, owing to its mode of representation, already makes this information 
available to learning processes. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the exemplar form of representation is not particularly 
useful in accounting for data involving stimuli that have different numbers of dimensions 
or components. The models that are capable of representing these kinds of relationships are 
models such as component and configural-cue models. If, as suggested by Kruschke and 
Bradley, short-term memory processes are required to allow these models to accurately 
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account for early training performance, it seems likely that the same requirement may 
obtain for the representation of learning in the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. 
More research would appear to be required to clarify whether the generalisation 
behaviour of exemplar representations provides an adequate source of the information to 
allow the modelling of observed early performance. It may be the case that other forms of 
representations used in a model, incorporating some other means of making use of absent 
stimulus information, may be just as appropriate for representing the fine details of early 
learning. 
A constraint on the role of this process, however, appears to be suggested by both 
the human data and by the success of the ALCOVE model in representing it. It would 
appear fiom these sources that enhancement of early learning is not totally indiscriminate 
but, instead, may favour most those tasks for which some dimensions are irrelevant. The 
indication may be, therefore, that at least some of this facilitation of learning may be a 
function of the attention learning system. 
6.4.1.2 Poor asymptotic performance and the handling of exceptions 
All of the dimensional attention models presented in this chapter suffered 
somewhat from poor asymptotic performance, particularly for tasks 111, IV and V. These 
tasks are characterised by the fact that the validity of dimensions and configurations of 
dimensions varies, depending on the stimulus presented. This poses certain problems for 
limited capacity dimensional attention models such as the three models in this chapter. 
If, on a particular trial, feedback reveals that one dimension is more relevant than 
another, the attention learning process will tend to result in changes to the subsequent 
sampling probabilities for the dimensions, such that the less relevant dimension has a 
lower sampling probability than the more relevant one. For the models presented here, this 
means that activation of all sources dependent on the less relevant dimension will be 
attenuated relative to those dependent on just the more relevant dimension. 
For the types I11 to V tasks, the dimensions that are relevant and irrelevant change 
according to the stimulus being presented. The result for these models is that performance 
on a stimulus is somewhat dependent on whether the dimensions that are relevant for it are 
the same as the dimensions for the stimuli which preceded it. If they are not, then one 
might expect high error signals and a change to the sampling process that favours the 
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dimensions relevant to the current stimulus. This tends to result in a persistently unstable 
set of sampling probabilities (for the ASP model) or transition matrix (for ATM and 
RATM models). This may attenuate average performance on all stimuli. 
These problems are related to the inability of dimensional attention models, such as 
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) to represent human learning performance in rule-plus- 
exception structures (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; 
Erickson & Kruschke, 1998), discussed in section 3.3.4.2. The learning of exceptions to 
low dimensionality rules requires attention to more dimensions than that used by the rule. 
The model must be able to identify exceptions if it is to be able to respond appropriately to 
them. It cannot do so if their defining dimensionality is ignored. 
The tendency of dimensional attention models is to distribute attention across 
dimensions according to the relative frequency of their validity. This impedes learning of 
exceptions. If the defining dimensionality is not ignored, then learning of the rule is, 
relative to the learning of exceptions, attenuated to levels below that suggested by human 
data. 
This difficulty will be returned to in the next chapters. Handling of exceptions may 
be particularly difficult for models which make use of rapid attention shifts, as some of the 
tasks to which they are suited seem to require an attention shift mechanism which would 
impede the learning of a rule-plus-exceptions structure. 
6.4.1.3 Parameter settings in relation to early and late performance 
The parameter settings adopted for use in these models were not formally 
optimised to increase the fit of the models to the data. One issue that seems relevant, 
however, is the high learning rates used for the attention learning processes. These high 
levels of learning rate were required to facilitate the early learning rates reported by 
Nosofsky et al. (1994), and illustrated in figure 2.3. It may well be the case that such high 
learning rate parameters contribute to the poor asymptotic performance of the models in 
relation to the types 111 to V structures. 
It may be possible to improve the fit of all three models by incorporating some 
form of ‘annealing’ factor such as that used by Kruschke and Johansen in their RASHNL 
model (Kruschke & Johansen, 1999), mentioned in section 3.3.5.4. Such a factor is meant 
to slow down learning rates as the experimental simulation progresses. Applied to these 
219 
dimensional attention models, an annealing factor may facilitate improved asymptotic 
performance. Such a factor may be especially useful for the RATM model, which, like 
RASHNL, involves a rapid attention shift process. This kind of process may be particularly 
unstable under conditions where rules with low frequency exceptions are being learnt. 
As was discussed in section 6.4.1 . I ,  however, it may be the case that different 
processes may be at work during the early blocks of these experiments. While these 
processes may result in enhanced early learning, it may not be the case that they can be 
adequately simulated in terms of decreasing learning rates across the course of the 
experiment. Further research is clearly required to establish how learning progresses 
during the initial trials of experiments. 
6.4.2 Sequential sampling models and dimensional attention 
Despite these problems, the sequential sampling model does appear to offer a 
practical means of implementing some form of dimensional attention using a configural- 
cue approach to stimulus representation. The three models in this chapter indicate that this 
dimensional attention may be represented in at least two distinct ways. 
As was discussed in section 6.1.4.4 there are certain conceptual and practical 
problems that might emerge from attempts to generalise the ASP model to other tasks. The 
ATM model, however, does not really represent a development of the ASP model. The 
ATM model is an alternative approach, which appears to begin without some of the 
problems of the ASP model. 
It was decided to implement the ATM model rather than the ASP model in a more 
explicitly connectionist way, in the form of the RATM model, because the ATM approach 
appeared to be the most readily generalisable to other tasks. The tasks, which will be 
examined in the next chapter, involve learning about stimuli with different numbers of 
dimensions or components. In its current state, as discussed in section 6.1.4.4, the ASP 
model has no clear way of dealing with these problems. 
Because the ATM model stores its attentional information between dimensions or 
components, its generalisation to this type of task is fairly straightforward. The initial 
sampling probabilities are always, simply, one over the number of dimensions. Where two 
dimensions or components have not been presented together, at the same time, one can 
assume an initial value for the transition weight of zero. If a dimension is absent from a 
280 
stimulus it may simply be assumed that there is no possibility of a transition to that 
dimension. Attention is learnt in terms of the relationships between dimensions and, as 
such, these relationships are only expressed to the extent that the dimensions which make 
up their components are present. 
It is important to note that the rapid attention shift algorithm for the RATM model 
may also be applied to the ASP model. In this case one would simply ‘send’ a positive 
signal back to a dimension if the sampling of that dimension leads to a decrease in error 
and a negative signal if the sample increased error. It seems likely that one might also have 
to ‘supplement’ this process using back-propagated error signals in the same way as was 
required for both ATM models. The reason for this is that the error level change from 
sampling alone will have difficulty with regards to picking out the relationships involved 
in the type I1 structure. 
For this structure, one dimension is irrelevant and the remaining two are relevant, 
but only in terms of the configural representations they support. A shift from the irrelevant 
dimension to one of the relevant dimensions is not likely to decrease errQr as, alone, the 
relevant dimension does not result in the configural activation required by the task. 
For the ASP model, the result will be that positive signals will only be sent back to 
a relevant dimension when its sampling is immediately preceded by sampling of the other 
relevant dimension. During early training trials this is only likely to occur on, at best, half 
of the occasions on which a relevant dimension is sampled, thus attenuating early learning 
on this task. Whether the back-propagation part of the ATM’s learning rule is important 
throughout learning or whether it simply represents another way of enhancing early 
learning perhaps requires further evaluation. 
The actual use of the sequential sampling process to represent the activation of 
representations may be regarded as a somewhat speculative approach. It may be the case, 
for example, that it simply provides a way of simulating processes which actually operate 
in parallel. To some extent, this assertion may be supported by the fact that the directional 
learning of the utility of transitions had to be suppressed in the RATM model to allow it to 
simulate human performance. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that information concerning the relative relevance 
of dimensions, for this type of experiment, is not stored in relation to the actual directions 
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of the transitions that revealed these relationships. Under some circumstances, however, 
directional sampling strategies may be stored. One example of this might be reading, 
where the components of words and sentences are likely to be sampled in a particular 
direction. It may be the case that where specific behavioural aspects to the sampling 
process are involved, such as eye movements, the directionality of error-reducing 
transitions may be remembered in some way. It seems likely, however, that the operation 
of selective attention processes is dependent on stimulus and context-dependent factors. 
Further research is clearly required to allow detailed theories regarding their role to be 
proposed and evaluated. Some of these issues will be returned to at the conclusion of this 
thesis. 
The next chapter concentrates on applying a variant of the RATM model to other 
tasks. Of particular interest is the applicability of the model to tasks involving stimuli with 
different numbers of dimensions or components. This is a particularly relevant ‘challenge’ 
for the model, as these tasks generally seem to require completely different models of 




The success ofthe ATM and RATM approaches with the Shepard et al(l961) 
category learning tasks suggested that dimensional attention could be usefully 
implemented using a configural-cue representation. This chapter will further explore the 
applicability of the model to other category learning tasks. The variant which this chapter 
will concentrate on is the RATM model. It was decided to apply this particular model to 
other tasks as it is the model that most specifically represents the processes of attention 
learning and representation involved in the adaptive transition matrix approach. 
7.1. Base-rate effects 
Employing as it does a form of rapid attention shift algorithm, it is suggested that 
the model might be usefully applied to tasks where this type of capacity seems to be 
important. Kruschke (1996a) suggested that rapid attention shifts might be essential for the 
representation of learning in certain tasks involving base-rate effects. 
7.1.1. The inverse base-rate effect 
As discussed in section 3.3.5.3, one experiment that seemed particularly amenable 
to this approach was Medin and Edelson’s (1988) exploration of the inverse base-rate 
effect (ibid. experiment 1). Kruschke (1996a) simplified the experimental structure 
somewhat for his replication, reducing the number of categories from six to four and 
employing the abstract design shown in table 7.1. 
I 
As can be seen there are two rare diseases, two common diseases and a total of 
eight symptom sets or stimuli. For each disease, there is a symptom which perfectly 
predicts it. For each pair of common and rare diseases (e.g. C1 and R1) there is also a 
single, irrelevant symptom. The base-rate is such that common diseases occur three times 
more frequently than rare ones. As stated in Section 3.3.5.3, the inverse base-rate effect is 
observed on transfer trials given after a period of learning. When the combination of 
symptoms PCl+PRl is presented, participants are more likely to assign the symptom set to 
disease R1 than to any other disease. Similarly presentation of PC2+PR2 is more likely to 
be followed by R2 assignments than any other. 
Kruschke (1996a) suggested that the key role of base-rates was to cause common 
categories to be learnt before rare ones. This learning would involve the commitment of 
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components involved in the common category to the prediction of that category. Kruschke 
then suggested that rare category members tended to be learnt in terms of their distinctive 
features, i.e. those features which had not already been committed to the response strength 
for another category. 
Kruschke’s explanation for the effect in terms of the design shown in table 7.1 is, 
therefore, that the common categories will tend to be ‘predicted’ by compounds of the I + 
PC symptoms, with total asymptotic associative strength being divided between the two 
components. The rare categories are predicted only in terms of the PR symptoms. When a 
transfer stimulus, PC + PR, is presented, the PR symptom will have higher magnitude 
associative weights than the PC symptom, promoting selection of the rare disease. 
symptom 
I1 PCI PR1 I2 PC2 PR2 disease 
1 1 0 0 0 0 c 1  
1 1 0 0 0 0 c1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 c1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 R1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 c 2  
0 0 0 1 1 0 c 2  
0 0 0 1 1 0 c 2  
0 0 0 1 0 1 R2 
Table 7.1: Abstract design of Kruschke’s (1996a) experiment 1, investigating the inverse 
base-rate effect. C = common disease, R = rare disease, I = imperfect predictor, PC = 
perfect predictor for common disease, PR = perfect predictor for the rare disease. A value 
of 1 indicates the presence of the symptom and a zero indicates its absence. 
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7.1.1.1 Adjustments required for the RATM model 
The RATM approach is likely to make similar predictions to ADIT about this 
experiment. Because common category members are, generally, presented before rare 
ones, the transition weights between PC and I components are likely to reflect not only the 
equal validity of these two components, but also the validity of the configuration which is 
activated by any sampling transition between the two components. 
Subsequent presentations of common category members will, therefore, result in a 
pattern where error is reduced by altemate sampling of the two components. This will lead 
to increases in the transition weights between the components and decreases in the 
recurrent transition weights. 
Presentation of a rare category member will, provided it follows presentations of 
common category members, result in an erroneous assignment of the stimulus to the 
common category. The subsequent attention shift phase will respond to the fact that error 
increases whenever sampling shifts from PR to I, or from I to I, and decreases when it 
either shifts from I to PR, or from PR to PR. The result will be negative transition weights 
between PR and I, and between I and itself, with positive weights developing between I 
and PR, and PR and itself. 
I Presentation of PC + PR transfer stimuli is likely to result in greater activation of 
the PR component because PC to PC transition weights are likely to be negative and the 
PR to PR transition weights will be positive. In addition, because the model employs an 
interactive learning rule similar to Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) rule, the PR symptom is 
likely to have larger associative weights than the PC symptom. 
i 
In order to model the inverse base-rate experiment described above, a few 
adjustments need to be made to the architecture described in the previous chapter. One of 
the advantages of using configural-cue representations is that one does not need to change 
the model of representation in order to represent learning in tasks involving stimuli with 
different numbers of components. Some aspects of the way in whch the model deals with 
stimuli with different numbers of components need to be clarified here, but the model is 
fundamentally the same with respect to representation. 
An important difference between this task and the Shepard et al. (1961) task, that 
has implications for certain parts of the model, is the fact that each category decision is 
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between four, rather than two, alternatives. This necessitates changes to the decision 
function and also to the way in which the ‘certainty’ of the network is evaluated. This, in 
turn, has consequences for the learning functions used which also need to be addressed. 
7.1.1.1. I Representation and sampling scheme 
The representation and sampling scheme was fundamentally the same as that used 
by the RATM model for the Shepard et al. (1961) task. In this case, as table 7.1 shows, 
only 10 representation, or s, nodes are needed for this experiment. These are the six 
individual stimulus components and the four configural representations which are possible 
during training; Il+PCl, Il+PRl, I2+PC2, and I2+PR2. While the transfer stimuli 
presented at the end of training involve far more combinations of the stimulus components, 
none of these are present during training. These combinations would not become active 
during training and, consequently, their contribution to response strength during the 
transfer phase, when they actually would be presented, would be zero. 
All possible transitions between the components were represented. While only 
some of these would acquire learnt weights during training, all of them occur during the 
transfer phase and so need to be represented. The sampling process described in the 
previous chapter is more or less the same in this model. In this case it is components which 
are being sampled rather than dimensions. 
The important difference is that components which are absent cannot be sampled. 
This necessitates alterations to the functions used in calculating the sampling probabilities. 
The probability of a component being sampled is the same as the probability for a 
dimension being sampled, given in equation 6.7 of the last chapter. Now, however, the 
‘activation’ of the component D, a, is dependent on whether the component is present, as 
well as on the sum of contribution from other active components, 
= ‘dam (7.1). 
d 
The presence of the component D is now indexed by x, which takes on a value of one if 
the component is present on a trial and zero otherwise. 
It is important to bear in mind that no changes occur for transition weights where 
one or both components are absent. All changes to transition weights, between components 
i and j are effectively gated by the product of xi and xj. 
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The predictions of the model, with respect to these base-rate effects, are generally 
similar to those made by ADIT (Kruschke, 1996a). One might expect the rapid attention 
shift mechanism to support configural representation of the common disease symptom sets. 
This is particularly the case if, as is most probable given the base-rates, the common 
symptom sets appear in training before the rare ones. In this case the adaptive transition 
matrix model would have nothing to choose from with regards to the two components of 
the common disease symptom set. A configural representation is likely to be activated 
which will, on subsequent trials, result in positive signals with respect to the transition 
between the two components. 
The transition weight learning rule, developed for the RATM model, tends to lead 
to greater increments to transmission weights between equally valid components than to 
transition weights connecting the dimension or component with itself. This is because the 
increment to the transition weight between dimensions is a fhction of the sum of the 
increments to transitions between the components in both directions. This may result in 
greater increases to these transition weights than to the recurrent weights for each 
component. If this occurs then, particularly in a two dimension or component situation, the 
activation of the configural channel on subsequent trials is likely to exceed that of the 
individual components. I The result of this is that the configural representation will receive larger associative 
weight increments than either of the components. This, in turn, will lead to a situation 
where recurrent transitions will lead to a net decrease in certainty due to the resultant d e  
activation of the configural representation, further enhancing the difference between 
recurrent transitions and transitions between the two components. 
Presentation of a rare symptom set will result in a problem for the precise 
implementation of the RATM model described in section 6.3. The problem emerges from 
the inclusion of the decision error or uncertainty in the determination of the ongoing 
transition matrix, incorporated in equations 6.17 and 6.18. The motivation behind this 
feedback process in the context of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks was an apparent 
requirement to enhance the activation of configural representations, particularly during 
early training trials. While it was hoped that this would improve the early performance of 
the model on the type I1 and VI structure, and also address certain problems with the 
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learning of exceptions in the type V structure, the results were somewhat equivocal (see 
section 6.4.1.2). 
What appears to be required, according to Kruschke’s (1996a) hypothesis regarding 
the role of base-rates, is that initial presentation of the rare symptom set results in a shift of 
attention towards aspects of the stimulus which are distinctive or, as described above, 
otherwise uncommitted. The ADIT model, described above and in section 3.3.5.3.1, 
performs this shift because doing so reduces the level of error at the decision process. 
While a similar process would apply for the rapid attention shifts of the RATM 
model, the high level of error that obtains on this initial presentation will result in error 
feedback to the transition matrix. Because this feedback promotes configural activation, it 
will seriously reduce the extent to which the irrelevant symptom is ignored. This would 
require very large changes, due to learning, to overcome. 
Not overcoming the error contribution to the matrix will lead to enhanced 
activation of the configural representation PR + I and, consequently, a large increment to 
the associative weight for this configural detector. If the increment for this weight is larger 
than that for the PR representation, then subsequently the transition matrix is likely to 
develop in ways that further enhance the activation of this representation. The end result is 
likely to be predominantly configural representations of both categories, which will 
compromise the model’s ability to display the inverse base-rate effect. This is because the 
associative weights for PC and PR representations will have developed according to equal 
activation levels (as half of a configural presentation) but with base-rates favouring the 
common cue. 
These problems will disappear if the ongoing error level fed back into the transition 
matrix according to equations 6.17 and 6.18 is removed. The equation determining the 
value of the effective transition weight between i and j at time t, or qj(tl is, for this model, 
Note that only one equation is required by this model for the representation of connections 
between different components, and those between a component and itself The implications 
of this adjustment will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter. 
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7.1.1.1.2 Increased number of categories 
The other changes to the model necessitated by this experimental design concern 
the choice functions and the determination of error for the network. As discussed in section 
3.1.2.2 it is straightforward to generalise the logistic choice function to choices involving 
more than two categories. The probability of a particular category, 1, being selected at time 
t, p(l), is given by the following function, 
a C o e , c , ,  
The gain on the choice function is given by g,, and o,, is the output from channel c to label 
node 1, as given in the previous chapter by equation 6.21. 
The impact of this change is perhaps greater for this model than in many other 
connectionist models. This is primarily due to the nature of the learning algorithms 
proposed and used for the RATM model. As discussed in section 6.1.3, the difference 
between responseprobability and feedback is used as the basis for most of the teacher and 
error signals for the models described in chapter 6. This includes associative weight 
updates, back-propagated signals, and the determination of error changes for use in the 
rapid attention shift process. 
Having four categories to choose from means that the 'chance' probability of a 
particular decision, given no other associative strength, is now 0.25 rather than 0.5. This 
means that there is an asymmetry with respect to the size of teacher signals, in relation to 
positive and negative instances of a category. From an initial ndive state, the maximum 
negative teacher signal is now -0.25, whereas the maximum positive signal is 0.75. 
One of the biggest problems for this model concerns the way in which uncertainty 
or error is represented with respect to the rapid attention shift process. For the two- 
category task in the previous chapters, a single error parameter may be used to describe the 
discrepancy of the decision probability from the feedback. The level of error would be 
equal with respect to both categories. For the four-category situation the level of error will 
be different for different categories. One is therefore faced with a choice as to how, and 
even whether, one should represent error using a single parameter. 
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It may well be preferable to represent error in terms of separate parameters for each 
alternative in the decision process. As will be discussed below, such a treatment may 
provide extra degrees of freedom for the model and facilitate its ability to represent certain 
experimental data. 
Here, however, it was decided to attempt a simpler approach making use of a single 
error parameter for the whole decision process. In this way, it was hoped to minimise the 
extent to which the model is changed for the purposes of this experiment. 
One candidate which might be considered for use as a single error term is the 
discrepancy between the presence of the category which has been presented and the choice 
probability for that category. This would be, basically, one minus the probability that the 
correct category was chosen. 
This measure was ruled out due to the problem of asymmetry between error for 
positive and negative instances of a category. For the shift process to result in a dominance 
of the distinctive component of the rare symptom set, error must be significantly reduced, 
on initial presentation of the set, by enhancing the probability of transitions away from the 
irrelevant symptom. Even by reducing the activation of the irrelevant symptom’s 
representation to zero, the lowest error the system can achieve on the first presentation of 
the set is 0.75. The initial changes to the transition weights are thus dependent on variation 
of this form of error between 1 and 0.75. 
The operation of the rapid attention shift process for exhibiting the inverse base- 
rate effect, seems to require that as much ‘priority’ be given to shifting attention away 
from representations which predict the wrong category label, as is given to shifting it 
towards representations which predict the correct label. This is particularly important in the 
case of the initial presentation of the rare symptom set, where there is no positive 
associative strength with respect to the rare disease. 
In order to address this issue, a somewhat speculative model was developed which 
enabled error to be expressed in terms of a symmetrical measure. In this case error is 
determined by only taking into account the choice probability for the correct category label 
and the highest other choice probability. To represent this the set, L, of possible decision 
alternatives, 1, is partitioned into three subsets called G, H, and I. G contains the ‘correct’ 
response, i.e. the response for which & = 1. H contains those alternatives with the single 
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highest value of (l-&i~I~)p(l)I, i.e. the highest choice probability for an incorrect alternative 
at time t. As with the previous model, t refers to a step of the trial and t refers to the trial 
itself. H may contain more than one member. I is the complement of the union of G and H, 
i.e. I = (GuH)’ or L - (GwH). This set may be empty. 
In order to calculate the single error parameter q,, for error at time t, the following was 
used, 
The value v(G), is given by p(l), where 1~ G. The other value in the equation is v(H). This 
value is given by p(l), where 1s H. This is not given as a probability, because H may 
contain more than one member (with equal choice probabilities) and, as such, the 
probability of set H would be given by the sum of the probabilities of its elements. Values 
for p(I), are provided using the softmax function given in equation 7.3. 
The error value thus implies that the system is only dealing with one pair of 
alternatives at a time, the correct alternative and those incorrect alternatives with the 
highest choice probability. Because it only deals with the probability of a single element of 
H, rather than the sum of these probabilities (where membership is greater than one), the 
value of qI is equal to 0.5 when v(G)=v(H). The error level for a situation where the 
associative strength delivered to the decision process is zero is, consequently, 0.5 rather 
than 0.75. 
7.1.1.1.3 Weight alterations 
It was decided to use this error measure throughout the learning algorithms for the 
model used here. This means that associative weights are only updated if they are 
connected to a member of set G or set H. Associative weights are updated at the end of 
each training trial according to the following, 
Wd(t+l) = Wd(t) +(6Q) - ~ ( X ) , = i 0 0 ) ~ ~ ~ 1 , ~ ~ ( , = ~ 0 0 ) ~ ~  (7.5). 
w h e r e s E ~ , p ( [ ) , = ~ ~ ~  EX, X = G A H  
Note that another adjustment made for the implementation of this model is that the trial is 
100 steps long, rather than the 75 used in the Shepard et al. (1961) simulations reported in 
the last chapter. Because the membership of H may change across the trial, the only 
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weight@) which are updated are those providing associative strength to members of G and 
H. 
This, in turn, affects the way in which error is back-propagated to the component 
nodes. Error is only back-propagated at the end of the trial via choice alternatives which 
are members of G and H at the end of the trial. The back-propagated signal to a component 
node d at the end of trial t, or bd(t) is evaluated by the following, 




Except for the qualification that transition weights involving absent dimensions are 
not changed at all on a trial, these weights are altered by the same rules as those used in the 
RATM model of the last chapter. In this case, the error parameter, whose increase and 
decrease governs within-trial updates, is given by equation 7.4. The point at which the 
post-response phase of learning begins is still t=50, with the decision being made on the 
50" step. For this experiment the post-response phase lasts until t=100 rather than t=75. 
7.1.1.2 The experimental simulation 
Kruschke's (1996a) experimental design involved participants being presented with 
12 blocks of training trials. Each block consisted of the eight symptom sets, shown in table 
7.1, presented one at a time, in a random order. Participants were given around 30 seconds 
to make their decision, and then were presented with the symptom set plus the correct 
category label (disease) for a further 30 seconds. 
Following training, participants were then presented with two blocks of transfer 
trials. Each block consisted of 18 patterns, presented in random order, consisting of 
individual symptoms and novel combinations of those symptoms. During this phase no 
feedback was presented. 
For the data reported here, the simulations were carried out by generating 30 
sequences of 120 training trials. Two transfer blocks were presented to each 'simulated 
participant' but the order was not randomised for the simulation. Because no learning takes 
place during transfer trials (learning parameters were all set to zero), the order of 
presentation of these trials is unimportant for the model. While Kruschke (ibid. p. 16) did 
present two training blocks to ADIT in his experimental simulations the model, with its 
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learning parameters set to zero for these trials, will produce the same choice probabilities 
on both blocks. 
The situation is slightly different for the RATM model presented here. On transfer 
trials where only one symptom is presented, because the probability of sampling this 
component is unity, the model will produce identical choice probabilities each time these 
transfer inputs are presented. When the transfer stimulus has more than one component, 
however, the nature of the sampling process means that the model is likely to produce 
different choice probabilities each time the same multi-component stimulus is presented. 
For the transfer results presented below, the choice probabilities are thus determined by 
averaging across each of the values for each presentation of the stimulus. The actual 
transfer stimuli tested were; the six individual symptoms presented alone, the four PC + PR 
combinations, I1 + PC2, I2 + PCI, I1 + PR2, I2 +PRI, I1 + PCl + PRI, I2 + PC2 + PR2, 
I1 + PCl + PR2, and I2 + PC2 f PR1. 
7.1.1.3 Results and discussion 
For the results presented below, the parameter values used are shown in table 7.2. 
While there was no concerted effort to optimise these parameters they are different to those 
used in the Shepard et al. (1961) simulations reported in table 6.1 of the last chapter. 
As can be seen, four parameters were altered for this model relative to that 
presented in the last chapter. The learning rate parameters for the transition weights have 
both been increased, the within trial shift being increased considerably. As discussed 
above, Kruschke’s (1996a) theory regarding the role of base-rates in learning relies heavily 
on the rapid shift of attention to distinctive inputs for the rare symptom set, on its first 
presentation. 
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parameter value function 




rate at which time elapsed in trial affects transition matrix (eq. 6.19) 
number of steps before 0.5 of transition matrix is used (eq. 6.19) 
gl 2 gain on decision function (eq. 7.3) 
x* 0.075 rate at which channel activation changes (eq. 6.22) 
h, 0.5 associative weight learning rate (eq. 7.5) 
h, 8 within-trial transition weight learning rate (eq. 6.25) 
b 3 between-trial transition weight learning rate (eq. 6.28 & 6.29) 
Table 7.2: Parameter values chosen for the simulation of Kruschke’s (1996a) experiment 1 
on the inverse base-rate effect using the RATM model. 
For ADIT (ibid.), and this model, this shift must be quite considerable to prevent 
there being any substantial change in the associative weights tiom the irrelevant symptom. 
With ADIT, the irrelevant symptom is likely to have developed a positive connection 
towards the common disease. In the case of ADIT, associative weights develop according 
to the discrepancy between the raw associative strength and the label feedback. This 
feedback is zero if the category is absent, and one if it is present. In most cases, therefore 
the irrelevant symptom will have a zero weight for the rare disease and a non-zero positive 
weight for the common disease. 
If the attention shift does not significantly reduce the effective activation of the 
irrelevant symptom representation, it is likely to develop a positive weight with respect to 
the rare disease, and the value of its weight for the common disease is likely to decrease. 
When the common disease is subsequently presented, dependent on the size of the change 
in weights for the irrelevant symptom, the rapid attention shift may move attention away 
from the irrelevant symptom and towards the PC symptom. This is likely to reduce the 
extent to which the common disease is represented by the configuration of symptoms and 
attenuate any inverse base-rate effect which might be displayed by the model. 
The same is true for this model. It was therefore felt that increasing the transition 
weight learning rates might better represent the proposed comprehensive nature of these 
rapid shifts. The associative weight learning rate was decreased for similar reasons, in that 
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smaller weight changes might facilitate the development of ‘clearer’ trends in the transition 
weights. As it turned out, the results suggest that either the associative weight learning rate, 
or the decision gain (which was also reduced), could perhaps have been a bit higher. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the learning curves for the model across the fifteen blocks of 
training data. The two common categories are collapsed into a single graph, as are the two 
rare categories. As can be seen the model takes longer to learn the rare assignments than 
the common ones. This is in line with Kruschke’s (1 996a) experimental results. Across the 
last 5 blocks of training participants averaged 0.954 p(correct) for the rare diseases and 
0.980 for the common diseases. 
The figures for the model are 0.834 p(correct) for the rare, and 0.951 p(correct) for 
the common categories. Kruschke reports that ADIT, with parameters selected for best fit 
to the transfer data, produced 87% correct for the rare categories and 96% for the common 
categories. The fit of the RATM model to early training trials shows a pattern which is 
considerably worse than human performance. Kruschke’s experimental data shows that 
first block performance for humans was 49% correct for the rare categories and 68% for 
the common categories. The RATM model fails to reproduce this early capacity, with 
actual first block figures being 23% for the rare and 37% for the common. ADIT suffered 
similarly in Kruschke’s simulations, with 16% and 54% for rare and common categories 
respectively. 
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Figure 7.1: Average p(correct) of the RATM model for the simulation of Kruschke’s 
(1996a) experiment 1 across the fifteen blocks of training data. Common and rare disease 
categories are collapsed into two graphs. 
The early part of the learning curve for the RATM model shows much worse 
performance than that observed in humans. Across the first five blocks of training 
Kruschke’s participants averaged 0.858 and 0.750 p(correct) for the common and rare 
categories respectively. The model produced proportions of 0.696 and 0.437. 
As discussed briefly in section 6.4.4.1, it has been suggested that human 
performance on early learning trials is not generally captured by models using the delta 
rule or those based on the Rescorla-Wagner rule. Kruschke and Bradley (1995) have 
suggested that short-term memory processes or strategic guessing mechanisms, not 
generally represented by connectionist models of category learning, may play a role during 
early trials. 
Without such processes it seems difficult to imagine how models such as ADIT or 
the RATM model presented here could possibly represent the early performance levels of 
human participants. Given that participants only see the rare category members once in the 
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first block, there is no way in which evidence capable of raising response probabilities 
above chance (0.25) can exist in this simple model, in the first block. 
As discussed above, the main focus of this simulation is to investigate whether the 
RATM model might show the inverse base-rate effect. The human data reported by 
Kruschke (ibid. p. 6) is shown in table 7.3. It shows the mean choice proportions for the 
various sets of transfer stimuli. These figures were produced by averaging performance on 
each transfer trial across all participants. These averages are then collapsed across the 
different types of trial given in the table. So, for example, the choice proportions for C 
given for the symptom I in table 7.3 refer to average of p(C1111) and p(C2112) and those 
for CO for symptom I refer to the average of p(C2111) and p(C1112). There were two 
values for each transfer stimuli, for each participant, and so averaging was across these two 
trials for each simulation. 
choice proportions 

































I+PC+PRo 0.719 0.036 0.036 0.210 
Table 7.3: Experimental mean choice proportions for the transfer stimuli for the 56 
participants in Kruschke’s, 1996a, experiment 1 (p. 6). I = imperfect predictor for the two 
diseases, PC = perfect predictor for the common disease, PR = perfect predictor for the rare 
disease; C = common disease, R = rare disease, CO = the other common disease, and Ro = 
the other rare disease. 
Kruschke noted a strong inverse base-rate effect for the PC + PR and PC + PRO 
transfer stimuli which, it can be seen, is shown by the simulation results in table 7.4. In 
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both cases, the disease associated with the rare symptom has a higher mean choice 
probability than the disease associated with the common symptom. 
A small base-rate consistency was also noted for the I + PC + PR transfer stimuli 
(ibid.). This effect was amplified for the I + PC + PRO stimuli. Again, a similar pattern of 
choice probabilities is shown by the RATM model. 
Comparison of the two tables illustrates that there is a fairly good qualitative fit of 
the simulation data to the experimental data with all of the first and second ranked choice 
proportions being accurately represented by the model. While some of the differences are 
somewhat attenuated in the model relative to the human data, it does indicate that the 
model would appear to be capable of reliably demonstrating the effects of interest. 
Some of the differences between choice proportions may be increased by 
increasing the decision gain or the associative weight learning rate. Other differences are 
inevitable consequences of the architecture. The fact that the model’s choice probability 
for the common diseases when presented with PC is less than p(R) when presented with 
PR, is a case in point. This is also characteristic of ADIT (Kruschke, 1996% p. 17) and 
occurs because the common disease is predicted using configural information such that 
associative strength is distributed across several weights. This is not the case for the rare 
disease where the PR cue is responsible for almost all of the associative strength of the 
model with respect to the rare disease. 
Factors which may affect the ability of this model to achieve closer fits to the data 
will be discussed in more detail below. Some of these are further highlighted by the 
performance of the model on the next task. 
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choice proportions . -  
Symptoms C R CO Ro 
I 0.555 0.240 0.103 0.103 
PC 0.735 0.077 0.094 0.094 
PR 0.057 0.789 0.077 0.077 
PC+PR 0.254 0.503 0.122 0.122 
I+PC+PR 0.512 0.340 0.074 0.074 
I+PCo 0.301 0.196 0.384 0.118 
I+PRo 0.220 0.157 0.096 0.526 
PC+PRo 0.286 0.107 0.100 0.507 
I+PC+PRo 0.708 0.069 0.059 0.163 
Table 7.4: Mean choice proportions for the RATM model on the transfer stimuli for 
Kruschke, 1996a, experiment 1 .  
7.1.2 Base-rate neglect 
As discussed in section 3.3.5.3, Kruschke (1996a) suggested that the same 
principles could be used to offer explanations of the inverse base-rate effect and the base- 
rate neglect noted by Gluck and Bower (1 988a). He suggested that in base-rate neglect the 
normatively irrelevant feature is infrequent (relative to ther features) for the common 
category. As such, it is not as likely to be ‘committed’ to its prediction as the more 
commonly associated features. When the rare category occurs, this feature, being relatively 
uncommitted to the common category, may be associated with the rare category 
(Kruschke, 1996a). 
The experiment that is simulated here is a variant of the previous experiment. In 
this variant Kruschke was trying to show that the inverse base-rate effect and base-rate 
neglect would be displayed within a single experimental structure (ibid. experiment 3). 
Table 7.5 shows the abstract structure of the experiment. 
The experiment is divided into two substructures. The top half of table 7.5 shows 
the substructure designed to investigate base-rate neglect. As can be seen the third 
symptom set includes the symptom PRn. This means that PRn is not a perfect predictor for 
the rare disease, as now the conditional probabilities p(Cn( PRn) = p(Rn I PRn) = 0.5. As 
with Gluck and Bower’s (1988a) paradigm, however, PRn is still the best available 
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predictor of the rare disease Rn. Base-rate neglect would, therefore, be demonstrated if 
participants chose Rn over other categories when tested with symptom PRn in isolation. 
symptom 
In PCn PRn Ii PCi PRi disease 
1 1 0 0 0 0 Cn 
1 1 0 0 0 0 Cn 
1 1 1 0 0 0 Cn 
1 0 1 0 0 0 Rn 
0 0 0 1 1 0 Ci 
0 0 0 1 1 0 Ci 
0 0 0 1 1 0 Ci 
0 0 0 1 0 1 Ri 
Table 7.5: Abstract design of Kruschke’s (1996a) experiment 3. C = common disease, R = 
rare disease, I = imperfect predictor, PC = perfect predictor for common disease, PR = 
predictor for the rare disease. Note n = base-rate neglect substructure, i = inverse base-rate 
substructure. A value of 1 indicates the presence of the symptom and a zero indicates its 
absence. 
The bottom half of table 7.5 shows the inverse base-rate substructure. This substructure is 
the same as the top or bottom half of table 7.1. 
7.1.2.1. Simulating the experiment 
Due to the similarity of this experimental design with the last one, minimal changes 
were necessary for the RATM model. The only alteration which was necessary was to 
include additional configural nodes to represent the In + PCn + PRn and the PCn + PRn 
configurations contained in the training stimuli. The way in which Kruschke presented the 
stimuli to his participants was somewhat different for this experiment. In this case a single 
block of 21 transfer stimuli was presented to participants after every five blocks of 
training. The parameters used for this simulation were the same as those used in the last 
experiment shown in table 7.2. Again, 30 ‘simulated participants’ were used. 
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7.1.2.2 Training results 
Kruschke noted that his participants, as above, learnt the assignments for the 
common diseases significantly quicker than the rare ones. He also noted that they generally 
learnt the inverse base-rate substructure with fewer errors than the neglect substructure 
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Figure 7.2: Mean probability of correct responding per training block for the RATM model 
on Kruschke’s (1996a) experiment 3. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the learning curves for the RATM model, and qualitatively 
reflects experimental observations. Again, early performance is much worse than that 
reported for humans. The reasons for this are the same as those for the previous simulation. 
The model does display the observed differences in a qualitative fashion, with the neglect 
substructure being learnt with generally higher error probabilities than the inverse base-rate 
structure. 
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7.1.2.3 Performance on transfer stimuli 
Table 7.6 gives the choice proportions of Kruschke’s experimental participants on 
the transfer stimuli presented in the experiment. Transfer blocks were presented after every 
five blocks of training. Kruschke observed that there was no apparent difference in the 
onset times for the various base-rate effects, with both neglect and the inverse effect being 
evident in the first block of transfer data (ibid. p. 9). Consequently he decided to combine 
the data for the three transfer blocks. Table 7.6 thus shows the average across the three 
blocks for his 56 participants. 
Base-rate neglect was noted in the results, with a strong preference for disease Rn 
when presented with the symptom PRn. The inverse base-rate effects observed in the 
previous experiment are repeated in this data. As can be seen there was a marked 
preference for the rare disease Ri when participants were presented with the conflicting 
pair of symptoms PCi + P E .  
As Kruschke points out, however, there is no inverse base-rate effect observed in 
the neglect substructure. When presented with the transfer stimuli PCn + PRn the result 
was a small, but not significant, preference for the disease Cn. It is also notable that 
participants preferred the Ri disease when presented with the PRn + PRi pair of symptoms. 
In addition Kruschke notes that the base-rate consistency effect, with respect to the Ii + 
PCi + PRi stimulus, is much attenuated (and non-significant) compared with its 
manifestation in the previous experiment. Kruschke tentatively attributes this ‘dilution’ to 
the effects of the three-symptom training pattern in the neglect substructure which, he 
suggests, may have predisposed participants to respond to any three symptom stimuli with 
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Table 7.6: Mean choice proportions for participants on transfer trials from Kruschke’s, 
1996% experiment 3. 
Table 7.7 shows the performance of the RATM model averaged across the three 
transfer blocks for each stimulus. The major effects are demonstrated by the model in a 
qualitative fashion when compared with table 7.6. The model displays base-rate neglect 
with respect to symptom PRn and also shows the inverse base-rate effect for the symptom 
combination PCi + PRi. Somewhat unsurprisingly the model does not show the inverse 
base-rate effects for the neglect substructure. It shows a clear preference for the common 
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Table 7.7: Mean choice proportions for the RATM model on transfer trials from 
Kruschke’s, 1996a, experiment 3. 
This preference for the common disease on the PCn + PRn symptom set may be a 
little more clear than the preference shown in the human data in table 7.6. It might be 
suggested that the fact that this preference is very marked for the model is unsurprising in 
that the model has a unique configural representation for this transfer stimulus. During 
training this representation occurs in the context of the In + PCn + PRn symptom set, 
which is diagnostic of the Cn disease. As will be seen below, however, much of this 
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The development of the transition weights for the inverse base-rate effect 
experiment described above (and for inverse-base rate substructure of this experiment) is a 
fairly straightforward process. The charts in figure 7.3 show the average, normalised, 
values of a, for the inverse base-rate substructure of the experiment. These values are 
determined by passing the values of e,, taken at the end of the last training block, through 
a logistic and then normalising them so that values for the same origin sum to unity. The 







Ii + PCi 1 Ii + PRi 
Ii-Ii Ii-PCi PCi-PCi PCi-Ii features li-Ii li-PRi PRi-PRi PRi-Ii 
origin-destination origin-destination 
Thicker stripe is origin feature 
Figure 7.3: Average effective transition weights (qj) at the end of training, normalised 
across each origin component, e.g. Ii-Ii + Ii-PCi = 1. The two charts show the values for 
the two training stimuli Ii + PCi and Ii + P E .  
The difference between this experiment and the Shepard et al. (1961) experiment, 
for this model, is that not all of the transition weights are ‘effective’ for each stimulus 
presented. Figure 7.3 thus shows the effective transition matrix which obtains for the 
model on presentation of the common stimulus set, Ii + PCi, and the matrix which obtains 
on presentation of the rare set, Ii + PRi. These are the approximate average transition 
matrices as they do not take into account the value of T,. This value will be close to unity 
at the point of decision, and so the above figure may represent the transition matrix quite 
well. 
As can be seen the transition matrix for the common disease is quite different to 
that for the rare one. In the Ii + PCi chart the probability of consecutively sampling the 
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same component is quite low, whereas the probability of sampling the other component is 
high. This matrix will strongly support the activation of the configural representation (Ii, 
PCi) and result in the distribution of associative strength suggested by Kruschke's ( I  996a) 
hypothesis. For the rare stimulus, Ii + PRi, the matrix represented in the right hand panel 
indicates that while there will be some sampling of the Ii component, the majority of 
samples are likely to be of the PRi component. For this component there is a chance of 
recurrent sampling, which is generally absent for the irrelevant component. 
For the neglect substructure the situation is different. The approximate transition 
matrices for the three stimuli presented during training are shown in figure 7.4. These 
values are calculated in the same way as those for figure 7.3. 
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Figare 7.4: Average effective transition weights (a,) at the end of training, normalised 
across each origin component, e.g. In-In + In-PCn = I .  The three charts show the values 
for the three training stimuli In + PCn, In + PRn, and In + PCn + PRn. 
306 
The situation is somewhat more complicated for the neglect half of the substructure 
than for the inverse half. The top two charts in figure 7.4 display similar average transition 
matrices. For the In + PCn stimulus similar alternate sampling ofthe two components is 
promoted by the transition matrix. In this case there is a somewhat increased chance of 
consecutive sampling of the PCn cue compared to that shown in the left-hand panel of 
figure 7.3. 
For the rare symptom set, again, the matrix appears to be quite similar. For this 
pattern, the PRn component is likely to be sampled more frequently than the In component. 
There is a somewhat increased chance, however, of consecutive In samples compared with 
that displayed in the inverse substructure. 
The reason for the absence of the inverse base-rate effect from this half of the 
substructure is highlighted by the effective transition matrix which results upon 
presentation of the In + PCn + PRn symptom set, shown in the bottom panel of figure 7.4. 
For this stimulus there is evidence of a high transition weight from the PRn to the PCn 
components. The effect of this is illustrated by the effective, average transition matrices 
which occur in the presence of the transfer stimulus PCn + PRn shown in figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5: Average effective transition weights (a,) at the end of training, normalised 
across each origin component, e.g. PCn-PCn + PCn-PRn = 1. The two charts show the 
values for the transfer stimuli PCn + PRn and PCi + PRi. 
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These values were calculated in the same way as those for figures 7.3 and 7.4. In 
this case it is important to note that if the transition did not occur in training, i.e. the PCi to 
PRi and PRi to PCi transitions, then the value of a,, for this transition was 0.5. 
For the PCn + PRn stimulus, all of the transitions shown occur in training within 
the In + PCn + PRn symptom set. As can be seen, for this stimulus there are high 
probabilities of recurrent sampling of the PCn symptom. The PRn symptom shows a 
pattern whereby its sampling is most likely to be followed by sampling of the PCn 
component. 
During presentation of the In + PCn + PRn symptom set, sampling of PRn, with its 
associative connection with the Rn disease, is likely to considerably increase error, this 
will result in transition weights leading to PRn being reduced. This relationship does not 
always hold for the In to PRn weight, as during presentation of the rare symptom set, 
sampling PRn is likely to decrease error. It is, however, alw’ays true for PCn symptom. 
Similarly, during presentation of the In + PCn + PRn symptom set, transitions from 
PRn to PCn are likely to lead to reductions in the overall error, consequently the transition 
weight between these two components is likely to increase. The result is, as shown in 
figure 7.5, a matrix for PCn + PRn which is likely to promote high levels of activation for 
the PCn component and low levels of activation in the PRn component. Activation of the 
(PCn, PRn) configuration is likely to be fairly low. Thus the lack of an inverse base-rate 
effect for this substructure is not, principally, a function of the presence of a configural cue 
(although some contribution is likely to occur). The fact that the choice proportion for the 
Rn disease is quite a bit higher than that given in the experimental data, shown in table 7.6, 
may be a problem for the model as it would appear to be a fairly robust characteristic of 
the way in which learning and representation operates. Further investigation of the model 
and the experiment may be indicated to determine the importance of this characteristic. 
In the inverse base-rate effect substructure, the matrix of transition weights is as 
might be expected. While there is no development of transition weights between the PCi 
and PRi components during training, the PCi to PCi weight is likely to be very low as 
indicated by the left-hand panel of figure 7.3. If this value is considerably less than zero, 
then when normalised along with the ‘blank’ transition weight for PCi to PRi, it will retain 
a low value and thus promote PCi to PRi transitions. The indication from this chart, is that 
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the PRi to PRi transition weight does not appear to acquire, on average, much in the way of 
a positive value. It would appear to be approximately equal to the ‘blank’ weight. This is 
enough to allow its activation to exceed that of the PCi component and, taking into account 
the larger size of its associative weights (as indicated by performance on the PCi and PRi 
transfer stimuli), thus facilitate the inverse base-rate effect. 
Despite the general attenuation by the model of most of the ‘preferences’ given in 
table 7.6, there is a qualitative match by the model to the human data on all of the 
individual transfer stimuli. For all stimuli, the largest choice proportions are the same and, 
for most of the transfer stimuli, the second ‘choices’ of the model are also the same. 
The model does appear to experience some difficulties with regards to the 
prediction of levels of differences between the choice proportions, both on this task and on 
the ‘pure’ inverse base-rate investigation described above. Some of these difficulties may 
be ameliorated by suitable parameter settings, but others may be more persistent functions 
of the architecture itself. 
The choice probabilities for diseases in the other substructure when tested on 
single-symptom transfer stimuli are fairly high. In some cases these exceed the choice 
probabilities for the other disease in the same substructure. Although the differences 
between many of these ‘improbable’ choice proportions are unlikely to be significant for 
the human data, the pattern displayed by the model is indicative of a potential problem for 
the model. 
One of the principal reasons for this pattern and, to a great extent, the attenuation of 
the size of differences in choice probabilities, is the reliance of the model on inhibitory 
associative weights. Symptoms are always negatively correlated with the presence of 
diseases from the other substructure. Ri never occurs in the presence of PCn, during 
training, for example. In this case there is likely to be some development of negative 
weights between, for example PCn and Ri and PCn and Ci. When In is subsequently 
presented in isolation as a transfer pattern, the ‘loss’ of these negative weights from PCn 
will enhance the probabilities of Ri and Ci selections. 
In fact, being the most frequent symptoms, In and Ii in this model are likely to play 
a significant role in ‘deciding’ which ‘half of the structure is most likely. Its absence from 
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a transfer stimulus will therefore result in increased uncertainty about which half of the 
structure a disease is likely to belong in. 
7.2 General discussion 
Despite the shortcomings described above, the fact that the model can display the 
desired base-rate effects on transfer stimuli is somewhat encouraging for the RATM model 
and the sequential sampling model of representation. Significantly, there does not appear 
to be any single model capable of reproducing the order of learning difficulty for the 
Shepard et al. (1961) tasks and displaying base-rate neglect and the inverse base-rate 
effect. It may, of course, be argued that the differences between the model used on these 
tasks and the model described in the previous chapter mean that it isn’t a single model at 
all. These differences, particularly the nature of the effective transition matrix under 
condition of error or uncertainty, are representative of an important problem in the 
modelling of categorisation. This issue will be returned to and discussed in more detail at 
the conclusion of this thesis. 
One important component of the models that is the same is the sequential sampling 
model of representation. Models that have been successful with respect to base-rate effects 
have not used the exemplar model of representation, tending instead to employ component 
cue representations. These representations are, of course, not capable of modelling learning 
of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. 
Whether the shortcomings of the RATM model described here could be 
ameliorated by a more concerted effort to optimise the parameters of the model awaits 
further research. It may be the case that more processes may have to be taken into account, 
in order to provide a comprehensive description of the learning and transfer effects 
observed. Investigation of the nature of these ‘extra’ processes is likely to require further 
experimentation to allow models with sufficient generality to be developed. 
Despite the success of models such as ADIT (Kruschke, 1996a) and EXIT 
(Kruschke, in press a and b) in modelling the base-rate effects described above, their 
dependence on a component cue form of representation provides an obvious limitation to 
the approach. The experiments to which models such as ADIT and EXIT have been 
applied only involve the learning of category structures which do not require configural 
representations. 
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It seems unlikely that the effects that are well represented by ADIT and EXIT are 
confined to the types of experiments to which these models are actually restricted. Whether 
base rate-effects, such as those described above, may be displayed for category structures 
which actually need configural representations is something which requires further 
research. If the effects are observable, using stimuli which involve different numbers of 
components, then the RATM approach would appear to be the only model which can begin 
to represent them. 
7.2.1 Kruschke’s theory on base-rates and order effects 
The RATM model may be described as an alternative method of formalising 
Kruschke’s (1996a) theory regarding the role of base-rates in category learning (see 
section 3.3.5.3). This theory relies heavily on the order in which examples of the common 
and rare categories are presented. This reliance extends to both ADIT and the RATM 
model. The base-rates actually used in Kruschke’s (1 996a) experiments mean that, 
generally, members of the common categories are presented prior to members of the rare 
category. The inverse base-rate effect occurs, according to the theory, because people learn 
to predict the rare category in terms of the rare feature or symptom in isolation and the 
common category in terms of the common and irrelevant symptoms in conjunction. 
The isolation of the rare component occurs because, even though the rare symptom 
is always presented alongside the irrelevant symptom, the irrelevant symptom has 
generally been committed to predicting the common disease. With ADIT, EXIT, and with 
the RATM model, the only way in which this effect can occur is if the common disease is 
presented prior to the rare one. 
If the rare disease is presented first, then the irrelevant symptom will have equal 
associative strength to the rare symptom, with respect to the rare disease. Subsequent 
presentation of the common disease will result in ‘attention’ shifting away from the 
irrelevant symptom, such that more associative strength is allocated to the common 
symptom. One might expect, under these circumstances, to see some reversal of the 
inverse base-rate effect. The irrelevant symptom may, at transfer, result in predictions of 
the rare disease and the rare + common transfer stimulus may result in a common disease 
diagnosis. 
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This is certainly the case with the RATM model. ‘Simulated participants’ tend to 
display this reverse pattern when the rare disease is presented prior to the common one in 
training. Because the common disease is more likely to be presented before the rare 
disease, the average response probabilities, across simulated participants, display the 
inverse base-rate effect. 
Kruschke (1996a) did not discuss whether the precise order of stimulus 
presentation in the first block, for his human participants, was related to subsequent 
manifestation of the base-rate effects at transfer. It would appear, however, to be 
something of interest, as both his theoretical account, and the ADIT model, predict that 
some relationship will exist. Kruschke has addressed this issue, to some extent, in a recent 
experiment which indicates that the inverse-base rate effect is preserved despite the 
introduction of a later training phase in which the base-rates of categories are reversed 
(Kruschke, in press b). Further experiments may be required, however, to determine 
whether base-rate effects are built into knowledge as early in training as suggested by 
attention shift models. 
7.2.2 Time-scale of learning: how rapid is rapid? 
ADIT and the RATM model are actually suggesting a lot more about why base-rate 
effects occur than is described by Kruschke’s (1996a) theory about the role of base-rates in 
learning. These models provide a framework in which Kruschke’s broad assertions about 
the role of base-rates may be seen as valid. 
In the rapid attention shift models, learning is represented as a two-stage process in 
which associative weights between representations and outcomes are alteredfollowing a 
period of evaluation of the contribution of each representation to the outcome. Kruschke’s 
theory cannot be currently modelled unless this two-stage model of the learning process is 
implemented. 
The base-rate experiments described above, and the Medin and Edelson (1988) 
experiments on which these were based, all involved participants being allowed some 
fairly lengthy post-response exposure to both feedback and stimulus. As such, the two- 
stage model of learning, implied by rapid attention shift models, is not really being 
adequately tested by these experiments. 
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One might provide a more specific test for the models by varying the period of co- 
presentation of stimulus and feedback. The models would predict that removing the 
opportunity for this attention shift to occur might also remove the base-rate effects. Many 
experimental paradigms in associative learning research involve no co-presentation of 
stimulus and feedback the stimulus is removed prior to feedback being presented (e.g. 
Pearce and Redhead, 1993). Single-stage associative learning models are often adequate to 
account for the learning effects noted in these experiments. Their success implies that 
some form of memory exists for the stimulus, allowing learning to be described ‘as i f  the 
stimulus was actually still ‘activating’ the representations between stimulus and response. 
This may leave room for the two-stage models, such as the RATM model presented 
here, to suggest that the attention shift process may operate on similarly activated 
representations. As such, actually testing the two-stage theory may require more 
sophisticated procedures, such as the use of masking stimuli following stimulus offset. 
The representation of learning as a two-stage process in models like the RATM and 
ADIT is actually fairly crude. There is no specific commitment, for example, to describing 
how long the attention shift phase lasts before associative weights are updated. It may be 
the case that this duration is dependent on some criterion of ‘error minimisation’ but, in 
this case, it seems difficult for the model to be able to identify exactly when error had been 
minimised. A criterion-based representation of the process may have to suggest that the 
onset of associative weight modification may be a stochastic process dependent on the rate 
at which error was being reduced by the attention shift process. In this scenario, as the rate 
of error reduction decreases, the probability that the associative weights will be updated 
increases. Whether this halts the attention learning process or not, would require further 
research and specification. 
The assumption of the rapid attention shift models is that associative learning may 
be described as the last thing to happen before the next stimulus is presented. This, for a 
situation in which the inter-stimulus interval is restricted in some way, is suggestive of a 
model whereby the presentation of another stimulus halts the attention learning process 
and is followed by associative learning about the previous stimulus. The post-response 
time c o m e  of learning is something that is comparatively under-researched but, given the 
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development of theories and models which propose some structure for this phase, this may 
have to change. 
7.2.3 Pre-response processes 
The requirement for apost-response attention shift as the key to establishing the 
conditions for the manifestation of the inverse base-rate effect may not be essential. While 
some form of attention shift seems justified, when this shift occurs is not necessarily 
accounted for by the data. It may be possible that at least some of the shift takes place 
before the response is made. 
The high average choice probability (see section 7.1.1.3) for the rare disease, upon 
initial presentation of the rare symptom set, suggests that some pre-response process is in 
operation, at least for these trials. Kruschke and Erickson (1995), and Kruschke and 
Bradley (1995), suggested that this probability, not predicted by ADIT, EXIT, or the 
RATM model, might be the result of some process of ‘strategic guessing’. 
Strategic guessing, also known as ‘eliminative inference’ (Juslin, Wennerholm, & 
Winman, in press), is, it may be argued, deployed by participants when faced with a novel 
stimulus. The response to an unfamiliar stimulus is to select an unfamiliar response 
(Kruschke, in press b). Whatever this process involves, it appears to enable participants to 
ignore the evidence in favour of the common disease being provided by the presence of the 
irrelevant symptom. As such, at least some of the enhancement of the rare disease’s 
probability of selection may be accounted for by a shift of attention towards the novel 
symptom and away from the familiar, irrelevant one. 
Why this shift should occur, and how it might be represented in a connectionist 
network such as the RATM model, is open to question. The fact that response probabilities 
for the unfamiliar diseases are elevated to a level far beyond the chance level given by 
totally ignoring the familiar stimulus, implies that attention shifting cannot be solely 
responsible for performance. It would appear that familiar categories are being actively 
eliminated from consideration by the decision process. The data, however, does not allow 
one to say that such an attention shift does not occur before the response is made. 
As discussed above, the ability of models to represent the inverse base-rate effect is 
highly dependent on the rare stimulus being initially presented after instances of the 
common disease. The fact that these are precisely the conditions which give rise to a pre- 
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response process of ‘strategic guessing’ means that it is very difficult to say whether the 
conditions which are responsible for the subsequent manifestation of the inverse base-rate 
effect emerge purely as a result of post-response rapid attention shifts. More specific 
experiments are clearly required in order to clarify the nature of both processes. 
7.2.4 Summary 
Despite the success of the RATM model in being able to represent base-rate 
effects, important questions about the RATM approach to the study of category learning 
await attention. The question raised at the start of this discussion, regarding whether the 
RATM model used in this chapter and that used in the last may be described as the same 
model, is among the most important of these questions. 
The somewhat speculative adjustments made to the learning algorithms for the 
model in this chapter, in order to ‘scale it up’ to a four-category structure, represent one 
difference. This version would, however, scale back down to a two-category model in a 
way which would, in fact, leave it identical to the RATM model presented in chapter 6. 
The most important difference between the two models, as suggested at the start of 
this discussion, is the removal, from the model presented in this chapter, of the influence of 
decision uncertainty, or error, from the transition matrix of the sampling system. 
The role of this feedback in the representation of the Shepard et al. (196 1) task 
difficulties was to enhance the rate of activation of configural representations. This 
appeared to be required by the model in order to represent early learning rates. As 
discussed in section 7.1.1.1.1, however, enhancing configural activation would prevent the 
model liom being able to represent the base-rate data described in this chapter. Despite the 
mixed success of the enhancement strategy in relation to the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks, 
removing the feedback from the model used in chapter 6 is likely to seriously affect early 
performance of the model on category structures which require configural representations. 
The nature of the process required for representation of the base-rate effects is also 
likely to seriously impair learning of rule-plus exception tasks such as the type V structure. 
In this case, the attention process is likely to result in a drastic shift of attention away from 
the ‘rule’ dimension in the presence of an exception. This will not allow the activation of 
the three-dimensional representations required to distinguish the exception members of the 
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categories from the rule-conforming members and will thus severely attenuate learning of 
these tasks. 
As such, it would appear that the shift of attention to error-reducing input 
components, required to establish the inverse base-rate effect, may not, for some reason, be 
operating in the same way for learning of the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks. While the model 
uses the same form of representation and equivalent learning algorithms to represent the 
data from the two paradigms, it would seem that some differences between the nature of 
the models required to represent these tasks still need to be addressed. 
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C h s  
Many specific issues regarding the relative merits and shortcomings of the 
approaches to modelling described in this thesis have been discussed in the previous 
chapters. A number of these issues have suggested avenues for further research, which are 
described in the conclusions of the various chapters. This concluding chapter is, therefore, 
concerned with evaluating the extent to which the goals of the thesis, outlined in chapter 1, 
have been addressed. It concludes with a section concerning how the research carried out 
in this thesis may indicate alternative approaches to other modelling issues in category 
learning research. 
8.1 Goals of the thesis 
This thesis has attempted to address a problem, outlined in chapter 1, with current 
connectionist models of category learning. The problem was described in terms of an 
apparent ‘division’ that has emerged in category learning research. This division may be 
characterised as being between the kinds of experiments which can be modelled using 
exemplar-based stimulus representations, and the kinds of experiments that cannot. 
The nature of this division does not appear to have any basis in a coherent 
psychological theory. Experiments which can be modelled using exemplar representations 
are those in which all of the stimuli being learnt about have the same number of 
dimensions or components. Where the stimulus set includes stimuli with different numbers 
of components, other forms of representation, such as the configural-cue representation, 
are required. 
The difficulty appears to work both ways in that data from certain experiments to 
which exemplar-based models have been applied cannot be simulated by models which use 
a different form of representation. The difficulty here would appear to be of a different 
nature to that faced by exemplar models with stimuli with different dimensionality. 
The problem with the exemplar models is that they lack any principled way of 
offering any explanations for certain experiments involving stimuli varying in terms of 
their dimensionality. They lack the capacity to perform certain tasks, which are 
straightforward for models such as the configural-cue model. 
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The problem with the configural-cue form of representation is that, while it can 
cany out many of the tasks to which exemplar models have been applied, its predictions 
regarding certain aspects of the experimental data are erroneous. This would suggest that it 
would be easier to alter models using the configural-cue form of representation to allow 
them to make similar predictions to the exemplar nehvork models, than it would be to alter 
the exemplar models to allow them to perform tasks which are basic for the configural-cue 
model. 
By taking as its ‘starting point’ the modelling of the subjective difficulty of the 
Shepard et al. (1961) category learning tasks, the research reported here attempted to 
address one of the major shortcomings of models making use of the configural-cue form of 
representation. As discussed by Shepard et al. (1961), and described in chapter 2, the task 
difficulties seem to be related to the number of dimensional values required, before 
sufficient information to predict the category membership of all stimuli is available. This 
index of difficulty is not really represented by the basic configural-cue model, which will 
learn tasks at a rate that is a function of the quantity, frequency and validity of its 
representations with respect to a task. 
While the configural-cue network has all of the information it requires to learn each 
task, it does not appear to use it in a way that reflects human performance. In order for the 
exemplar or stimulus generalisation approach to simulate the performance advantage that 
would accrue for category structures with irrelevant dimensions, Shepard et al. (1961) 
identified a requirement for some form of selective attention process (see section 2.3.2). 
This requirement would appear to apply equally to the configural-cue representation. 
In chapters 5 and 6, several models based on the configural-cue form of 
representation, but incorporating ‘selective’ attention processes, were developed. These 
models all appear to provide qualitative fits to the learning curves reported by Nosofsky et 
al. (1994) that are superior to the variants of the configural-cue model tested by these 
authors. 
The relative merits and shortcomings of these different models are discussed in 
detail in chapters 5 and 6. The most promising of the models, however, appear to be the 
dimensional attention models described in chapter 6. While the modular approaches in 
chapter 5 were able to represent the data, providing them with the ability to do SO would 
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appear to have resulted in the loss of some important aspects of the functionality of the 
basic configural-cue network (section 5.3). 
The dimensional attention models involved the use of a novel conceptualisation of 
the configural-cue representation as being dependent on the operation of a sequential 
dimensional sampling process. While this conceptualisation remains somewhat 
speculative, it does appear to allow selective attention to be implemented using the 
representation, without obviously losing any of the functionality of the basic model with 
respect to simple associative learning tasks. This generalisability is particularly true of the 
ATM and RATM approaches. 
These models would appear, for, example, to be able to offer simulations of 
blocking, transfer from compounds to components, transfer from components to 
compounds and be able to learn compound-component discriminations in more or less the 
same way as the basic configural-cue network. Further research with the models would 
appear to be warranted to investigate in more detail their applicability to these associative 
learning tasks. 
The ATM and RATM models might also be able to offer similar predictions to 
exemplar models such as ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) and its variants regarding the data 
that these models have successfully simulated. Although the exemplar models obviously 
have a superior ability, to the models presented in this thesis, to simulate learning about 
stimuli varying in terms of continuous dimensions, it may be possible to apply adaptations 
to the form of representation used. 
One possibility would be the ‘consequential region’ approach proposed by Shanks 
and Gluck (1994) (section 3.2.2.4). More research into the applicability of this approach to 
the sequential sampling model is required to establish whether incorporating the 
dimensional attention processes developed here can extend the functionality of the 
consequential region model. 
As discussed in section 3.2.2.4, the configural-cue representation may offer a 
conceptually preferable account of generalisation between readily discriminable feature- 
based stimuli such as those used by Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994), 
described in section 2.2. The sequential sampling model also offers an account of why 
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learning gets harder as the number of dimensions required increases. As suggested in 
section 4.2.2.1, the frequency or arity of the representations alone does not predict this rate. 
Exemplar models such as ALCOVE and the GCM appeal to the idea of limited 
capacity, in relation to specificity or discriminability, to simulate the full effects of the 
number of relevant dimensions on learning rate (Nosofsky, 1984, Nosofsky et al. 1994, p. 
366). Exemplar models imply that the rate at which objects themselves get confused for 
one another increases as a function of the number of dimensions one has to simultaneously 
pay attention to. The sequential sampling model’s account of this increment in difficulty is 
expressed in terms of the fact that the conditions required for the activation of high 
dimensionality representations are less probable than those for lower dimensionality 
representations. Whether this model is generalisable to tasks involving higher 
dimensionality discriminations remains an area for future research. 
The RATM approach, in section 6.3 and chapter 7, appears to show particular 
promise in relation to its generalisability to other tasks. Incorporating, as it does, a rapid 
attention shift process, it would appear to possess similar functionality to other rapid 
attention shift models such as EXIT (Kruschke, in press a and b) and RASHNL (Kruschke 
& Johansen, 1999). In addition, it is perhaps unique amongst connectionist models of 
category learning in being potentially able to simulate experiments involving variable 
dimensionality stimuli, where selective attention and configural representations appear to 
be necessary. The fact that the RATM model is capable of offering predictions about 
experiments which involve all of these issues simultaneously, provides an obvious point of 
contrast between it and other connectionist models which may be worth further 
examination. 
8.2 Further implications: attention ‘strategies’ 
As was discussed in section 3.2.4, it would appear that the way in which 
generalisation operates is strongly dependent on the tasks in which it is used. As discussed 
in this section, Tversky (1977) proposed that generalisation may be a flexible process, 
implemented in ways that take into account different, context dependent, relationships 
between stimuli and their components. 
It was proposed (section 3.2.4) that selective attention processes may be 
conceptualised as processes that ‘control’ the way in which generalisation takes place. 
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Many models, including those presented in this thesis, represent this control in terms of a 
variation in the influence of particular aspects of stimuli on learning and decision 
processes. 
While the models developed in this thesis appear to offer a way of addressing the 
representational issues outlined in chapter 1, their development and application to different 
tasks has highlighted a potential inadequacy with respect to their representation of the 
apparent flexibility of attentional processes. This was exemplified by the differences, in the 
role of error in the determination of the effective transition matrix, between the RATM 
model presented in section 6.3 and the variant used in chapter 7. 
For simulating the Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994) data, there 
appeared to be some requirement for the model to ‘respond’ to uncertainty or error by 
increasing configural activation and associability. For establishing the conditions under 
which a model will display the inverse base-rate effect, a different response to error or 
uncertainty seems to be needed. In this case the response to error is to reduce the activation 
and associability of representations which contribute to error, and increase the activation 
and associability of representations which reduce error. 
One important point, which has emerged, is that it is not necessary to suggest that 
different forms of stimulus representation mediate the learning of these tasks. 
The success of models such as ADIT and EXIT in modelling the base-rate effects 
described in chapter 7, is dependent on them making use of a particular method of 
implementing selective attention, using a component cue form of representation. While this 
may suggest that these tasks are learnt in terms of the component cues involved in the 
stimuli, it has been demonstrated here that there is no need to suggest that configural 
representations are absent from the system which is learning the task. Indeed, there is no 
plausible psychological theory which may account for why representation of the stimuli in 
these particular tasks is restricted to just the individual stimulus components. 
The fact that these component cue models succeed, indicates that whatever system 
does underlie the manifestation of the inverse base-rate effect, it does not make use of 
configural representations in a way which can be described by the basic configural-cue 
model. One might suggest that the real challenge posed by this experiment is to account for 
the manifestation of the inverse base-rate effect, given that people are capable of 
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configurally representing the stimuli involved. By eliminating these forms of 
representation from models such as EXIT and ADIT, the task of modelling things like the 
inverse base-rate effect is, arguably, made considerably easier. EXIT and ADIT have no 
choice but to use only component cue representations of the stimuli. 
Other than the differences between representations used in previously successful 
models, there is no principled reason to suggest that completely different forms of 
representation underlie performance on the Shepard et al. (1961) tasks and the base-rate 
tasks. There does, however, appear to be a difference in terms of the way in which stimulus 
representations are used in the two tasks. One may describe these different uses of the 
information afforded by stimuli as representing different processing ‘strategies’. While 
certain theorists have suggested a distinction between ‘elemental’ and ‘configural’ 
processing strategies (Williams, Sagness, & McPhee, 1994, Shanks et al., 1998), the 
justification for this distinction is generally in terms of the capabilities of extant models 
using elemental (component cue) and configural representations to simulate the data 
reported in different experiments. 
This simple dichotomy supports assertions that some tasks are best modelled in 
terms of component cue representations, whereas others may be best simulated using 
configural or exemplar representations. The apparent necessity, however, to include 
selective attention processes in models of associative and category learning, makes the 
distinction between these two types of strategy, as being indicative of different forms of 
representation, hard to justify. 
Selective attention would appear to allow exemplar representations to ‘change’ into 
representations of just one or more of the components of the exemplar (sections 3.3.3.1 and 
3.3.3.2.2). Configural-cue representations, such as those used in the ASP, ATM, and 
RATM models, similarly allow flexibility in terms of the dimensionality of the 
representations which are actually being associated with outcomes. It may be just as 
appropriate to suggest that different strategies are supported by a process of attention, 
which operates on the same form of representation to ‘allow’ it to behave in different 
ways. As such, differences in apparent strategies being used in different experiments may 
be describable in terms of the different ways in which attention operates on stimulus 
representations, within the context of the experiment. 
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This still leaves the considerable problem of developing models that are capable of 
simulating the wide variety of strategies that are, apparently, used by people in the 
performance of category learning tasks. 
The RATM model may be described as capturing the differences in the two 
strategies that appear to be involved in the two types of task modelled in this thesis, in 
terms of the contribution of error and uncertainty to the determination of the ongoing 
sampling transition matrix. One might control this contribution using a single parameter to 
multiply the contribution, prior to its inclusion in the transition matrix. To ‘fit’ the data for 
the base-rate experiments, one could set this parameter to zero and set it to a higher value 
to enable a fit to the Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994) data. 
Without some theory as to why this parameter should vary between the two tasks, 
little is gained fiom this approach, other than the knowledge that the stimulus 
representations are used differently by the model for the different tasks. In addition, the 
flexibility with which stimulus information is used in learning is unlikely to be 
representable in terms of this single degree of freedom. 
Whether it is appropriate to address the differences between other connectionist 
models in terms of their being representative of some difference in attentional strategy is, 
at this point, uncertain. If, as suggested above, selective attention may be describable in 
terms of a flexible process of control over the way in which representations are used in 
learning, it might be possible for an appropriate selective attention scheme to ‘emulate’ 
other models and, consequently, their performance characteristics. 
For this approach to be applied further, considerably more sophisticated models of 
attention processes would appear to be required. It would appear from the research 
presented here, and the review of models and research presented in chapter 3, that different 
strategies may operate for different tasks. In addition, for some tasks, it would appear that 
people might use information about stimuli in different ways within the same task. A good 
example of this is provided by the learning of low frequency exceptions to single 
dimensional rules as described in section 3.3.4.2. The data from this type of experiment is 
particularly difficult to simulate using dimensional attention models. As was described in 
section 6.4.1.2, this difficulty is inherited by the dimensional attention models developed 
in this thesis. 
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It is also almost certainly the case that there are differences between the strategies 
employed on the same tasks by different people (Shanks et al. 1998, Nosofsky, Palmeri, & 
McKinley, 1994). Models attempting to simulate, in a general way, associative and 
category learning processes ought, therefore, to incorporate sufficient flexibility to account 
for th~s ource of performance variation. 
Because there has been a tendency in category learning research to simulate 
different data using different models, often incorporating different models of stimulus 
representation, there has been little in the way of research directed at identifylng why 
different models appear to be required in the first place. Despite the, often considerable, 
differences between the models used to simulate different category and associative 
learning experiments, the differences between the stimuli used in these experiments are not 
generally sufficient to justify an assertion that stimuli are represented differently as a 
function of the experiment. 
It would appear, therefore, to be a sensible avenue for future research to explore 
what it is about the different tasks, which suggests that stimulus information is used 
differently. What is it about different tasks, which suggests that different representations 
are being used? This would seem to require experiments capable of identifying the kind of 
variation in task characteristics that informs the way in which selective attention operates 
in a particular task, or in response to a particular stimulus. 
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